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There is little doubt that development policy is in the process of substantial reappraisal. It is 
increasingly recognised within the major development organisations and banks that problems 
of poverty, growth and governance are not so easily resolved simply by the introduction of 
markets or by policy or institutional reforms, including recent emphasis on the construction 
of ‘good governance’.  In particular, policy makers are struggling with the question of what 
to do with governments that appear to lack any political will to engage the reform process 
and are themselves resistant to attempts to introduce ‘good governance’. They also confront 
indifference or even hostility to reform from less powerful elements of society that might be 
expected to embrace reforms aimed at eliminating corruption, political repression and 
incompetent governance.  
 
One response to these is that institutional and policy reforms have not gone far enough or 
have been badly designed and sequenced. In particular, the World Bank has been concerned 
with the design of increasingly targeted institutional reform aimed at reshaping the behaviour 
of individuals. Increasingly though, more attention is being focused on the way broader 
political factors influence and constrain reform. Calls for a new political economy approach 
to development have emphasised the importance of understanding the architecture of 
economic and political power and how various interests attempt to shape the direction of 
change. Such an understanding, it is thought, might enable policies that can mobilise 
potentially progressive groups and interests behind the reform agenda. Such initiatives have 
been pioneered by the British Department for International Development (DFID) through it 
work on ‘drivers of change’ and by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
with its focus on ‘power analysis’. More recently the World Bank itself and the Australian 
Aid Agency (AusAID) have begun to look at ways of increasing the ‘demand for 




However, recognising that politics plays an important part in shaping and constraining the 
options for policy makers in the development field has proven much easier than 
accommodating or harnessing these processes in practical policy agendas. Increasing 
attention is being paid to the question of how and whether politics can be incorporated into 
the design of development policy. This study pulls this debate together and builds on it, 
introducing some new perspectives and questions. In particular, we ask two main questions: 
Does this awareness of political economy represent a genuinely new way of understanding 
politics and society and how conflicts over power influence the development process? Has 
political economy been successfully incorporated into new policy frameworks and opened 
the door to new ways of thinking about development policy? One central aspect of our study 
is that the development debate is not one between political economy approaches and those 
that emphasise market and institutional reform. Rather, we argue that institutional and policy 
approaches have always embodied implicit notions of politics and the real conflict is between 
different understandings of political economy and the nature of good policy, good institutions 
and good governance.  
 
Most important, we bring to these attempts at using political economy a new way of looking 
at the problem. Rather than focusing on actors or even groups as the key aspects of the 
problem, our approach is focused on the networks and relationships within which they are 
situated and which define the allocation of power and wealth. Local policies and practices, 
and partner governments may be embedded in relationships of power that depend upon forms 
of governance different to those being proposed. For example, it may be pointless to try to 
mobilise peasant farmers within new forms of agrarian governance where they are beholden 
to specific elites for finance or land in a network of relationships that require opaque and 
corrupt forms of governance. To an important extent, the governance problem is therefore re-
defined from one that addresses immediate aspects of efficiency, transparency and 
accountability in a generic sense towards one that addresses reorganisation of networks and 
relationships in the direction of reform.  
    
This policy monograph is structured along the following lines. 
Setting the scene for the study, Wil Hout asks in the first chapter how the major 
development agencies have attempted to construct political economy approaches to the 
development problem. He identifies three main models. These include the Drivers of Change 
Approach developed by DFID in the UK, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis 
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of the Ministry of Development Cooperation in the Netherlands and the Problem Driven 
Governance and Political Economy Analysis of the World Bank. The central question is not 
only to specify how these approaches differ but whether they have really been the basis of 
new policy or an attempt to introduce new strategies into old paradigms. Thus, Hout looks at 
how political economy approaches have collided with or been reconciled with existing policy 
paradigms. 
 
These themes are extended in the second chapter where Richard Robison seeks to identify 
different ways in which the problem of politics is understood and how these shape the 
practical strategic objectives of the major development agencies and banks. Three main 
models are identified. It is argued that the World Bank and most development agencies in the 
West see the political problem as one of domesticating the naturally predatory nature of 
politics within more rational forms of technical and managerial authority. A second and 
influential theme emerging from classical liberal traditions assumes a naturally vibrant and 
entrepreneurial civil society that requires its liberation from the constraints of centralised 
state power and vested interest, and favours the recruitment of progressive forces to support 
development agendas. A third view, drawing on the critical political tradition, proposes that 
the political resistance to open markets and governance often comes from governments and 
elites that are themselves the product of more intensive and global, economic and political 
relationships. This presents special problems for reformers as we shall see.   
 
In Chapter Three it is proposed that the options of development policy-makers and 
practitioners must be understood in the context of dynamics at work in the donor countries 
themselves. It is argued that preferences for specific geo-political and investment outcomes 
and pressures to measure and report success in terms of quantitative assessments that relate to 
fiduciary objectives can collide with other development priorities.     
 
How can the questions and issues raised in these first two chapters be used to understand how 
different development agendas work in practice? In chapter four, Caroline Hughes and Jane 
Hutchison examine the way policies are operationalized, specifically the way strategies of 
ownership and participation are diverted and transformed by the realities of power and 
interest. In particular, they build a way of understanding the real political nature of reformist 




At the core of this study, we investigate four case studies. These constitute chapters five, six, 
seven and eight. They include a study of the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance 
Programme in Cambodia (Hughes); the Asian Development Bank’s programme for slum 
eradication and housing for the poor in Manila (Hutchison); Participatory Budgeting in 
Mataram (Mundayat, Hiariej); governance and the reform of the informal street economy in 
Jakarta (Wilson). These are designed to illustrate the operation of political economy in 
governance programmes. In each of the case studies we seek to identify the conditions under 
which local actors are able to form larger coalitions to influence national and international 
centres of authority. Each will assess the way larger networks and relationships of power 
inhibit or enable actors to construct broad reform coalitions. They will draw out larger 
implications for policy reform that emerge from this relational understanding of power. 
 
Chapter eight looks at the question of ‘where to now’ in the context of the previous chapters 
and in relation to the various literatures now devoted to this question. Several main strategies 
are identified. Some strategies involve a withdrawal from attempts to engage with the 
political question. A. Neo-conservative programmes to remove recalcitrant and obstructive 
regimes. B. Neo-conservative programmes to refuse aid to regimes that do not achieve 
specific governance and policy pre-requisites. C. accepting the predatory nature of the local 
political economy and working within it. D avoiding projects that involve difficult issues like 
corruption or governance.  Others seek to engage with the questions of politics in different 
ways. A. By targeting better designed institutions to specific areas of the political space and 
by  outflanking governments and dealing directly with civil society at regional and local 
levels. B. By more direct engagement with civil society through leadership programmes and 
by mobilising progressive forces in society behind reformist development agendas. Most 
important, we ask what contributions structural or critical political economy perspectives 
might bring. This is done primarily by means of drawing out the lessons of the case studies 
and applying structural political economy analysis to these. We ask whether certain reforms 
have specific social and political pre-requisites that are beyond the reach of development 
strategies, and what the limits of policies of governance and institutional reform might be.  
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1. It’s big, grey and has a trunk…: Donor agencies and the political 
economy of governance 
 
Wil Hout 





During the 1990s, donor agencies started to realise that development policy involves more 
than adherence to macro-economic fundamentals, which had been the major precept of the 
Washington Consensus. The awareness that non-economic factors were important produced a 
wave of publications on the centrality of ‘governance’ and led to a focus on institutions. 
 
Under the Post-Washington Consensus, the proper organisation of social and political life 
became the focal point in the thinking about governance and development; a reflection of this 
since the late 1990s was the increasing popularity of the term ‘good governance’. Much of 
the governance literature – in particular the more policy-oriented work done by of the World 
Bank – was, however, grounded in an essentially depoliticised framework. The challenge for 
policy makers was defined, certainly in the case of the Bank, as “building institutions for 
markets”. This concern was epitomised in the title of the 2002 edition of the Bank’s flagship 
publication, the Building Institutions for Markets: World Development Report (World Bank, 
2002).  
 
Following the World Bank’s approach to governance, many development agencies tended to 
orientate their governance programmes on relatively technical issues, such as public sector 
management, public finance and decentralisation. In their support of governance reform 
programmes, the agencies were preoccupied with the sequencing of reforms rather than with 
the concrete impacts that such reforms were having on the power relations in the countries 
concerned (cf. Robison 2009). 
 
As argued elsewhere (Hout and Robison, 2009: 2-3), many development agencies gradually 
came to appreciate that governance involves more than a concern with formal mechanisms 
It’s big, grey and has a trunk…: Donor agencies and the political economy of governance  
2 
and institutional arrangements. The agencies started to realise that power relations and 
‘informal’ patterns of governance play an important role, and that an understanding of these 
is required for the analysis of development processes, as well as for policy making on, and 
implementation of, development assistance. 
 
Calls for a better understanding of underlying power structures and the causes of deep-rooted 
political conflicts – often cast in terms of the need for ‘political economy analyses’ – resulted 
in the development of various instruments that aim to capture governance realities by 
‘looking behind the façade’ (a term used, among others, by Harth and Waltmans, 2007 and 
Waltmans, 2008). The attention for political economy was inspired, to a considerable extent, 
by the growing recognition in various development agencies of the limited use of the 
governance approach that had been adopted under the influence of World Bank thinking, and 
that was grounded essentially in a depoliticised framework.  
 
This paper discusses the struggle of the donor community with the application of political-
economy analysis to governance issues. In particular, the ensuing discussion focuses on the 
paradox that donor agencies which stress the need to engage in political-economy analyses 
appear to be, at the same time, largely unable to use the insights derived from such analyses. 
The paper focuses on three agencies: the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), the Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) and the World 
Bank. Their respective instruments are the Drivers of Change, the Strategic Governance and 
Corruption Analysis (SGACA) and the Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy 
Analysis.  
 
This paper argues that the inability of development agencies to apply the outcomes of 
political-economy analysis stems from their conception of what is proper development 
policy. For most agencies, development is about improving (poor) peoples’ livelihoods, 
either in terms of income or social development indicators (with the Millennium 
Development Goals as the pinnacle of the current policy consensus). Development policies 
are conceived, first and foremost, in terms of the instruments to achieve these targets. 
Agencies are primarily interested in ‘doing development’: because they operate effectively as 
‘anti-politics machines’ (cf. Ferguson, 1990), they experience an almost insurmountable 
difficulty in taking political assessments seriously. 
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Drivers of Changei 
In 1997, Claire Short, Secretary of State for International Development in the Blair 
Government, presented the first major policy statement on UK development cooperation in 
over twenty years. This policy document stressed the importance of improving governance: it 
announced measures ‘to build sound and accountable government which is the foundation of 
economic growth and poverty elimination allowing poor and disadvantaged people to 
achieve their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights’ (Secretary of State for 
International Development, 1997: 32). The operationalisation of the UK’s targets for 
governance, which were perceived to be instrumental for achieving the main goals of 
international development policies, were cast in terms of seven ‘key capabilities for the state’ 
(Department for International Development, 2001: 12): 
• the establishment of a political system that enables all people to influence 
government policy; 
• macroeconomic stability and facilitation of private sector investment and trade; 
• pro-poor policies; 
• effective public service delivery; 
• personal safety and security, and access to justice; 
• the creation of accountable national security arrangements and mechanisms for 
conflict resolution; 
• the combating of corruption. 
This listing makes clear that ‘governance’ in the early days of the Blair government was 
defined in largely instrumental terms and had a strong focus on policies of aid recipient 
countries. 
 
First steps towards a political economy approach to governance were set at the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) with the launch of the so-called Drivers 
of Change (DoC) framework. After a first analysis of the ‘drivers of pro-poor change’ in 
Bangladesh in 2002 (Duncan et al., 2002), Drivers of Change was introduced because of the 
feeling at DFID that it would not be sufficient for donor agencies ‘to bring about change 
through technically sound programmes, supported in country by individual champions of 
reform or change’ (Department for International Development, 2004: 1). In addition to such 
programmes, it was argued, knowledge would be required about governance realities on the 
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ground in developing countries, in particular related to the role of formal and informal 
institutions and ‘underlying structural features’ shaping governance practices.  
 
The philosophy behind the Drivers of Change methodology was to examine: 
 
‘what is driving change’ in the countries where DFID is active. This is to address the 
fact that, ‘DFID and other donors find it easier to say “what” needs to be done to 
reduce poverty than “how” to help make it happen’. By better understanding how 
change occurs within specific contexts, it is hypothesised that DFID’s programming 
decisions will be better equipped to respond to this ‘how’ question and help bring 
about pro-poor change. DoC therefore emphasises DFID’s need to understand 
economic, political and social contexts, in other words, the application of political 
economy analysis to formulation of donor strategy and implementation. (Warrener, 
2004: 1) 
 
The Drivers of Change programme typically led to the commissioning of analyses by DFID 
country offices from teams of independent local and international consultants. Altogether, 
consultants have produced some twenty-five reports ii that all followed the programme’s 
conceptual model.  
 
By analysing three different aspects of economic, political and social contexts (agents, 
structural features and institutions) the Drivers of Change methodology attempts to uncover 
the factors that contribute to or impede change. Agents are individuals and organisations 
pursuing particular interests, including political elites, the judiciary, the military, civil society 
organisations and the media. Structural features relate to ‘deeply embedded’ factors as the 
history of state formation, natural resources, economic and social structures, and 
urbanisation. Institutions are the formal and informal ‘rules governing the behaviour of 
agents’ (Department for International Development, 2004: 1), and range from laws and 
official procedures to social and cultural norms. As Mustaq Khan has noted in a review of 
various Drivers of Change studies, the common assumption underlying those studies seems 
to have been that certain ‘good governance reforms’ (Khan 2005: 38) are a prerequisite for 
further development and transformation in aid-receiving countries. The main issues appeared 
to be the sequencing of reforms and the identification of the change agents to bring about 
such governance reforms. 
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Assessments of the Drivers of Change approach have pointed at various weaknesses that 
limit the usefulness of the framework. In a review of the first twenty reports Leftwich (2006: 
17-20) focused on the lack of rigour underlying the Drivers of Change studies (cf. Khan, 
2005: 5-6). He noted that the studies performed under the broad umbrella of Drivers of 
Change displayed considerable variance in the use of central concepts such as agents, 
structural features and institutions. Moreover, Leftwich argued, the studies did not produce a 
convincing view on possible dynamics of change, as the interrelations among agents, 
institutions and structures were not well specified. Finally, Leftwich indicated that there was 
not a clear, shared understanding among the Drivers of Change analyses of what ‘political 
economy’ actually is. 
 
Various commentators have argued that several factors limited the applicability of the 
Drivers of Change approach to programming exercises and concrete policy decisions 
(Thornton and Cox, 2005; Dahl-Østergaard et al., 2005). Importantly, the timing of Drivers 
of Change studies was often not well aligned with the preparation of DFID’s country 
programmes. Further, many Drivers of Change analyses proved to be highly descriptive and 
did not provide operational conclusions (Thornton and Cox, 2005: 6, 22-3; Chhotray and 
Hulme, 2009: 45). Finally, as pointed out in an OECD-DAC report on the lessons learned, 
 
there is a sense of growing tension – expressed by staff in all locations – arising from 
the pressure to increase spending, especially in Africa, and to pursue short term 
interventions to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. This is seen as difficult 
to reconcile with the emphasis of DOC studies on local political process, and longer 
timescales for fundamental change. (Dahl-Østergaard et al., 2005: 7) 
 
In the end, Drivers of Change analyses appear to have served mainly as a means to enhance 
the understanding of staff at DFID country offices and country specialists at headquarters 
about the political-economic realities in partner countries (Dahl-Østergaard et al., 2005: 7). 
The approach has failed to have a lasting impact on policy making, as is reflected in its 
apparent disappearance in recent years. 
 
 
It’s big, grey and has a trunk…: Donor agencies and the political economy of governance  
6 
The Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis 
Dutch policy making on development has demonstrated a commitment to principles of ‘good 
governance’ ever since the arrival of social-democrat Eveline Herfkens as Minister for 
Development Cooperation in 1998. Herfkens, who had previously served as Executive 
Director at the World Bank, changed the orientation of Dutch development assistance by 
embracing aid selectivity, in that a limited set of countries were chosen for Dutch bilateral 
development assistance on the basis of ‘the presence of good policies and good governance 
in the recipient countries’ (Minister for Development Cooperation, 1998: 2, my translation). 
 
Subsequent Ministers for Development Cooperation (christian-democrat Agnes van Ardenne 
and social-democrat Bert Koenders) increased the number of Dutch partner countries from 22 
to over 30, while maintaining a concern with governance in aid-recipient countriesiii. 
Koenders, in particular, showed great interest in the quality of governance in developing 
countries, as witnessed in a major speech he delivered on the modernisation of Dutch 
development assistance in November 2008: ‘Good governance is a huge boost for 
development, and that is why I am investing in building the rule of law and well-functioning 
government’ (Koenders, 2008: 9). In his own words, he was applying a ‘more political 
conception of good governance’ (Koenders, 2007: 9). His call for a political strategy for good 
governance was grounded in attention for the ‘context’ (Koenders, 2007: 9) that influences 
the success of policies aimed at fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law and 
building democracy. 
 
The so-called Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA), which had been 
conceived by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2006 and was introduced in 2007, resonated well with Koenders’ views on 
governance. Despite the Minister’s enthusiasm for the new tool, SGACA appears to have had 
a similar fate as the Drivers of Change approach. 
 
SGACA had been introduced by the Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian 
Aid Department with the clear aim of integrating the analysis with standard policy making 
procedures at the ministry. The instrument was given a role in the design of Multi-annual 
Strategic Plans per embassy with the intention of enhancing the “operational” value of the 
analyses.  
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The starting point of the SGACAs was the so-called Power and Change Analysis (PCAs), 
which would be a political-economy assessment aiming to bring out what are the 
determinants, in state-society relationships, of countries governance problems. According to 
the SGACA framework, the underlying assumption of the analysis is ‘that building more 
effective, accountable states and public institutions requires a political process of interaction 
between the state and (organised groups in) society’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 10).  
 
The SGACAs’ Power and Change Analyses addressed, in a similar way as the Drivers of 
Change studies, three aspects of the political economy of aid-receiving developing countries: 
the “foundational factors”, the “rules of the game” and the “here and now” (the current 
context and main actors and stakeholders)iv. The approach envisaged that operational 
implications would be derived from the SGACAs during workshops organised at the 
embassies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 6-7). As it was put in the SGACA framework: 
 
The PCA can help with refining existing choices or making new ones, by enhancing 
understanding of context (the underlying causes of bad governance and weak 
development); and highlighting opportunities and threats arising from that context 
that should inform all donor interventions. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 27) 
 
The first of 29 completed SGACA exercises started from the assumption that the Power and 
Change Analyses would be “quick scans”, on the basis of governance assessments made by 
the Dutch embassies (the so-called ‘track records’; cf. Hout, 2007: 58-61) and other available 
material, such as academic publications and policy-oriented reports. On the basis of the pilot 
phase, which took place in the second quarter of 2007, a decision was taken to increase the 
time allocated to the work of the international and local consultants in order to provide more 
solid analysesv. 
 
Despite the increase of resources allocated to the analyses, interviewsvi with direct observers 
of the SGACA exercises indicate that the quality of the SGACAs has been highly variable. In 
certain cases, the limited expertise of the consultants was mentioned as a cause of poor 
quality, while in other cases the relative failure of SGACAs was ascribed to the lack of 
interest among embassy staff. Most observers agree that the decision by the Minister for 
Development Cooperation to bring the drafting of the Multi-annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) 
It’s big, grey and has a trunk…: Donor agencies and the political economy of governance  
8 
for 2009-2012 forward had important negative impacts on the SGACA process. As fewer 
than half of all 29 SGACAs had been completed by the time the MASPs were finalised at the 
beginning of 2008, most SGACA reports failed to feed into decision making on multi-annual 
programming.  
 
The SGACA process seems to have come to an end only three years after its inception. The 
Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department has been considering 
an ‘action plan’ in order to bring the usefulness of ‘political economy thinking’ to the 
attention of embassy staff, but this idea has been abandoned in early 2010. Instead of the 
action plan, a set of briefing papers on the salient components of the SGACA exercise has 
been produced for staff at Dutch embassies and at the Ministry vii . The fate of SGACA 
seems, therefore, rather similar to that of the Drivers of Change, as its main value is seen to 
derive from the contribution that political economy analysis has on the understanding of 
embassy staff regarding interests and power struggles in the partner countries. 
 
Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis 
The World Bank has come a long way in its thinking about the political economy of 
governance practices. The Bank’s World Development Report 2002 was premised on the 
notion that markets are the central element of development: ‘income from participating in the 
market is the key to boosting economic growth for nations and to reducing poverty for 
individuals’ (World Bank, 2002: 3). The main challenge in fighting poverty was almost 
reduced to a micro-economic issue: it would involve creating opportunities and incentives for 
poor people to make use of markets (cf. Fine, 2003: 14). “Good governance” precepts would 
limit the role of the state to that of a regulator. The World Development Report 2002 
distinguished four elements, in particular, as tasks of a well-governed state: 
 
Good governance includes the creation, protection and enforcement of property 
rights, without which the scope for market transactions is limited ... the provision of a 
regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition ... the provision 
of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment for market activity 
... the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the 
legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets. (World Bank, 2002: 99) 
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In a self-assessment published in 2005, the World Bank embraced some significant 
conceptual and theoretical innovations that contained an implicit criticism of and distancing 
from its earlier apolitical, technocratic approach. Interestingly, the self-assessment argues:  
 
Perhaps the most important lesson of the 1990s is that technocratic responses to 
improve governance work only in very auspicious settings – where there is 
committed leadership, a broadly based coalition in support of reform, and sufficient 
capacity to carry the reform process forward. ... Meeting the challenge requires a 
good understanding of the political dimensions of reform, and, in particular, of how 
reform can be used to identify and build constituencies that are capable of sustaining 
the reform momentum. (World Bank, 2005: 298) 
 
Although the report seemed to signal much greater sensitivity to political dynamics than in 
the past, the “guidelines” for policy reform as formulated by the Bank remained limited to the 
creation of incentives for economic actors, the pursuit of growth strategies and the creation of 
institutional conditions for a favourable investment climate (World Bank, 2005: 262-5). 
 
A so-called “good practice framework” (Fritz et al, 2009) , published by the World Bank’s 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network in September 2009, 
emphasises the need for ‘problem-driven governance and political economy analysis’ as ‘a 
crucial part … in enhancing the effectiveness of development’ (Fritz et al., 2009: vii). The 
Bank, so much is clear from the framework, stresses the instrumental nature of its approach: 
 
A number of recent evaluations have underlined the need for understanding the 
political economy context of reforms more systematically and for taking this into 
account when designing and implementing reforms. … [Governance and political 
economy] analysis can help to anticipate and manage risks – including risks of reform 
failure, of Bank-supported reforms triggering unintended negative consequences, as 
well as potential reputational risks. It can also assist in transmitting important 
knowledge about institutions and stakeholders more quickly and effectively to staff 
newly joining a country or other operational team. (Fritz et al., 2009: 1) 
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Although the framework alludes to ‘country-level analysis’ (Fritz et al., 2009: 23), specific 
sectors and policy themes receive most attention. It is at this level that the framework seems 
to see the best opportunities for the application of governance and political economy analysis. 
In particular, the authors of the framework suggest three options to the Bank. In the first 
place, analyses would inform Bank staff teams how to adjust strategies and operations to 
existing opportunities for change. Further, such analyses would enhance and broaden the 
policy dialogue with country governments. Finally, findings of the governance and political 
economy analyses would point out opportunities for supporting change proactively.  
 
On the basis of the recent “good practice framework” on governance and political economy, 
one is led to conclude that little has changed in the World Bank’s approach to politics. 
Insofar as the analysis of the political economy context of borrowing countries is felt to be 
relevant, it is judged primarily on the contribution it may make to the Bank’s own risk 
management.  The World Bank’s increased recognition of political factors in the governance 
reform process, which goes back at least to a stock-taking exercise of 2005 (World Bank, 
2005) seems to have had only limited impact on its day-to-day operations. The Bank’s use of 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is a case in point.  
 
The CPIA, which was introduced at the end of the 1990s in order to render IDA allocations 
more sensitive to recipient countries’ reform of policies and governance, has been one of the 
most fiercely criticised instruments in international development financing viii. Much of the 
criticism of the instrument centres on its neo-liberal, market-oriented bias. Despite a recent 
revision of the CPIA methodology, assessments of country performance in the 2008-11 
period are being determined, for about two-thirds, by a governance-related cluster of five 
measures (International Development Association, 2008: 43-5) ix. These measures are:  
• property rights and rule-based governance; 
• quality of budgetary and financial management; 
• efficiency of revenue mobilization; 
• quality of public administration; and 
• transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector. 
Thus, the emphasis of IDA’s governance assessments continues to be on impediments for 
private-sector activity, on public sector management in relation to public finance, taxation 
and service delivery, and on checks on government. There are no signs that the allocation of 
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loans to developing countries has become less performance-based and less reliant on the 
technocratic and market-oriented CPIA. Further, it is not clear how the change in thinking on 
political economy analysis is reflected in actual lending practices, nor how the awareness of 
political dimensions of reform is factored into projects and programmes aimed at 
strengthening governance in developing countries. On the basis of information that is 
available at the time or writing, the changes advocated in the good practice framework are 
seemingly having little impact on day-to-day World Bank policy practices. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion in this paper of various methods for political economy analysis has indicated 
that such approaches do not sit very comfortably among the range of tasks undertaken by 
development agencies. When governance entered the vocabulary of international 
development at the end of the 1990s, the concept was understood in overly technocratic, a-
political terms. Set against the background of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, which emphasised 
the role of market forces and the harnessing of the state in development, “good governance” 
referred to, in particular, the adoption of “good policies” by governments that were having 
effective public management instruments in place.  
In itself, the technocratic and a-political framing of governance was not surprising. Well-
known authors such as James Ferguson (1990), who studied the implementation of 
development policies in Lesotho, and John Harriss (2001), who analysed the usage of “social 
capital” by the World Bank, pointed out already long ago that the international development 
community is operating as an “anti-politics machine”. More recently, the former Chief 
Governance Advisor at the UK’s Department for International Development argued that 
donor agencies find it inherently ‘hard to come to terms with politics’ (Unsworth, 2009). 
 
This paper has pointed out that the debate on international development has recently been 
characterised by a paradox. While the treatment of governance remains largely technocratic, 
many development agencies have started to recognise the need for political (or “political 
economy”) analyses. Three examples (the UK’s Drivers of Change, the Dutch Strategic 
Governance and Corruption Analysis and the World Bank’s Problem Driven Governance and 
Political Economy Analysis) have been discussed in the paper. Despite their pretensions the 
first two approaches did not produce many concrete results in terms of day-to-day policy 
making. The Drivers of Change and the SGACA, in the end, seemed mainly to serve for 
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enhancing the understanding among embassy or country office staff of the political-economic 
realities in the countries they are posted to. Vagueness of the methodologies seems to have 
been a factor contributing to the limited use of the approaches, as was the lack of operational 
embedding. The launching by the World Bank of a “good practice framework” has not 
appeared to result in a major change in the way the Bank is dealing with governance issues. 
Its sectoral application of political economy analysis seems to be “inward-looking”, in that it 
aims to limit the risk of reform failure and reputational risk. The increased attention for 
political aspects of governance, which dates back at least to a major self-assessment 
published in 2005, has not impacted on the way the Bank deals with lending to developing 
countries, as the IDA’s main diagnostic tool remains biased to technocratic and market-
oriented performance indicators. 
 
The tension between the fundamentally depoliticised understanding of governance and the 
call for political sensitivity is, most likely, unsolvable in the current framework of 
international development (cf. De Haan and Everest-Phillips, 2007), as development agencies 
understand their own role primarily as ‘doing development’. Such self-conception leads to a 
preoccupation with finding the right instruments to bring about desired effects, be it building 
infrastructure, providing health care or implementing macroeconomic policies. Development 
practice, as noted above, tends to be seen as an expert activity, not an act of politics – on the 
contrary, much of the development ‘industry’ still operates as the ‘anti-politics machine’ that 
it has always been (Ferguson, 1990). 
 
Notes 
i  This section draws on Schakel et al. (2010). 
ii  The overview of Drivers of Change country studies at the website of the Governance and Social 
Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) mentions studies on: Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, Vanuatu and Zambia 
http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=597A76DB-14C2-620A-2770D688963DF944#doc 
(accessed 3 September 2010). 
iii  Van Ardenne broadened the group of partner countries to 36; one of the criteria for selection was 
‘the quality of policies and governance in recipient countries’ (Minister for Development 
Cooperation, 2003: 19-20, 32, my translation). Koenders selected 33 countries across three 
different ‘profiles’: countries with a focus on accelerated achievement of the Millennium 
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Development Goals, fragile states and (near) middle income countries. The least-developed and 
low-income countries in the first group were required to have ‘a reasonable level of stability and 
improving governance’ (Minister for Development Cooperation, 2007: 38-9). 
iv  The similarity between Drivers of Change and SGACA is due, in part, to the involvement of Sue 
Unsworth, former Chief Governance Advisor at DFID, as a consultant during the process of 
setting up the SGACA framework. 
v  In 2007, discussions started on the extension of the SGACA framework to make it applicable to 
fragile states. After his appointment in February 2007, the new Minister for Development 
Cooperation, Bert Koenders, had been placing emphasis on the inclusion of fragile states into 
the Dutch development assistance framework. The extended SGACA framework, which 
included a security component, was approved in September 2008. A pilot was undertaken with 
the extended framework in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, but the revised 
SGACA has never been applied to fragile states because most SGACAs had been completed 
before the original deadline of October 2008 (Schakel et al., 2010: Annex III). 
vi  Details of interviews and interviewees are included in Schakel et al., 2010: Annex II  
vii Based on a personal communication by a policy advisor at the Human Rights, Good Governance 
and Humanitarian Aid Department, The Hague, 2 September 2010. 
viii A good summary of the criticism can be found  in Alexander, 2004.  
ix  A new formula for calculating the Country Performance Rating was introduced in the 15th 
replenishment period of IDA (IDA15, from 2008 to 2011). This formula is  
 
Country Performance Rating = (0.24 * CPIAA-C + 0.68 * CPIAD + 0.08 * PORT) 
 
in which CPIAA-C stands for the average score on the clusters on economic management, 
structural policies and policies for social inclusion/equity, CPIAD represents the average on the 
five components of the governance cluster, and PORT the assessment of portfolio performance 
(International Development Agency, 2007: 9-10). In earlier periods, a so-called ‘governance 
factor’ had been used to emphasize governance-related criteria in the Country Performance 
Rating (see Hout, 2007: 31-40 for a detailed analysis). 
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) ‘Drivers of Change’ (DOC) initiative was a call to recognise the 
importance of politics in the development process. However, development policy in general 
has always embodied specific understandings of politics or political economy. Thus, the 
significance of the DOC is not that it introduces the idea of politics into the equation but that 
it represents a pluralist vision of the way political economy operates that is substantially 
different from prevailing public choice models and calls for a more direct engagement with 
the complexities of the political world.  
 
Two ideas about the nature of politics in particular have shaped the orthodoxies of 
development policy. One is focused around rational choice or public choice political 
economy (generally referred to as ‘neo-liberal’) which sees the political problem in terms of a 
need to protect markets from the predatory raids of self-seeking interests and to insulate 
technocratic policy makers from the irrationalities of politics. The second main stream is that 
of pluralist political economy which understands politics as a process of conflict or 
negotiation between different ideological or economic interests. Thus, the main task of 
development policy-makers in this view is not simply to isolate or neutralise predatory elites 
but also to support and mobilise progressive social forces in favour of development 
objectives and ‘good governance’.  
 
Obviously, there are other ways of understanding the factors that shape conflicts in the of 
development process. Roslyn Eyben (2005), for example, also identifies approaches that see 
development as a process of cultural change and the adoption of modern norms and values or 
as a process of technological transformation. These were highly influential in shaping 
development policies before the neo-liberal revolution in the 1980s, driving strategies based 
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on the injection of cultural values or technology and education as the primary means of kick-
starting change.  
 
The intention of this chapter is to explain how ideas about political economy generate 
specific development strategies and policy. But it also introduces ideas of critical or structural 
political economy. This is an approach that shares with pluralist political economy the idea 
that politics is about conflict over power but sees the competing forces and interests as locked 
in an overarching structure of power relations rather than being simply the reflections of 
functional role specialisation and therefore amenable to negotiated settlements. This makes it 
difficult simply to reshape politics through institutional reform or by engaging more directly 
with progressive forces. Structural political economy may, on the one hand, suggest that the 
processes of social and political change are outside the control of development agencies and 
banks. At the same time, it offers a perspective that can lead to more realistic engagement 
with political economy.  
 
The World Bank Model and Public Choice Ideas of Political Economy: Protecting the 
Market from Politics.  
 
The idea of political economy inherent in the public choice (neo-liberal model) is based on a 
view of a society defined by the voluntary transactions of rational, utility maximising 
individuals where the essential problem is how to resolve the collective action dilemmas of 
predatory, self-serving behaviour. As these ideas began to dominate development thinking in 
the early 1980s it was generally assumed that the advance of the market would be enough in 
itself to end problems of economic inefficiency, corruption and arbitrary rule in developing 
countries (see Toye 1987: 47-70). It was thought few institutional prerequisites would be 
needed beyond some basic property rights in the initial stages of market transformation. This 
view was an important justification for strategies of “shock therapy” in Russia and Eastern 
Europe (see, Rapaczynski 1996; Sachs 1992). Increasingly, though, there was a long retreat 
from the belief in the self-regulating capacities of markets, accelerated most recently in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian economic crisis and, indeed, the GFC. Neo-liberal agendas for global 
economic change and development gradually shifted from a simple plan to roll out markets 
through policy reform to a new concern for containing the risks that seem invariably to 
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accompany their rise. Their dilemma was whether to insulate or mobilise social forces in this 
process. 
 
Strategy One: Protecting markets and Insulating Technocrats from Politics – liberal 
authoritarianism. 
As early as the 1980s, in the so-called Berg Report and in its later 1989 report on the growing 
crisis of development in sub-Saharan Africa, advocates within the World Bank began to 
argue that structured programmes of institutional change were required to solve the scourge 
of corruption and pervasive clientelism (World Bank 1981; 1989a). The problem was, where 
would these institutions come from? It was initially assumed these would emerge seamlessly 
as rational individuals dealt in an instrumentally rational manner with new collective 
problems of transaction costs and information asymmetries that accompanied markets 
(Williamson 1987; North 1994). However, as public choice political economists observed, 
institutions were not only constructed to contain the self-serving behaviour of vested 
interests; it was entirely rational for coalitions to organise collectively for the purposes of 
making predatory raids on the state rather than to establish the collective goods that make 
markets work (Bates 1981; Olson 1982; Buchanan and Tullock 1962) i. North himself 
(1995:20) and the World Bank (see, World Bank 1997), began to argue that it was only the 
state that could provide such institutions, a remarkable turnaround from the earlier position 
that the state was at the heart of the problem. Yet, where the liberal pluralist idea of the 
benign state had been replaced with the idea of a state that is necessarily predatory and whose 
politicians and officials deal in the currency of rents and privileges it became difficult to 
explain why the state would drive the reform process. As Gamble (2006) has stated it, neo-
liberals had arrived at a point where neither state nor society could be trusted. It seemed that 
there was nowhere to go.  
 
It was in this context that neo-liberal policy-makers began to turn to the idea that reform must 
be provided by enlightened technocrats operating above the demands of politics to protect the 
general welfare of society against the self-serving behaviour of vested interests (Williamson 
1994; cf. Grindle 1991). Without becoming directly involved in the turmoil of politics and 
social conflict, it was envisaged technocrats could neutralise distributional coalitions by 
altering the institutional incentives that shaped the choices and behaviour of individuals ii. 
Technocratic elites, often dominating key economic and financial ministries and agencies in 
developing economies, have played an important role in designing and implementing neo-
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liberal reform agendas. For example, Chile’s famous ‘Los Chicago Boys’ in the 1970s had 
their equivalents in the so-called ‘Berkeley Mafia’ who, almost a decade earlier, had begun to 
play a central policy role in Soeharto’s Indonesia. In Russia, technocrats like Anatoly 
Chubais initiated decisive privatisation programmes during the Yeltsin period of the early 
1990s while in Zambia, the ubiquitous Harvard Institute for International Development gave 
rise to the so-called ‘Harvard Boys’ in the early 1990s.  
 
Yet, despite the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars into programmes of institutional 
reform, conflicts over issues of efficiency, corruption, rule of law, arbitrary authority and 
opaque regulation of markets have continued to proliferate and deepen. Within the World 
Bank and other mainline development agencies these are explained primarily as problems of 
design or sequencing, requiring more precise recalibration of the way incentives are 
structured within the new institutional arrangements to produce specific behavioural changes 
(Rosser 2005; World Bank 2004: 16-60). Yet, while it was true newly engineered institutions 
may indeed change behaviour this was not always in the way favoured by those within the 
neo-liberal camp. Something was needed to ensure that policy and institutions worked; that 
something was ‘good governance’. 
 
Essentially, neo-liberals have understood ‘good governance’ as a mechanism to provide 
efficient public and private management for markets. As the World Bank has stated it, ‘[t]he 
ability of the state to provide institutions that make markets more efficient is sometimes 
referred to as good governance’ (World Bank 2002a: 99). Thus, ‘good governance’ ensures 
efficiency in public administration, rule of law and regulation of corporate life, including 
competition laws and anti-corruption watchdogs, arms-length procurement processes and the 
outsourcing of public services and supply. But the idea of governance has spilled over into 
wider agendas for regulation and authority at the political and social level. In the idea of a 
form of authority that is technical and managerial in nature it offers a solution to perhaps the 
key political dilemma of neo-liberals. As economist Hal Hill observed in his analysis of 
Indonesia after the Asian financial crisis, ‘One of the big challenges of the coming years will 
be to find a way of separating the economic and commercial world from the political world’ 
(Hill 2000: 4).  
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The idea of ‘governance’ meets this objective in several ways. Broadly understood as a form 
of authority separate from traditional notions of politics and the state and defined 
increasingly in terms of legal or constitutional principles (Gill 1995), it enables a vast range 
of problems related to economic efficiency and political order and legitimacy to be 
approached without any reference to the contentious arenas of power and politics (Hewitt de 
Alcantra 1998). More practically, the idea of governance can be used to bypass opponents 
(vested interests) through modes of technocratic and managerial rule. In the words of the 
World Bank, ‘… good governance requires the power to carry out policies and develop 
institutions that may be unpopular among some – or even a majority – of the population.” 
(World Bank 2002a: 99).  
 
Strategy Two: Mobilising Civil Society: decentralisation and new modes of governance.   
Nevertheless, there has been a growing recognition that the market state requires a broad 
legitimacy across society and at least some measure of support and engagement from popular 
social forces. New policies of engagement with society began to accept the classical liberal 
proposition that civil society represents a potentially progressive and entrepreneurial force. 
Social movements and NGOs were increasingly considered potential allies against 
recalcitrant and corrupt governments, bureaucracies and elites. In its 1991 Report on 
Governance the World Bank stated, ‘While donors and outsiders can contribute ideas and 
resources to improve governance, for change to be effective, it must be rooted firmly in the 
societies concerned, and cannot be imposed from outside.’ It urged citizens to be responsible 
- ‘Citizens need to demand good governance’ (World Bank 1991 : 6,7).   
 
Such moral exhortations failed generally failed to galvanise civil societies seemingly 
characterised by indifference or hostility to market-based reform? One explanation was that 
this potential reservoir of entrepreneurial energies in civil society was constrained by the 
restrictions of highly centralised states. It followed that this could be most effectively 
mobilised by means of administrative and political decentralisation (see, Manor 1999). In 
other words, once again there were institutional answers to political questions. 
Decentralisation, it was thought, would introduce competitive relations of the market place 
into society and reduce the power of the state by diffusing authority to regional and local 
legislatures and governments. It became a common feature of post-crisis agreements with 
governments on the part of the World Bank and the IMF and was also a key element in post-
war reconstruction strategies iii.  
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However, decentralisation and localisation also potentially opened the door to various 
business interests, local warlords, criminals and individuals able to mobilise tribal or clan 
attachments that were also part of civil society and were unruly and unpredictable, especially 
where fragile or failed states were unable to provide the basic regulation and order necessary 
for market societies (World Bank 1997, 2002b). One way of dealing with this was by 
strategies of hyper-decentralisation aimed at getting below these dark elements to the real 
grassroots of atomised individuals via programmes including micro-credit and small scale 
participatory infrastructure creation (Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner 2003).  
 
Most important, though, neo-liberal policy-makers concluded that the problems of a hostile 
or indifferent citizenry required programmes of capacity building to create the networks and 
values - the social capital – and new forms of citizenship and participation that would enable 
individual citizens to organise collectively in favour of markets (Collier et al 2003; see, 
World Bank 2002a: 21; Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock 2004; Woolcock 
2001). These new modes of governance would involve a functional integration of citizens 
through assemblies, meetings and other neo-populist devices that would bypass competitive 
and representative politics (Rodan 2006; Jayasuriya 2005; Carroll).   
 
The idea of social capital became an indispensable organising concept. It enabled 
development policies to be redefined in terms of poverty reduction strategies that avoided 
any entanglement with issues related to concentrations and distribution of power and wealth 
in society. Such functional and organic ideas meant that politics could be redefined in 
technical and managerial terms and created a whole new industry in capacity building, 
training and social inclusion projects by the World Bank and other development agencies 
(Fine, et al, 2001; Harriss 2002). 
 
Pluralist Political Economy  
For pluralist political economists, political economy is not a puzzle aimed at imposing 
technocratic forms of authority on dysfunctional rent-seeking coalitions and insulating 
markets from these self-seeking forces. Instead, political economy is a world of contending 
interests seeking to advance their cause by influencing the policy and resource priorities of 
the state. Because these are forces that emerge from the division of labour they are able to 
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solve problems in a process of negotiation and accommodation. While it is true that most of 
the leading figures involved in the development of DFID’s Drivers of Change (DOC) 
approach were familiar with theories of structural political economy their policy initiatives 
generally operated on pluralist assumptions. Aid planners were encouraged to do political 
analysis that identified the various players involved in the development process and, in 
particular, those that could be co-opted in various ways to support reform programmes. It 
was considered essential to identify both individual and collective agents that were 
obstructing change, including both external actors and institutions that give the wrong signals 
to political actors (DOC Team, Policy Division, DFID 2006).  
 
There is little doubt that the DOC approach potentially enables a more sophisticated 
understanding of why development is failing and where specific policies may be counter-
productive. It is recognised that “DFID has a political role and that it and other donors are not 
perceived as neutral and apolitical, and play a role in shaping the context” (DFID 2005). 
Studies led to sets of principles that could be applied to designing concrete programmes. For 
example, policy-makers were urged to; “Be flexible, as politics are unpredictable and 
recognise that crises and sudden change may offer and opportunity” and to “Recognise that 
power does not only lie with partner governments especially where the line with business is 
blurred” (DFID 2005: 2, 3). While the attempt to mobilise support for reformist policies 
could involve institutional strategies aimed at changing incentives, as Chhotray and Hulme 
note, ‘ The attempt to identify “Drivers” of change signals therefore the need to collaborate 
with those “driving” change, including elements within the elite, as well as important actors 
not typically involved in donor activities, such as political parties of change” (Chhotray and 
Hulme 2008 :41). Thus, DFID programmes began to pay attention to participatory 
approaches to local level-decision making and community empowerment projects, supporting 
new political parties and identity-based movements and organising poorly paid workers (see, 
Eyben 2005). In short, the DOC recognised that reducing poverty is about, “…intervening in 
historical processes and not simply rational planning.” DOC was driven by the idea that, 
“…each country has its own particular agents, institutions and structures that drive change” 
(Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 40).  
 
In chapter four, Hughes and Hutchison examine some the attempts to apply these 
observations as the basis for practical policy and this analysis will be extended in chapter 
eight of this volume.   
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Critical Political Economy: Institutional and policy reform and the consolidation of 
Oligarchy. 
For critical, or structural, political economists, the difficulties of the development process are 
not explained in terms of the politics of resistance versus transformation. Rather, these are 
understood as part of the processes of conflict to shape the rules that define the new market 
societies and to establish new forms of social and political power within the market system 
(Chaudhry 1997; Robison and Hadiz 2004). Nor is the development problem simply 
concerned with the progress of markets (as the “development problem”) but also with issues 
of equality and redistributive justice. While the policy and institutional solutions of donor 
nations may be perceived, at one level, as attempts to bypass the often brutal conflicts that 
historically underlie the formation of modern rational states (Ottaway 2002: 1004), they are 
seen by critical political economists as integral to these conflicts and designed to impose very 
specific and normative social and political orders. 
 
It follows that because different interests and groups in society are enmeshed in overarching 
structures of power, it is difficult to achieve change simply by institutional measures 
(Sangmpam 2007), whether these are to insulate technocrats or to support perceived 
progressive forces and interests so long as the structures remain intact. It also follows that the 
conflicts on the ground may not be primarily about markets but can be focused on more 
fundamental issues; for example, relating to the allocation of land or rights to occupancy.    
 
Thus, for orthodox policy-makers, these structures and the social and political elites and 
oligarchies that preside over them constitute the elephants in the room that have upset the 
best of plans. These are not external to the process of market consolidation but have 
established and consolidated their positions within the broad rules of the market by co-opting 
property rights, undertaking financial sector reform and adopting techno-managerial 
prescriptions for political rule (Robison 1986; Rodan and Jayasuriya 2007; Jesudason 1986). 
They are resilient in the face of crises and resist the reformist demands of development 
organisations even where this appears to invite economic decline or social dislocation where 
their political ascendancy is at stake see (Bardhan 1989). Such resilience and ability to evolve 
is made possible not least because such elites and the forms of authoritarian and discretionary 
forms of market governance they preside over are often useful to the broader economic and 
political agendas of donor governments. They can protect markets from certain forms of 
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politics and liberate private interests from a range of collective social demands and they can 
play a part in battles to preserve economic or political hegemony played out at the global 
level.  
 
The point to be made here is that identifying the players in the constellation of power and 
interest is not enough. What counts is how the power relationships work and how powerful 
interests exercise their dominance. The important contribution of critical political economy is 
to explain how the significance and potential of different groups is constrained and defined 
within these larger structural relationships. As we shall see, some development thinking is 
addressing these issues (see, Leftwitch 2010).     
 
Oligarchy and Markets 
A key proposition is that attempts to create reforms in governance often collide with the rise 
of the very forces that have been sustained and even created within the broad process of 
market reform – these are the elephants in the room. The privatisation of large state 
monopolies and companies has offered opportunities to a range of privileged oligarchies to 
expropriate public resources and state corporate wealth. Property rights have enabled new 
entrepreneurs to claim state assets or community land where title to these was not clear. As 
Mick Moore has also argued, the , ‘…political underdevelopment of much of the South also 
results from the ways in which Southern states have been created and political authority 
shaped through economic and political interactions with the wealthier countries of the North’ 
(Moore 2001: 385). Opening economies to global markets has meant that new private 
interests can now access flows of finance from international lenders and investors who prove 
willing to accept the risks of highly politicised markets and arbitrary systems of regulation. 
Neo-liberal models of techno-managerial authority have also offered a new means of 
legitimising authoritarian rule in the name of economic efficiency and the need to protect 
markets from the excesses of representative politics.  
 
These seemingly counter-intuitive relationships between markets, predatory economics and 
illiberal politics have existed across different types of political and economic systems in 
developing countries. In the predatory clientelist political systems of sub-Saharan Africa, 
extensive market deregulation and privatisation in the 1980s served to consolidate what 
Harrison describes as, ‘a new political class that reproduces itself through ‘neo-liberal 
clientism’ (Harrison 2006: 109). The corrupt disposal of state enterprises, leakage of finance 
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from large banks and corruption in procurement as well as plunder in the Congo and 
elsewhere have all been essential elements in the way the new ‘champions’ of neo-liberal 
reform have reinforced the politics of ethnic allegiances, patronage and corruption iv. No sign 
of any ‘relatively autonomous’ state apparatus appeared on the horizon to put an end to this 
ongoing logic of disorganised capitalism nor any progressive middle class alliance able to get 
its hands on power. (Harrison 2005, 2006; Van de Walle 2001; Tangri and Mwenda 2001). 
 
Quite different forms of client-patron regimes existed in Latin America and in the 
Philippines, where business or landed oligarchies became the beneficiaries of the new 
markets by determining the flow of rents from a largely incoherent bureaucracy. Elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia, new oligarchies were more commonly incubated within highly centralised 
and powerful states incubated private business interest. The rise of private business as a 
political power in Thailand was made possible as deregulated global and domestic financial 
and banking systems and equity markets in the 1980s and 1990s enabled a new raft of 
individuals to consolidate themselves outside the big Sino-Thai banks in finance, property 
and telecommunications (Lauridson 1998; Hewison 2006). Fitful democratic reforms 
stretching back to the 1970s meant these private interests could outflank the formerly 
dominant state bureaucracy and press their interests more directly through a pervasive system 
of money politics; to become the financiers of parties rather than the clients of bureaucrats 
(Anderson 1990; Hewison 1993).  
 
In Indonesia, the rise of Soeharto in 1965 was widely seen by neo-liberal economists as a 
triumph of rationality over politics. However, the presence of Western trained technocrats in 
key economic ministries and the opening of Indonesia to foreign investment and selective 
market reforms were to reinforce a pervasive apparatus of security and repression and a vast 
network of state-owned enterprises that stood astride the commanding heights of the 
economy (Robison 1988). Ideas of technocratic and managerial rule able to bypass vested 
interest and representative and competitive politics also suited the needs of the new regime 
by offering a convenient legitimacy for authoritarian rule (see, Moertopo 1973).  
 
More thorough-going market reforms in the 1980s were not imposed by technocrats but 
signalled a takeover of state capitalism by a politico-business oligarchy for whom the state 
that had incubated them now constrained their ambitions. This was not a private sector 
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increasingly tired of arbitrary authority and seeking orderly markets. It was a process of 
privatisation without liberalisation and was thus highly selective in its application. Domestic 
trading and manufacturing cartels were preserved while the newly opened finance sector was 
to be unconstrained by rules about intra-group lending and capital adequacy ratios and no 
distinction existed between lenders and borrowers. Public monopolies were transformed into 
private monopolies while key state enterprises became the conduits through which state 
funds haemorrhaged into private hands by subsidising the costs of their activities and 
providing discretionary credit (Robison and Hadiz 2004).  
 
The Indonesian model has striking similarities with processes of change cases in the Middle 
East (see King 2007). Perhaps the most dramatic example of the rise of a market oligarchy 
has been that of Russia where a programme of ‘shock therapy’ introduced radical market 
reforms that saw vast swathes of the state sector pass into private hands almost overnight. 
The loans for assets deals of the early 1990s, made possible in the context of new, market-
based financial sector reforms, created a system of private oligarchy that was to be governed, 
initially at least, by violence and murder presided over by gangsters and mediated within a 
highly corrupt state bureaucracy (Volkov 2002; Oversloot 2006).  
 
The Resilience of Oligarchy 
By the late 1990s, many of these regimes appeared to be experiencing difficulties. In sub-
Saharan Africa, it was hard to see how the predatory regimes could survive in the face of 
deepening poverty and economic decline. In Russia, as economic crisis and bank collapse hit 
hard in the 1990s, it was thought that business and the middle class would recognise that the 
regimes that had incubated them were now constraints on their development. In many Asian 
countries, it seemed that change would be imposed by economic crisis and put an end to the 
robber baron era of capitalism. For many Western observers, including within the IMF and 
the World Bank, the Asian economic crisis signalled the ultimate triumph of markets and the 
end of those regimes that had refused to embrace its disciplines (Friedman 1997). 
 
However, change did not take place as expected. Despite the fact that poverty and economic 
performance remained entrenched in much of sub-Saharan Africa and other poorer regions, 
regimes proved able to preserve their authority and to consolidate the economic and political 
power of ruling coalitions, resisting or hijacking programmes of institutional reform and 
‘good governance’. Enthusiasm among Western governments and donors for new champions 
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of reform in countries like Kenya and Uganda evaporated as these and other governments 
bypassed attempts to impose conditionality on development assistance. Such regimes were 
able to bolster their bargaining capacity with income from oil and mining in particular, 
providing them with a degree of autonomy from the demands of their own citizens as well as 
requirements of global governance (Moore 2001; Bates 2006). This leverage vis a vis 
demands from Western governments and donors has been enhanced by accelerating Chinese 
investment where financial support carries no demands for such reforms (Watts 2006)vi.. 
Foreign involvement in the exploitation of resources and in the laundering and banking of 
illegal windfalls has benefited many local regimes. As Reno has shown, some rulers in weak 
African states have even used foreign firms not only for financial support but to enable them 
to conduct offensives against old patronage networks and insurgencies and deal with other 
states and multi-lateral agencies (Reno 1997). 
 
Scholars of Latin America and the Philippines had always been more pessimistic about the 
possibility of reform in governance and policy. For some, it was considered the persistence of 
predatory oligarchies was a consequence of the relationship of powerful business families 
with incoherent states. Economic growth is argued to reinforce the power of social interests 
resistant to reforms that would break up rent-seeking coalitions and impose general rules on 
business. In contrast, it was claimed that the rise of a modern rational state is more likely 
where power resides, at least in the early stages, with a class of office-holders who are the 
main beneficiaries of rents extracted from a politically disorganised business class. Here the 
state is assumed to possess the autonomy to impose reform and nurture a private sector more 
likely to tire of the uncertainties of rents and seek more formal modes of economic 
governance (see Hutchcroft 1998: 45-64).   
 
There are two problems with this institutional hypothesis. First, neo-liberal reform has indeed 
taken place in some of these client regimes, driven by a range of perhaps unexpected new 
political entrepreneurs located in the political margins. v These saw fiscal austerity, 
privatisation programmes and trade and investment reforms as an opportunity to undermine 
entrenched elites and to construct new political bases in league with provincial and middle 
and lower ranking classes together with emerging corporate and financial interests (see 
Weyland 2003). Such neo-populist democracies dispensed with earlier forms of corporatist 
alliances or settlements, including with labour unions, constructing plebiscitary relationships 
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with the unorganised poor  and formerly marginal elements of the lower middle classes. This 
anti-organisational bent, argues Weyland, has important affinities with neo-liberalism. “As 
populism wants to protect the unity of the people against politicking factions and selfish 
elites, so neo-liberalism seeks to protect the equilibrium of the market against the 
machinations of mercantilist rent-seekers” (Weyland 2003: 1098). 
 
At the same time, centralised authoritarian states have not produced the sort of reform 
expected. Anatoly Chubais, the architect of the 1990s shares for loans privatisation that 
opened the door for the emergence of Russia’s oligarchy, claimed that despite the chaos, 
corruption and inequity that accompanied it, not only was ‘shock therapy’ the only possible 
way of creating private property but that the oligarchs that emerged would themselves 
increasingly tire of the arbitrary and discretionary authority that made their ascendancy 
possible and see that moving on to the next stage requires a system based on rules that ensure 
their general interests (cited in Ostrovsky 2003, 2004). This view had parallels with the ideas 
of Marxist analysts who also saw in the arbitrary handover of state assets to well-placed 
individuals, a process nothing less than unconstrained ‘primitive accumulation’ essential to 
the early stages of capitalist development. This world of political deals, gangsters and 
violence would be cured only as the state secured the position of the oligarchs through 
property rights and via the increasing interest of business in an orderly system of regulated 
market capitalism (Holdstrom and Smith 2000). 
 
Yet, the political future was not to be determined by an increasingly mature business 
community demanding ‘good governance’ and democratic reform but by a powerful state 
asserting it ascendancy over the emerging private oligarchs. Faced with the prospect that 
private wealth might spill over into a broader political challenge funded by some of the new 
oligarchs, President Putin moved to recapture the agenda of change. This was a move 
designed not to roll back the market but to subordinate the oligarchs within the ambit of the 
state itself and to renationalise many of the commanding heights of capitalism. Elsewhere, 
the private sector and the middle class have not been the drivers of neo-liberal reform but, 
more often, allies of authoritarian regimes and their supporting elites and enmeshed in 
predatory systems of governance.  
 
In the case of Asian economies affected by the economic crisis, it is true the IMF was able to 
impose unprecedented programmes for reforms in governance in return for huge financial 
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bailouts in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. These included special corruption 
watchdogs, arms-length procurement practices, transparency regulations, increased property 
rights, capacity training for officials and remuneration strategies as well as programmes of 
democratic reform and political and administrative decentralisation. vii But this did not 
produce the expected results.  
 
In post-crisis Thailand, business achieved its most complete ascendancy over the state 
following the electoral victory of the Thai Rak Thai party of new Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawat. Reacting against the hard line neo-liberal reforms of immediate post crisis 
governments, beleaguered Thai business interests sought to consolidate its position vis a vis 
the advance of global markets. Policies were put in place to stem the flow of external 
corporate takeovers and to slow the pace of privatisations and corporate reform. At the same 
time, the political ascendancy of business was consolidated in an increasingly centralised 
system of money politics appealing to the poor where a new social contract to draft broad 
political support included highly populist measures for health insurance and village level 
grants. In an important sense, the Thai bourgeoisie adopted a Fujimori solution to their 
problems (Hewison 2005). When metropolitan middle classes reacted against this business-
led populist revolution, they did so in alliance with conservative elites gathered around the 
monarchy and the army.  
 
In Indonesia, old power relationships between business and the state remained relatively 
intact after the crisis. Although forced out of sectors like finance and banking, Indonesian 
conglomerates moved into booming resources and property sectors, retaining the essentially 
predatory relationships with politicians and state officials albeit within a more diffuse and 
disorganised state apparatus. Technically bankrupted business groups held onto their key 
assets by emptying their banks and sending the cash overseas, stalling foreign creditors or 
warehousing their debt with the government agencies responsible for the recapitalisation of 
banks, and fighting efforts to seize assets or prosecute them by using corrupt courts, 
effectively socialising the costs of their losses (Hamilton-Hart 2002; Robison and Hadiz 
2004). Despite the collapse of centralised authoritarian rule and new political and 
administrative reforms, democratic reform and decentralisation appear to have enabled the 
same systems of business-state relations to be reproduced, albeit across a wider range of 
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alliances and within a disorganised system of money politics, extending down into the 
provinces and sub provinces (Hadiz 2004, 2007).  
 
Conclusion 
Neo-liberal and liberal pluralist expectations of a grand liberal convergence towards markets, 
democracy and ‘good governance have been disappointed. Social power and state authority 
have evolved in quite different ways, not as a resistance to markets but as new and apparently 
viable models of accommodation. In particular, middle classes and business have often 
proven to be highly illiberal in their political preferences. Policy-makers in the development 
arena are faced with two main problems. It is not sufficient to identify potential progressive 
forces in the expectation they will be able to effectively operate on behalf of reform while 
overarching sets of power relationships remain intact. And illiberal models of state authority 
and social power are surviving and flourishing in the market society and economy. These are 
the elephants in the room. The question is what can be done with them. Is it really possible to 
outflank them or to transform them through institutional or policy reform? Or will 
development agencies be forced to work with them and to accept collateral damage to 
development programmes? Or should the whole development effort simply retreat into 
methodological reviews or as support to larger national strategic objectives? These questions 
will be tackled in chapter Nine of this volume.  
   
Notes 
i It should be noted that the idea that institutions would emerge organically as rational 
individuals addressed problems of transactions costs was supplemented by a recognition 
within the new institutional economics that collective action dilemmas may have to be 
addressed externally and from within the state and that these solutions might not produce 
efficient outcomes because they would necessarily reflect specific interests (see, North, 1995)   
ii  The view of institutions as both an explanation for political and social problems and a 
solution for them is a central theme in World Bank writing on institutions. See also Bates 
(2006) and Levi (2006).   
iii A comprehensive analysis of the attachment of the World Bank and other development 
organisations to policies of decentralisation can be found in Hadiz (2010) pp. 1 – 39.   
iv  These include such figures as Museveni of Uganda, Rawlings of Ghana, Chiluba of Zambia 
and Muapa of Tanzania and Kibaki of Kenya.  
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v Among these are Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina, Carlos Bolona in 
Peru, Miguel Rodriguez in Venezuala and Fernando Collor in Brazil 
vi These became, for example, the basis of Chad’s refusal of World Bank demands that it restrict 
the use of its loans for development programmes rather than for arms purchases (Massey and 
May 2006) and the continuing ability of Sudan to chart an independent course in economic and 
geo-political strategy. Former World Bank Head, Wolfowitz, has expressed concern that 
Chinese bank loans, particularly in Africa, could undo the objectives of debt forgiveness 
programmes introduced by the West by opening opportunities for further plunges into debt 
(Crouigneua, and Hiault 2006). In Southeast Asia, too, the surge of investments from China, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan (see, Watts 2006; UBS 2006) bring quite different 
implications for the broader politics of governance in that region. 
vii It has often been the best remunerated and trained sections of the civil service, including in 
the financial ministries and central banks, that have been at the heart of many financial 
scandals (see, for example, Hamilton-Hart 2001). Applying salary increases for civil servants 
to reduce incentives for corruption and the costs of being honest is a popular strategy for 
changing behaviour by institutional means among neo-liberal political economists (see, 
McLeod, 2005). But this assumes a short term rational choice calculation that ignores the role 
of corruption as a cement for wider political and social relations. As Harrison (2005: 252) has 
observed, higher pay scales have simply fed into existing systems of clientalist and informal 
politics in many African countries. 
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3. Obstacles to Using Political Economy Analysis 
 
Richard Robison 
Emeritus Professor, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia 
 
In the final analysis, development practitioners must operate within constraints imposed not 
only by the forces and interests that underpin recipient governments but by their political and 
economic paymasters. There are three main constraints. One is the constraint imposed by 
highly influential ideological views that politics is something to be removed, contained or 
circumvented in favour of managerial forms of authority. These may conflict with attempts to 
mobilise progressive social forces or enhance democracy. A second constraint is that 
imposed by politicians and financial controllers to produce quantifiable measures that 
demonstrate fiduciary responsibility. A third constraint is imposed by investment 
communities or foreign policy officials in donor countries who will require that development 
policy enhances regimes that are supportive of economic or geo-strategic interests.  
  
The Constraints of Ideology 
As we have noted in previous chapters, while there is recognition that politics exists, there is 
reluctance within important sectors of the development industry to accept that politics is 
anything other than a constraint on development rather than being the very process within 
which different processes of development are forged. The idea of politics as something 
antithetical to rationally efficient decision-making that is the underlying position within the 
neo-liberal camp requires the establishment of technocratic and managerial forms of 
authority and governance. On the other hand, pluralists see politics in terms of the interplay 
of overlapping and shifting interests that can be brought into the development agenda by 
various devices of ownership, participation, partnership and inclusion. In other words, while 
the problem may be conceived as political in a way not recognised by neo-liberals, the 
resolution involves negotiation that is abstracted from any notion of overarching, structural 
relations of power.   
 
Satisfying Funders 
All of the major public development organisations are funded through the budgets of national 
governments or are themselves international public organisations. As such, they are hostage 
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to specific kinds of bureaucratic processes that may be explained in the context of the new 
public management. Governments need to demonstrate how the tax dollars and euros 
expended on development are effective. Ministers of Development need to defend their 
budgets against the competing claims of other departments and their domestic constituencies. 
And revelations of waste or misuse of funds spent on the citizens of other countries are 
highly sensitive matters. Thus, apart from episodic expenditures on humanitarian tragedies, 
politicians are required to explain to suspicious publics that development budgets are 
effective ways of achieving national interests.  As Eyben notes, these pressures also represent 
the focus on risk in Western bureaucracies and the rise of the audit culture (Eyben 2005: 100, 
101).    
 
The result has been a constant regime of review and assessment in which measures of success 
are defined by processes rather than development outcomes and expressed in quantitative and 
easily demonstrated terms. It is a process that favours measurable indicators such as the 
supply of physical projects, ‘good governance’ and institutions. Thus, considerable energy 
has been injected into measuring ‘good governance’, for example (see, Kauffman, Kray, 
Maztuzzi 2007). The Millennium Development Goals provide a set of Key Performance 
Indicators for officials that require ways of measuring levels of poverty or illiteracy, for 
example. The construction of schools, delivery of training courses, provision of information, 
travel and workshops are all useful measures for quantitative review. Thus, institution 
building projects are ideal for such review in the New Public Management model. The 
energies of the development agencies are shifted from tackling the causal problems of 
development to that of devising methodologies for measuring performance and selecting the 
sorts of activities that are best measured.  
 
The point is engaging with politics will not produce results that are easily quantifiable. It will 
be hard to convey a message about what is being done (even achieved) to taxpayers. And the 
prospects of such longer term attempts at local political engagement, particularly around the 
budget process, conflicts with a risk-averse approach that is concerned with fiduciary 
objectives and fear of reinforcing patronage systemsi.  
 
Dealing with Contending Ideological, Corporate and Security Priorities within Donor 
Countries 
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As we have seen in chapter two and will be illustrated by the case studies, regimes that 
obstruct governance reforms are not universally fragile and unstable, such regimes are 
often surprisingly stable and cohesive entities that have proven resilient even in the face of 
political and economic crises. They derive an important resilience from their ability to 
deliver power and wealth to key interests in society. And they may also derive power 
because they are important allies in securing commercial advantages for private corporate 
investors or in supporting the geo-strategic priorities of officials in defence, trade and 
foreign affairs ministries of donor countries. This means the problem of how to deal with 
these regimes and oligarchies may be hotly contested within donor countries.   
 
One critical factor is that there are important ideological differences between liberal pluralist 
and neo-liberal (so-called market fundamentalist) views of development priorities. So-called 
market fundamentalists, often dominant in the banking and financial sectors and in the 
economics profession and within economic Ministries of the West are often ambivalent about 
democracy because it is seen inevitably to act as an incubator for rent-seeking majoritiesii. 
There is a preference for techno-managerial forms of governance that redefine the 
relationship between state and society within de facto social contracts intended to free 
technocratic elites from the debilitating effects of political bargaining with organised rent-
seekers in representative organisations like political parties and trade unions. It is this 
emphasis upon controlling distributional coalitions and setting up powerful regulatory 
capacities that have been central to US efforts at democracy promotion programmes and 
embody a particular form of what critics have called ‘low intensity democracy’ or ‘liberal 
authoritarianism’ where the market is removed from the arena of representative politics and 
constituted within a technocratic and legal status (Gills 2000). Such ideas as participation and 
citizenship are understood in terms of functional co-option into market society rather than in 
terms of collective rights to contest political agendas embodied in classical liberal or social 
democratic thinking (Jayasuriya 2005).  
 
Such views resonate with private investors in the West who are less interested in free markets 
than in the particular advantages that might be gained by individual investors even if these 
are facilitated by a neglect of regulation in the collective interest or by various forms of state 
or political intervention in the market. The corporate sector in the West has been involved in 
protracted struggles to escape regulatory constraints on financial markets, health and 
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environmental standards, labour laws and ethical constraints on business practice that persist 
in residual social democracies (see, for example, Simpson 2008). Globalisation, ironically, 
has therefore meant an opportunity to seek competitive advantages within different systems 
of governance, looser regulation and where taxes and labour costs are kept low by political 
means. 
 
This explains the mixture of admiration and disapproval with which Singapore is regarded. 
As Rodan (2006) points out, Singapore regularly appears at the top of tables of economic 
freedom produced by various market-oriented foundations and by the Wall Street Journal. 
This clearly illustrates the attractions of government that can guarantee to private investors 
high levels of stability, infrastructure while also containing demands from distributional 
coalitions, including pressures for collective social goods. We also see, in the case of 
Indonesia, nostalgia for the highly centralised rule of the former Soeharto regime which is 
seen to have provided certainty and enforcement of property rights. By contrast, the current 
democratic regime, beset by the rise of administrative decentralisation and parliamentary 
process, is seen to offer no such certainty for investors (Duncan and McLeod 2007). It is a 
sentiment echoed in the business community. Comparing China to Indonesia, for example, 
former Vice President (and prominent businessman), Jusuf Kalla, recently observed, ‘China's 
strength is that it can plan and implement. Our system, which is too democratic with too 
much individual freedom that often disregards the rights of others, has made it difficult for us 
to build infrastructure … As long as individual right is above public responsibility, we will 
not progress... That's the only problem we have now’ (Suparno 2007).  
 
In situations where the problems of dealing with corrupt officials and judges or financial and 
banking sectors without distinction between borrowers and lender, these can be offset against 
the potential bonanza offered by the capture of rents as illustrated in the financial feeding 
frenzy that directed huge flows of funds into increasingly speculative Asian markets in the 
years preceding the Asian economic crisis (Wade 1998; Kristof and Sanger 1999). Such risks 
can be lessened where they are offset by hedging through complex derivative instruments and 
by the direct support of government Import Export banks and insurance providers and where 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) might be expected to come to the rescue, bailing out 
imprudent investors rather than allowing them to face the consequences of bad decisions. It is 
ironic that one editorial in the free market Asian Wall Street Journal characterised the IMF as 
nothing less than a form of socialist international (1997).   
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Concerns by development agencies to reform ‘bad governance’ or to attack problems of 
poverty may also be counter to other priorities within donor governments to keep intact the 
regimes that preside over these circumstances. Such regimes can provide the political muscle 
to eliminate political movements that are radical or social democrat in nature and challenge 
the market agenda even where they preside over poor development records and social 
repression. These priorities prevailed in the Cold War, where a range of anti-communist 
dictatorships in Latin America and the Middle East remained close allies of the West despite 
their poor development and human rights credentials. And in more recent times, concerns for 
development and governance reform contend with other priorities to mobilise allies as the 
struggle for global economic and political hegemony becomes more intense, particularly as 
China enters the arena. As security issues once again become serious competitors with 
reformist ideas there are shifts from multilateral to bilateral relationships in trade and legal 
jurisdiction (see Higgott 2004). Some Western governments have been quick to withdraw 
support from, or even to champion ‘good coups’ against, democratic governments that 
undermine existing geo-strategic interests or prove hostile to private investors. The ability to 
deliver real security and economic benefits to the US in particular, and to transform failed 
states into effective states, rather than capacity to deliver accountability and transparency in 
the management of markets, is clearly an important agenda for many donor governments. 
 
Notes 
i See Unsworth’s (2009) observation referring to conclusions drawn from research by ODI. 
ii James Dorn (1993: 601) of the Cato Institute has argued that, ‘Democratic government is no 
substitute for the free market’. Hayek himself saw the ideal market state as one that essentially 
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4 Driving Development Effectiveness: Donors’ politics without opposition 
 
Caroline Hughes and Jane Hutchison 




Challenges to the liberal consensus on governance in the developing world have attracted 
much attention, particularly in recent years under the rubric of concerns about 
“development effectiveness”. This has promoted new interest amongst international donors 
in political economy, as evidenced in research agendas increasingly focused on obstacles to 
change, such as the World Bank’s study of governance reform “under real world 
conditions”; and those focused on levers of change, such as the British Department for 
International Development DFID’s “drivers of change” approach. However, political 
economy insights have proved difficult for donors to operationalise and have yet to feed 
into substantial new departures in donor practice.  
 
Donors’ turn to political economy takes place against the backdrop of broader debates 
surrounding the international agenda for action set by the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Development Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration asserted the centrality of such terms as 
“ownership” and “partnership” in developmental discourses, and this has been understood 
in sharply divergent ways by political analysts.  Some consider the ownership agenda is too 
apolitical (Hyden, 2008a; Unsworth, 2009; Rosser and Simpson, 2009), while others see it 
as ‘augmenting, and not undermining, established notions of good practice’ (Armon 2007: 
654).  
 
One debate is whether the insertion of concerns for “ownership” and “partnership” into 
donors’ relations with recipient government implies new relations of commitment from 
recipients or control by donors. Supporters of the ownership agenda consider it a matter of 
donors securing recipients’ commitment to the implementation of policies and programs, 
which extends to recipients taking responsibility for implementation (Whitfield and Fraser 
2009a: 3) i. Critics tend to see this instead as donors wanting more control over the agenda 
as a way of limiting policy choices on the part of recipient governments (Whitfield and 
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Fraser 2009a: 3, also Hayman 2009: 594). Thus, for Whitfield and Fraser, who has control 
is more critical than agenda contents and, indeed, how agendas are selected and pursued – 
through democratic, patrimonial or corrupt processes – because they consider ‘the question 
of whether a society can minimise foreign influence over its policymaking is logically and 
politically prior to questions about the quality of internal democracy and about the content 
of policies themselves.’ (Whitfield and Fraser 2009a: 5).  
 
A further development with respect to the ownership/partnership agenda has been the 
emergence of the “new conditionality” critique.  This has spawned a large literature on the 
politics of development practices which principally seeks to variously analyse technical 
processes as a form of coercive “biopower” (Duffield, 2007).  Drawing on the writings of 
Foucault, this literature regards aid practices as comprised of myriad micro-technologies of 
discipline, which aim to reshape recipient agencies in accordance with donor rationalities 
(see, for example, Gould, 2005; Harrisson, 2004; Li, 2007).  Where this succeeds, it is 
argued the result is to effect a depoliticisation of development by virtue of removing the 
bases for resistance within recipient states.   
 
By contrast, our view is that international donors can be in less control of the development 
agenda than these and other authors suggest. Our point is not that donors generally disdain 
control; instead it is that they achieve it rather less often than is supposed as the political 
space for contestation over development agendas (and their implementation) remains rather 
more open than is claimed.  Furthermore, we argue that the space for contestation of donor 
policies depends upon the way that aid money and policies function in the context of the 
local political economy.  In countries where there is high aid dependence, for example, this 
may lead to technocratic elites internalising donor models, as in contexts such as Rwanda 
and Tanzania.  Alternatively, different local political economies of aid may see a variety of 
context-specific strategies of co-optation, negotiation, manipulation and outright resistance.  
In our case studies in Southeast Asia, we found that international donors are less hegemonic 
and intrusive than is often portrayed; and the outcome of their intrusions, regardless of the 
ideology motivating them, is not always necessarily anti-poor and retrogressive, as the 
Foucaultian approach tends to predict ii. Therefore, we accept the premise that donors are 
working from – that political economy issues are critical to aid effectiveness – what we do 
not accept is that the turn has achieved a break with past thinking and practices. We are not 
alone in stating that the donors’ turn to political economy has been inconsequential (see 
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Unsworth 2009); where we make a contribution is in highlighting that the problem lies with 
donors’ conceptions of development as a public good, essentially uncontested and 
objectively known, and opposition as temporary, compensatable and open to 
“partnerships”.  
 
Unsworth rightly indicates the important intellectual and institutional barriers to donors 
acting more politically; however, we reject her view that development happens when the 
right political incentives are created (Unsworth 2009: 889-890; also Williams et al. 2009). 
Instead, we argue political economy analyses need to understand conceptions of 
development or “good governance reform” as ideological constructs emerging from 
struggles between coalitions with different, structurally determined, material interests and 
resources of power. Hence, the analyses of the prospects for particular development 
projects need to proceed by carefully identifying the historically-determined interests, 
distributions of power, and processes by which alliances – not “partnerships” – between key 
groups are formed and maintained. In this way, donors can better know how their programs 
are interpreted by recipients, how this affects their alliances (or not) and, accordingly, how 
formal and informal shifts in alliances can strengthen or weaken different ideological 
perspectives, over short and long terms. 
 
This paper is written in four sections. In the first section we explain the nature of the turn to 
political economy that donors and their consultants are now actively debating. This is 
followed by two sections on the attempts to operationalise political economy analyses, the 
latter directly critiquing three donor documents. Finally, we suggest an alternative 
conceptual typology for repoliticising development; one in which the reform orientations of 
participants are considered centrally.  
 
Capturing donors’ turn 
With greater international donor acknowledgement of the political dimensions of aid 
effectiveness, political economy analyses are being viewed as an important means of 
achieving improvements in development outcomes (see SIDA 2006, World Bank 2009, 
DFID 2009). In this section we outline how this turn is generally explained before 
proceeding with more directed coverage of the conceptions of politics involved. The 
literature we refer to is not limited to the publications of donors themselves, but includes 
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contributions also from a number of institutes and think-tanks with policy and research 
links to bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.  This means there is not only a degree of 
institutional overlap arising from individuals crossing over as consultants and staff, a 
number of the same individuals are also critical observers of the turn, able to reflect back in 
their institutions on what is occurring. As a result, the discussion below serves to cover the 
common themes defining the turn as well some of the more outlying views, not reflected in 
donor documents, but which indicate what is being debated more fully. 
 
International donor’s turn to political economy analysis is most often expressed as the 
desire to identify the “underlying” causes of the outcomes from  their interventions (see 
Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005: 19, Booth et al. 2005: 2, Cammack and Thompson 2008, 
World Bank 2009). Where attention had been on poor governance, faulty institutions and or 
lack of “political will”, the intention now is to “go beneath the surface” of these to account 
for these. In this, no one framework of analysis is agreed upon and recommended; mostly 
there is some variation on the conceptual mix of “actors, institutions and structures”. A 
second common theme is that donors are wanting to identify not only the obstacles to 
change, but also the positive levers or “drivers of change’ (World Bank 2009: ix, DFID 
2005).  
 
There is rather more critical comment on what this means for donors’ practices, generally 
the need for them ‘to start with the country context, not with a specific policy agenda’ 
(DFID 2003: 11). Criticisms of technocratic approaches to governance reform are a clear 
influence here; both with respect to the “straight to Weber” concern to replicate 
international best practice and the focus on formal institutions, resulting in too little 
attention to the informal processes that can explain how political actors actually behave and 
how political systems really work (Hyden 2008b, Unsworth 2006). Whilst for some, this 
suggests a need for interventions to be adapted to local/country circumstances, for others it 
suggests more – that the local should be a source of policy and programming initiatives. For 
example, to quote Hyden: 
To date, donor agencies have acted as if the glass is half empty. The challenge has 
been to fill the void with ideas and practices that have worked elsewhere. What if 
the glass is viewed as half full and the challenge is to fill it by improving practices 
already on the ground in Africa? (Hyden 2008b: 1-2) 
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However, starting with the country context is not the same as a political approach as it can 
suggest adaption to the status quo. Booth and his colleagues are more concerted advocates 
of donors as behaving as brokers of change. Their starting point is there are often 
discernable opportunities for reformers  ‘to use strategies and tactics’ to shape development 
outcomes (Buse and Booth 2008: 3, Booth et al. 2006). From this they conclude donors 
need to allow greater space for ‘adaptive’ learning and be much more flexible and 
responsive in their planning and financing of projects and programs (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2009: 25). In short, what these researchers have more in mind is that development is 
a political process, albeit one they view as negotiable.  
 
Going a step further, it is signalled that politics is not something to be avoided; as the 
essence of development is that donors have to ‘deal with it’ (Booth et al. 2006: 1, Unsworth 
2009: 887). As Grindle put it before, it is necessary to ‘accept politics, not as a spanner in 
the economic works, but as the central means through which societies seek to resolve 
conflict over issues of distribution and values’ (Grindle 1991: 45). Thus, Edelmann talks of 
using ‘positive language’ (Edelmann 2009: 74)  with respect to political factors. By this he 
means, instead of thinking that politics is always in the way of things, there is a need to 
acknowledge the legitimacy and rationalities of political behaviours in their own terms.  
 
We can see then that the literature on donors’ turn to political economy offers plenty of 
pointers to the implications for development practice. However, despite the urging to do 
more with political economy analyses, politics continues to be conceived of in largely 
stunted and instrumental terms. In the next section we indicate this in reviewing the various 
attempts to operationalise political economy. Overwhelmingly, either political economy 
insights are used to adapt to the status quo – and essentially avoid politics – or, 
alternatively, they are viewed into “factors” in the current tool bag of donor interventions 
(Booth et al. 2006, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 45).  
 
Operationalising political economy  
Broadly it is accepted that international donors have found it particularly difficult to 
operationalise political economy; to translate research insights into actionable strategies 
(Warrener 2004, Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005: 23-25, Scott 2007: 89, de Haan and Everest-
Phillips 2007, Bird 2008, Unsworth 2009, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 45). As Unsworth 
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makes clear, donors’ approaches have remained largely technocratic and ‘there is little 
evidence that it is prompting them to question their (mostly implicit) assumptions about 
how development happens’ (Unsworth 2009: 884).  
 
First, political economy analyses are said to enable international donors to trim their 
ambitions for reform to better align them with what is “feasible” and “realistic” in different 
contexts (World Bank 2009: 12-13, DFID 2009: 150-17). As Unsworth (2009: 887) 
observes, ‘a common experience is that political analysis can prompt country programme 
managers to adjust their expectations, review overall priorities, and make changes in project 
design and aid modalities’ (Unsworth 2009: 887). The trimming can apply to goals, 
timeframes and expectations of a clear result (Booth et al. 2006: 60, Dahl-Østergaard et al. 
2005, de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007: 12). Political economy analyses are considered to 
equip international donors with the knowledge to better understand the risks of failure they 
face and to cut their cloth accordingly. In this light, the donors are in fact aiming to avoid 
political engagement by sticking to working within the status quo.  
 
Alternatively, political economy analyses are operationalised as a way to equip donors to 
identify leaders or “champions” to be the drivers of change. Williams et al. describe these 
as individuals within political and bureaucratic elites who are ‘motivated by considerations 
of the greater public good’ to ‘play a pivotal role in promoting change’(Williams et al. 
2009: 28). However, they warn such individuals are not necessarily powerful; they may be 
committed but ineffective. Also, they may ‘often have multiple agendas and issues’ and so 
‘their needs, incentives, and constraints’ need to be fully understood (World Bank 2009: 
47). The focus on elites is significant: de Ver (2008: 49) includes leaders from business and 
civil society, but her attention to “coalitions” is still limited to the interactions among them 
and not between them and the marginalized poor, for example. 
 
More than any other, there is a view that political economy insights can be operationalised 
by efforts directed at changing resource and or political incentive structures (Landell-Mills 
et al. 2007, Booth 2008, Unsworth 2009, Chhotray and Hulme 2009: 41, Williams et al. 
2009). Incentives are in this respect the “carrot” alternative to the “stick” of conditionality: 
both are considered to encourage desired behaviours. Whereas “champions” are essentially 
already made, here the intention is to create and shape new reformers.  This can be allied 
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with the concern to identify the winners and losers from change, to ensure that the losers are 
sufficiently compensated to avert their resistance (Meier 1993: 387).  
 
However, despite there being wide acceptance of the role of incentives as drivers of change, 
there is little actual analysis ‘of how incentives and political processes operate in practice’ 
(Landell-Mills et al. 2007: 5, also de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007: 10). Williams et al. 
(2007) are critical of attempts to use only financial leverage, arguing for longer term 
institutional changes to support actor behaviour; yet they do not abandon incentives, all 
they do is source them differently, in institutional frameworks. From our perspective, it is 
likely that the incentives international donors can offer are one or more among many that 
the targeted recipients face. Moreover, donor programs are often designed to link with – 
and promote – the very capitalist development processes that can provide other, “perverse” 
incentives not to participate or comply (by, for example, providing alternative revenue 
sources). It is one thing to examine the political economy of particular, “intentional” 
(planned) development processes; it is another to consider the political economy of related, 
“immanent” (structural) processes, and how these intersect with the planned interventions 
(see Cowen and Shenton 1996: 4). 
 
The thinking on incentives is linked to the ‘principal-agent problem’ in rational choice 
theory (see Nunberg et al. 2010). This is ‘the problem of motivating one party to act on 
behalf of another’ (World Bank 2009: 51): the issue being how to get one actor (the agent) 
to behave in ways that satisfy the preferences of another (the principal, the donor). 
Critically, because individuals are assumed to act according to their rational calculations of 
the best way to enhance their utility, they are thought to be best motivated to change by 
personal inducements. Linking incentives to utility maximisation does not enable 
understandings of the political process in terms of inequalities of power and ideology 
(Whitfield and Fraser 2009b: 36, Grindle 1991).   
 
Alternatively, political economy analyses are said to enable better communication 
strategies. DFID reports that political economy analyses have improved ‘the quality of 
dialogue and engagement with partners’ (DFID 2009: 18). Communication strategies are to 
be directed at reformers, opponents and the public in general to facilitate “voice”, 
deliberative dialogue and coalition building (Odugbemi and Jacobson 2008). In World 
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Bank terms, information campaigns and intensified dialogue with key stakeholders can be 
drivers of change in that they ‘deepen the understanding of reform issues and/or to win 
support’ (World Bank 2009: 20). Otherwise, the World Bank also refers to the need for 
‘information and communication campaigns’ (World Bank 2009: 21) in which international 
donors act as “honest brokers”. There is similar talk in relation to coalition building – 
wherein donors work to develop linkages between different pro-reform individuals and or 
groups to aggregate, support and embolden the drivers of change. For example, Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi speak of ‘another kind of facilitation, namely the brokering or negotiation 
of difficult change processes, turning potential realignments of interest into actual 
realignments’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: 21); there are ‘conditions in which an 
intelligent third party can expect to play a useful role, as an enabler of constructive 
realignments’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: 21) between different actors. Both the 
communication and honest broker approaches stress the contingencies in political 
alignments, but again with rather less attention being paid to the inequalities of power and 
ideology.   
 
Finally, there are attempts to operationalise political economy insights through donors 
acting to ‘build demand’ for change among citizens (AusAID 2007, Haley 2008). This is 
generally conceptualised as working ‘outside the state to build progressive change 
coalitions across civil society, the private sector and the media’ (DFID 2009: 6). Recently, 
AusAID has acknowledged that its own responses to the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action have focused on ‘ownership’ and ‘harmonisation’ (AusAID 2009: 1-2) 
with partner governments and not with in-country non-state actors. Accordingly, the agency 
is now working to see how ‘engaging with civil society can help extend “ownership” 
beyond central government’ (AusAID 2009: 1-2).  In this way, political incentives are 
operationalised in ways that recast the principals as citizens who can (or ought to) wield the 
weapon of accountability to demand good development from their agent politicians (who 
want to be re-elected) (World Bank 2009). 
 
Compared to the trim ambition response above, this is clearly a more proactive and indeed 
apparently political response from donors. However, a question is what demands are to be 
supported? Are we observing donors attempting to build new, previously untapped support 
for their own (struggling) programs, or are they looking to support (more concertedly than 
in the past) the “organic” demands of existing social movements? The gap between these 
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need not always be great, still it is useful to compare the “build demand” response to 
solidarity actions. Solidarity means engaging with the movements of poor and marginalised 
people because it is the authenticity of their demands, not the technical correctness of their 
solutions that makes them authoritative. An important point is that solidarity entails taking 
sides in historical conflicts that are as well often deeply ideological. By contrast, to what 
extent does the “build demand” response require that civil society organisations, for 
example, trim their own reform ambitions to comply with donors’ expectations for the 
resultant social order? The power relationships in these two are very different. Currently, 
most official development “partnerships” with civil society organisations are directed at the 
effective implementation of the donor’s program. 
 
Critiquing the turn 
In this section we elaborate on what is missing from the political economy turn of 
international donors. In bringing politics back into development, the donors have not 
radically transformed their notion of development, but have emptied the concept of 
politics of its meaning and resonance.  This is achieved through the retention in donor 
discourse of the idea that development ‘is a public good’ (Hyden 2008b: 3). The precise 
nature of this public good is affected by context to be sure, but it is objectively 
identifiable as operating in the public interest all the same.  This conception of 
development is antithetical to an understanding of development itself as political.  Hyden 
(notes, international donors have ‘tended to take authority, consensus and the pursuit of 
collective goals as givens. … [They have] acted on the premise that there is a “negotiated 
order” between equal partners’. He adds, ‘The alternative [view] that collective goals may 
be the negotiated outcome of conflicts between parties holding different degrees of power 
is never considered’ (Hyden 2008a: 262-63). 
 
Evidence for this conception of politics can be found across a range of donor documents.  
Here we focus on three: Building Demand for Better Governance: New Directions for the 
Australian Aid Program (2007), Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy 
Analysis: Good Practice Framework (2009), and The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens 
and States: Findings from Ten Years of DFID Funded Research on Governance and 
Fragile States 2001-2010 (2010). Although these documents are clearly not representative 
as a sample, they were selected following a wider review of numerous documents produced 
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by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. The first two, produced by the World Bank and 
AusAID, exemplify three broader patterns identified in donor approaches to political 
economy: namely, a reassertion of development as a public good, objectively identifiable; a 
consequent view of opposition as temporary and compensatable rather than structurally and 
ideologically determined; and the use of a variety of framing strategies to avoid awkward 
realities that threaten this view.  Such strategies include: emphasis on the “local” at the 
expense of the national; emphasis on service-delivery rather than, for example, 
redistribution of resources; an understanding of “structural factors” as primarily concerned 
with geographical realities and resource endowments rather than as related to issues of 
economy or class; and concentration on citizens as clients of public services rather than as 
contenders for control over state institutions and resources.  These emphases shore up a 
conception of development as essentially technical and uncontested, allowing an embrace 
of politics as a bargaining process rather than as a struggle aimed at reforming entrenched 
structures of power.   
 
In the World Bank’s formulation, two recurring concepts suggest the assertion of 
development as a public good.  The first concept is that of ‘progress’ (World Bank 2009: 
10): the utility of political economy analysis is that it allows analysis of situations ’where 
political economy factors appear to prevent progress that is otherwise considered possible 
from a technical perspective’ (World Bank 2009: 10). The unquestioned assumption that 
the World Bank policies equate to progress, objectively measured from ‘a technical 
perspective’ is maintained despite awareness that opposition may emerge from ‘underlying 
drivers such as the relationship between stakeholders, available rents and how they are 
distributed, interests, collective action dilemmas and incentives’ (World Bank 2009: 9-10). 
The Bank acknowledges that there may be opposition to reform: ’many of the reforms ... 
involve changes to power relations, rent-seeking approaches or to ingrained incentive 
structures’ (World Bank 2009: 11). Yet these are never problematised in terms of the 
assertion of “progress”: the Bank’s framework proceeds from the assumption that the 
Bank’s account of “good governance” is unquestionably for the good of all over the long 
term.  This has an impact on the way that the Bank conceives of opposition itself.  
Opposition cannot be regarded as serious or legitimate, even though it may be 
understandable in cases where particular groups bear an unfair proportion of the costs of 
development.  Yet this is regarded as either temporary or compensatable, given the overall 
dividends from “development”.  The idea that development may attack the material 
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interests of certain classes in society in order to benefit others is never taken seriously. 
Opposition is reduced to coordination problems associated with the difficulties of transition, 
rather than structurally and ideologically determined conflict. Consequently, structural 
analysis in World Bank documents is never fully elaborated: where it occurs it focuses 
mainly on geographical issues such as distributions of natural resource endowment.  There 
is no concern to unpick structural inequalities of dominance and subordination within 
society, or to analyse how these might be entrenched or attacked by development processes.   
 
For AusAID (2007 and 2009), equally, the emphasis on development as, ultimately, good 
for everyone has led to antagonism towards “oppositional” groups.  AusAID uses the 
concept of “partnership” to frame a different sort of politics, associated with the building 
and coordinating of networks of governance rather than with struggle between dominant 
and subordinate groups. AusAID defines partnerships as ‘strategies that increase links 
between local communities, local government and civil society in the planning, delivery 
and performance assessment of local services, or plans to meet other local development 
challenges’ (AusAID 2007: 7). This range of strategies can be used, it is asserted, ’to 
develop collaborative rather than oppositional relationships with government on various 
issues’ (AusAID 2007: 7). Indeed, partnerships are intended to be based upon ’mutual 
respect, transparency, shared planning and decision-making, co-ordination and support’ 
(AusAID 2007: 5). Rather than constituting a process which is essentially contested and 
contentious, producing new relations of domination and subordination, development is now 
regarded as largely uncontroversial and “of mutual benefit”.  The possibility of structurally 
disadvantaged groups existing in persistent relations of subordination vis-à-vis elite actors – 
whether state, non-state, or community elites – is precluded.  Instead, opposition is 
reframed as the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the public interest – hence the 
inordinate focus on patrimonialism as a form of rule that is antithetical to this.  Opposition, 
even in the classical liberal form of assertive scrutiny of the state and rights based resistance 
to expansions of state power, can therefore be largely dispensed with.   
 
AusAID’s model of partnership runs the risk of imposing forms of collaboration that 
disguise and marginalise conflict, rather than allowing it political expression.  Indeed, 
AusAID makes the ability to ‘have a respected and credible voice’ contingent upon the 
ability to engage in approved forms of partnerships, rather than taking a ‘blunt oppositional 
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approach’ (AusAID 2007: 2).  This narrows the scope of acceptable forms of opposition to 
well within the rather broad limits envisaged by classical liberalism. It further raises the 
prospect of replacing liberal institutions with new forms of network governance which, via 
partnership relationships backed by donor funds, expand the reach of the state far more 
widely than before. For donors, admitting the legitimacy of opposition entails undermining 
the authority of technocratic development models.  One strategy for ameliorating this 
problem is to narrow the scope of development, and this has been achieved by two means.  
First, the fashion for decentralisation has prompted a narrowing of the spatial horizons of 
development. Second, a shifting of the focus of “development” from economic growth to 
provision of services allows a narrowing of the conception of the state-society relationship.  
The assumption is that the major mode of engagement between citizens and governments is 
as consumers of services.  That citizens should be empowered to assess the performance of 
those services, is central to the new public management model associated with the 
neoliberalisation of states in the West from the early 1980s.  This is significant, since 
drawing upon the neoliberal, market-based model of community relations in fact obviates 
the need for the kinds of structural analysis that “demand for good governance” approaches 
initially posited.  Once the citizen has been tacitly recast as a consumer of services, 
“empowerment” becomes oriented around mechanisms for complaint or consultation about 
a restricted list of government activities (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007).  While the 
stranglehold of pernicious, “rent-seeking” and “patrimonial” elites remains to be tackled, 
there is little else on the liberal horizon for politics to deal with, except the day to day 
brokering of minor conflicts. 
 
Combining these two trends and pitching development as a process of service delivery 
which occurs at the “local” level within “communities” makes it easier to assert that it is 
also consensual.  Reliance upon the “community” and the local level has the effect of 
reducing the scope of politics to the level of the “village” while framing out larger scale, 
specifically structural processes of transformation.  Of course village politics can be and 
often is contentious and stratified; however, it is also often very well policed and poorly 
networked internationally, so that practices of opposition or processes of exclusion are less 
overtly contentious.  Looking specifically at service delivery also reduces the extent to 
which even intra-village politics interferes with the assumption of fundamental consensus.  
At the village level, most services – e.g. health, education, access to justice, use of the vote 
(AusAID, 2007: 4) – are externally provided goods;  their quality and scope are rarely the 
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subject of intra-village contestation unlike, say, regimes of land ownership and resource 
control.   
 
These discursive strategies allow the assertion of a “political” approach to development 
which in fact leaves almost entirely intact a regime in which donor priorities are imposed 
onto recipient communities and governments in a manner highly reminiscent of 
conditionality. Use of the term “ownership” does little to disguise this: although it features 
heavily in contemporary aid discourse, it is rarely used without ambivalence. For AusAID, 
a key concern of governance programs is ‘building the demand’ for good governance 
(AusAID 2007: 3, emphasis added), suggesting that intervention is required to orient 
community action to priorities identified by donors.  Elsewhere, however, the document 
specifies that local priorities ‘may not match donor-identified priorities’ and that ‘[l]essons 
from past experience highlight that when external actors identify these issues, they risk not 
only lack of local interest and ownership, but also legitimacy’ (AusAID 2007: 4). The 
World Bank shares the same ambivalence towards ownership as the AusAID document.  
Thus, the Bank comments: ’Because feasible solutions are sensitive to the political 
economy context, they should in principle be more compatible with country ownership a 
key principle of the development effectiveness agenda’ (World Bank 2009: 12).  Yet, as 
with the AusAID document, the preoccupation is with ‘building support‘ (World Bank 
2009: 15) for pre-existing World Bank agendas, and much discussion is devoted to the 
utility of the analysis for decisions and options for “the team” and for the “reputational risk” 
of the Bank (see World Bank 2009: 10). 
 
The DFID document, The Politics of Poverty, goes much further towards reinvesting the 
politics of development with ideas about structurally produced inequality and collective 
struggle. In synthesizing ten years of research, DFID reports: ‘Research has shown that 
political context and process is central to shaping the way politicians and policy makers 
decide for or against progressive changes that can deliver legitimate, capable, accountable 
and responsive states’ (DFID 2010: 5). The assertion of “progress” is associated with ‘the 
role of contestation and bargaining between the state, elites and citizens in building the 
public institutions that deliver development’ (DFID 2010: 5).  It is important to note that 
contestation and bargaining remain associated with means, rather than with ends.  
“Development” remains to be “delivered” rather than constructed through political action. 
4 Driving Development Effectiveness: Donors’ politics without opposition 
58 
However, in the report, a key concern with “the political settlement” allows attention to 
structural inequalities embedded in political institutions that maintain the dominance of 
elites at the expense of subordinate groups. 
 
Consequently, DFID’s agenda for rethinking development allows much more emphasis on 
struggles for power among unequal contenders than either AusAID or the World Bank is 
prepared to admit. DFID acknowledges the need to promote “active citizenship” whereby 
citizens develop as actors, capable of claiming rights and acting for themselves’ (DFID 
2010: 52). Furthermore, the development of citizens as actors is regarded as requiring the 
forging of “broad coalitions” which promote changes through ‘contention and contestation 
– both inherent in how they are framed and in how they are fought’ (DFID 2010: 55).  In 
regarding contentious coalitions as drivers of change, DFID explicitly challenges 
‘approaches to participation and civic engagement, which reduce such processes to 
technical solutions, or to notions of and processes of “national ownership”, achieved 
through non-contentious consultation and dialogue – but which veil vast chasms of 
differences in power and interest’ (DFID 2010: 55).  DFID regards the mere provision of 
state-sponsored space for participation as insufficient to challenge such inequalities: the 
mobilization of ‘broad-based coalitions’ on their own terms is required (DFID 2010: 64), 
and this should apply to ex ante contention over policy as well as ex-post contention over 
the quality of services delivered (DFID 2010). This leads DFID to an understanding of 
development which requires collective action to challenge dominant power relations. 
 
In this vein, DFID rejects AusAID’s appeal to the “local community” as a means of 
avoiding contentious politics. Indeed, the DFID report specifically asserts that decentralised 
institutions are ‘no more likely, in and of [themselves] to be more accountable’ (DFID 
2010: 47) noting that local politics is just as elitist as national politics, and that 
decentralization can be used to shore up national level inequalities, rather than to undermine 
them. 
 
However, even in DFID’s relatively radical formulations we see certain restrictions 
imposed. First, DFID persists in viewing collective struggles as something that need to be 
understood in order for donors to achieve their goals in promoting change.  For example, 
the report notes with respect to fostering coalitions for change that ‘strengthening 
organisations that are on the margins of the network and have few relations to the state is 
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likely to have limited impact.  On the other hand, strengthening those central to the network 
and well-connected to the state is likely to produce far greater impact’. DFID concludes 
from this ‘the need for some caution, especially on the part of external organisations, about 
their ability to engineer quick institutional fixes’ (DFID 2010: 70).  While the caveat is 
well-made, it is only relevant if collective action is seen as an instrument for “institutional 
fixing” rather than as an end in itself, in terms of challenging power relations in society. 
 
Similarly, in its concluding chapter, DFID notes that outsiders have far less influence over 
local development processes than is often assumed’ (DFID 2010: 92); yet again, this 
statement is delivered as a warning rather than as the starting point for rethinking the 
purpose and nature of “development”. 
 
Furthermore, throughout the report, key terms such as “exclusion/inclusion,” “mobilisation” 
and “legitimacy” are substituted for a careful analysis of different types of coalition or 
collective action.  The report claims that ‘capacity to mobilise supporters’ is essential for 
effective rule, and that this capacity flows from ‘social legitimacy’ (DFID 2010: 17).  
However, in this section of the report, legitimacy and mobilisation are seen as a function of 
institutional design rather than as a function of distributions of power achieved through 
struggles between elites and masses.  This, arguably, glosses over the particular dynamics 
of political action.  Although later in its report, DFID flags the need for broad-based 
coalitions to undertake collective action, these are regarded in terms of securing policy 
change rather than as fundamental to the political settlement itself.  As such, the opportunity 
to connect the achievement of policies with the redistribution of power in society is lost: the 
latter is discussed almost solely in respect of founding moments in post-conflict states, 
while the former is related to questions of service delivery, losing the opportunity to regard 
development, even outside fragile and post-conflict situations, as a process of open-ended 
struggle and contestation.   
 
The language of exclusion, inclusion and marginalisation opens up the prospect of 
discussing inequalities in distributions of power and access to resources, and making this 
fundamental to conceptions of development.  Here, too, DFID goes far further than either 
the World Bank or AusAID in acknowledging persistent structural inequalities between 
groups. However, DFID limits its discussion of these largely to issues of ethnicity and 
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gender. Thus particular and salutary attention is paid to the need to remove structural 
obstacles to the empowerment and participation of women, indigenous groups, ethnic 
minorities, dalits and so on (see for example, DFID 2010. 17; . 34; . 44). Far less attention is 
paid to a broader understanding of class-based structures of domination, which would make 
the politics of struggle a far more central and challenging problem for donors.  As it is, 
these elisions allow a conception of the politics of development which requires a 
redistribution of power at the margins, to be sure; but in the interests of legitimising elite 
settlements at the centre. 
 
Taking the repoliticisation of development entails reconceptualising politics as a struggle 
between coalitions, not merely at the margins, but at the centre; and allowing conceptions of 
development to be articulated as an outcome of this form of contention.  Political economy 
analysis thus needs to understand conceptions of development or “good governance reform” 
as ideological constructs emerging from struggles between coalitions with different, and 
structurally determined, material interests and resources of power.  We employ the term 
“alliances” rather than “partnerships” as a means of emphasising the contingent nature of 
political coalitions, and their formation as an effect of the interplay of structurally determined 
interests, distributions of resources, and contending ideological positions. Analysis of these 
allows development outcomes to be thought through, not merely as the extent of adherence to 
or “ownership” of liberal norms, but as part of an ongoing process of struggle for control 
over the distribution of power and resources in society. For donors, this has the added value 
of giving emphasis to the nature of contending groups and their processes of formation; the 
stability or otherwise of alliances over time; and the ideological underpinnings of conceptions 
of “development” that are being contested. 
 
From this perspective it makes sense to distinguish between, not only the constituencies that 
are “for” or “against” a particular project, but between the long term and short term interests 
of different groups more broadly.  Short term interests may or may not broadly align with 
project aims; long-term interests are more concerned with an overall perception on the part of 
interested actors regarding ways in which strategies for maintaining domination or 
contending for power will be affected in the broader sweep of change associated with neo-
liberalisation, globalisation and donor intervention. Understanding long term ideological 
imperatives can inform a political debate between donors and recipients that goes deeper than 
the sterile language of ownership and incentivisation. 
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Toward a Typology  
As a starting point for such analysis, we suggest a research agenda for political economists 
working in development contexts which begin by elaborating questions of how ideas of 
reform emerge from struggles between and within alliances of reformers and opponents. The 
alliances forged around reform, we contend, are not “partnerships” but the stuff of politics 
itself. As such, reformers themselves, in relation to a particular reform agenda, can be 
categorised into idealists; pragmatists; and opportunists (see Table One below).  Importantly, 
reformers (and opponents) may or may not have official responsibility for the reform’s 
implementation. Rather than look to who has official, institutional responsibility and seek 
their commitment or “ownership”, we suggest that a broader determination of reformers and 
opponents provides greater clarity about the interests and power relations involved and, also, 
about the nature of pro and anti-reform alliances and how they might be understood and 
maintained or countered. Alliances can be disaggregated into two subcategories: tactical 
alliances, based upon conceptions of short term instrumental gain; and dedicated alliances 
based upon ideological convergence around particular conceptions of reform (see Table 
Three below). Similarly, alliances against reform can be disaggregated into different types of 
opposition. We identify three categories: wreckers, who directly oppose reform as antithetical 
to short and long term interests; obstructers, who may be uninvolved in the short term in the 
particular reform, but whose interests and position, over the long term, form part of the 
overarching structures that idealists seek to transform; and recalcitrants, whose interests are 
tangential to the reform process, and whose passivity is a drag on reform efforts. Short term 
tactical or long term dedicated alliances may form between these different subcategories in 
order to oppose reform efforts. 
 
A further category of actors is also significant in analysis of reform prospects – namely 
gatekeepers (see Table Two below).  These are actors who hold power over the issue area 
and can facilitate or block reform action. This group is worth specific attention because, 
regardless of other interests that might come into play, maintenance of the gate keeping role 
is likely to form one of their key concerns. The role of gatekeepers is significant in 
considering how an interest in maintaining or altering long term distributions of power over 
policy processes is a key determinant of ideological convictions in particular policy areas. 
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Reformers  
(in relation to a 
particular reform 
agenda)  
Idealists:  interested in reform in so far 
as it advances long term goals of social 
transformation.  
Form dedicated alliances only with 
ideologically likeminded actors; likely 
to reject tactical alliances. 
Pragmatists:  have long term goals of 
social transformation but also consider 
short term gains significant. 
Form both dedicated and tactical 
alliances 
Opportunists:  have short term goals of 
self-interest; long term goals unrelated 
to reform agenda. Hence commitment 
is contingent and tactical. 
Form tactical alliances. 
Table One.  Types of Reformers 
 
In addition, other key actors are as follows: 
Gatekeepers Hold power over the issue area and 
therefore need to be onside in some 
way.   
Short term and long term goals may 
coincide with reformers in some 
respect, or not; but maintenance of 
gate keeping position is likely to be 
one of their objectives. May be drawn 
into tactical alliance, but the power 
they hold entails that they can 
withdraw at any time with little cost to 
themselves. 
Opponents Recalcitrants: oppose reform because 
they see no advantage in supporting it.  
Interests tangential but their 
cooperation is in some way necessary 
if their recalcitrance is an issue. 
Wreckers: oppose reform because they 
regard it as operating directly against 
their interests. 
Interests are directly affected, and they 
will attempt to form tactical alliances 
(e.g. with recalcitrants) or dedicated 
alliances in opposition. 
Obstructers Not directly involved in the reform 
process, but their interests and 
activities form part of the broader 
structures that make reform difficult. 
Interests and goals are wider than the 
specific reform programme, and form 
part of the overarching structures that 
idealists seek to transform. 
Table Two.  Other Key Actors 
 
A further step in constructing a typology for analysing the relationship between actors, 
distributions of power, and ideological approaches to reform, is to consider the power 
relations operating within alliances constructed around reform agendas.  Co-operative 
alliances emerge among groups with broadly even distributions of power among themselves.  
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As such, changes in perceptions of interest or divergence in goals are likely to more swiftly 
result in a breakdown in the alliance. Controlling alliances emerge among groups with 
unequal distributions of power among themselves (see Table Four below). Consequently, 
they may more easily maintain outward shows of stability even when under stress; but 
divergences in interest or breakdowns in common perceptions may cause the emergence of 
subversion from within. As asserted by a number of political economy analyses, the degree 
of formality of these alliances may be highly varied, from contractual or written agreements 
to loose groupings of support. 
 
Having disaggregated reformers, we disaggregated their alliances further. These alliances 
are cooperative: 
 Formal Informal 
Dedicated NGO or political party coalitions; long 
term programme funding relationships 
Networks 
Tactical Some kinds of short-term coalitions; 
project agreements 
Ad hoc movements; political deals 
involving accommodation and 
compromise 
Table Three.  Cooperative Alliances 
 
These alliances are controlling: 
 Formal Informal 
Dedicated Co-optation (e.g. membership of an 
advisory board, encouraging the member to 
shift allegiances or modify aspirations over 
the long term) 
Clientelism (e.g. promise of inclusion 
over the long term in a flow of benefits 
or informal rewards) 
Tactical Contractualism (e.g. one group is formally 
employed by another to achieve a 
particular purpose or legal or contractual 
obligations are brought into play to achieve 
compliance) 
Coercion (pressure and/or inducements 
brought to bear to ensure compliance 
over the short term) 
Table Four.  Controlling Alliances 
 
A crucial aspect of this kind of analysis is that it draws attention to shifts in distributions of 
power among and within alliances, and the effect of this on the ideological framing of reform 
agendas. As such, this typology is capable of sustaining a more nuanced analysis of fluid and 
contested situations than models based upon incentivisation of rational preference-pursuing 
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actors; or models based upon pragmatic replication of good-enough solutions. Analysis of the 
relationships between class structure, power, and ideology in the context of alliances of 
reform allows for richer appreciation of the way that strategies of contention are both 
constrained by context and continually evolving. As such, this approach allows a more truly 
political analysis of the ways in which reform coalitions emerge and subside, and, finally, a 
properly political analysis of the support role that donors can play in that process. 
 
Conclusion 
The political economy analyses that have become prominent in donor thinking over the last 
decade reflect, in our view, an astute, recognition of the centrality of politics to the   
conceptualisation of development and reform. However, donors have been unwilling to 
import an adequate conception of politics itself into their analysis, resulting in political 
economy approaches that have failed to offer new ways of understanding aid programming. 
In particular, there has been insufficient recognition that contention over development means 
and ends represents more than transitory conflict over temporary or compensatable costs and 
benefits attached to the mechanics of change. We argue for a richer conception of politics as 
comprising entrenched struggles between groups emerging as a result of structurally 
determined inequalities in the distribution of power and resources within society.  
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In general, the quality of governance in Cambodia is regarded by international aid donors as 
poor. Since the end of the Cold War, different aspects of governance have been a key 
concern of Western aid donors hoping to improve the country’s political stability and its 
development performance.  Consequently, in the context of heavy dependence on external 
aid, Cambodia has undergone twenty years of reform programmes aimed at rebuilding the 
state and rehabilitating civil society along the lines of liberal models.  However, the record 
has been mixed in terms of results. 
 
Successful integration of Cambodia into the regional economy from the mid-1990s led to 
spectacular rates of growth during the years of boom from 2002 to 2008, fuelled largely by 
regional investment from Japan, China, Korea and South East Asian neighbours.  However, 
Cambodia remains a poor country: the economy is dominated by a poor subsistence sector 
and growth has been narrowly focused on urban garment factories, a tourist industry 
surrounding the ruined temples of Angkor, and large agro-industrial plantations established 
in remote areas.  Political development has been equally skewed. In the years since the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia organised elections that were envisaged 
as setting Cambodia on the path to democracy, there has been a dramatic resurgence of the 
dominant Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).  The dominance of the party over the state takes 
the form of networks of politicised allegiance within ministries, local government, the armed 
forces and public services, which are effective at excluding opposition supporters from 
access to government jobs and contracts, and from benefit from state development projects.  
At the same time, international efforts in the 1990s to foster civil society in Cambodia as a 
key plank of international democracy promotion strategies have faltered.  Since the 1960s, 
decades of war, intervention and upheaval had constrained political space for contention. 
Although thousands of NGOs have been established in Cambodia since the formation of 
civic associations was legalised in 1992, political space has again closed down significantly 
from a high point of contestation around the turn of the century.  Strategies of intimidation, 
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including politically motivated assassinations of trade union leaders, defamation lawsuits 
against human rights activists and journalists, and police attacks against protests and 
demonstrations, have severely inhibited freedom of association and expression over the past 
decade. 
 
Donor emphasis on the promotion of electoral democracy, human rights and political 
freedoms in the 1990s gave way, following the electoral victory of the Cambodian People’s 
Party in 1998, and the shock of the September 11th attacks in New York in 2001, to a new 
approach comprised three main foci: stability, improvement in service delivery and 
improvement of the business environment.  The first focus, stability, was largely achieved 
from the end of the 1990s as the CPP’s emphasis on security and public order successfully 
ended the war.  The second two planks were to be achieved through an ambitious programme 
of governance reform, comprising judicial and armed forces reform; reform of public 
administration and systems of public financial management in the Ministries; and devolution 
of both power and functions to reorganised subnational governments. Central to these 
reforms was the cross-cutting issue of corruption regarded as compromising public sector 
reform efforts, undermining attempts to promote better services, and problematizing the 
business environment in a manner likely to undermine economic growth.  This approach to 
governance reform both emerged from and was enshrined in donor and government 
documents, including the two Governance Action Plans, produced in 2001 and 2006; the 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy produced in 2002; the government’s flagship 
Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia, Phase 1 
and 2, produced in 2003 and 2008; the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, 
produced in 2005; and the National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009-2013, 
produced in 2008.  These policy platforms have foregrounded the need to improve 
governance as a means to strengthen economic growth and promote development, reflecting 
concerns about governance that had been articulated since 1998 by Cambodia’s western 
donors. The reform programmes envisaged in these analyses and policy documents were 
subsequently translated into detailed implementation plans, with complete with benchmarks 
and monitoring indicators. An apparatus of joint donor-government technical working groups 
was created for each area of reform, responsible for monitoring the progress of 
implementation. 
Progress on implementation has been highly variable, suggesting that parts of these plans, at 
least, are formulated by the Cambodian government with an eye to stimulating flows of aid 
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rather than actually guiding reform policy. For example, Cambodia’s performance with 
respect to corruption has been abysmal. In Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Cambodia ranked 158th out of 180 in 2009, falling between Yemen and 
the Central African Republic, a slight improvement on its 2008 ranking of 166th. 
(Transparency International, 2009). The update on the National Strategic Development Plan 
for 2009-2013 articulates a liberal position close to that of the World Bank, in relating 
corruption to the quality of the business environment, stating, “For RGC, the elimination of 
corruption is a high priority because it is an obstacle to achieving its goal of sustained high 
growth by fostering private sector development in order to reduce poverty.” (Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 2009: 17). 
 
However, the nature of corruption in Cambodia is closely connected to the political economy 
of efforts to achieve peace and stability over the past thirty years, and to the growth of the 
private sector as the foundation of politicised rural development programmes.  The analysis 
of governance reform efforts in Cambodia presented here focuses on the nature of this 
political economy and the political forces thrown up by the transition from war to peace and 
the rapid integration of Cambodia into the booming South East Asian region after 2000. 
 
The Political Economy of Statebuilding in Cambodia 
Following the Vietnamese invasion in 1979 and the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, 
the new Cambodian government, found themselves building a new socialist regime under the 
purview of Vietnamese advisors in a country where socialist ideology had become 
thoroughly discredited.  Corruption flourished as a result of the discrepancy between 
Vietnamese and Cambodian government official promotion of collective farming and 
centralised control of prices and markets and the reality of a pragmatic slide into a shadow 
market economy in which ownership rights and distribution practices were facilitated by 
informal payments to disillusioned state cadres.  In 1989, economic reforms were enacted to 
legalise these de facto arrangements. However, access to legal procedures in the context of an 
extremely violent and predatory state was more easily available to the wealthy and the well-
connected, paving the way for processes of privatization that disadvantaged the subsistence 
sector of the economy, and the poor.  Cambodia has shifted from having a remarkably equal 
distribution of wealth in 1989 when land rights were formally granted to the tillers, to a 
highly unequal distribution, particularly in rural areas, and particularly in areas of rapid 
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natural resource exploitation. The Gini coefficient for landholdings from 1989 to 2004 
increased from virtually zero (perfect equality) to 0.63 – one of the highest levels of 
inequality in the Asian region. Since 2004, continued expropriation of rural land and violent 
mass evictions as well as a continued fostering of agro-industry through the award of large 
economic land concessions to firms has widened the gap still further i. In 2007, the Land 
Coalition estimated that one fifth of Cambodians were landless, and the poorest 40 per cent 
of the population occupied only 10 per cent of the land (Star Kampuchea, 2007: 3). 
 
These figures suggest that in the course of the fifteen years since the United Nations elections 
in Cambodia, a rapid and drastic social stratification has occurred, entailing the dispossession 
of the poor by an emerging capitalist class. Significantly, this has happened alongside the 
consolidation of electoral democracy, and the resurgence and entrenchment of the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) as the dominant political party. The CPP for the first time 
gained more than 50 per cent of the popular vote in elections in 2008. The ability of the CPP 
to mobilize increasing levels of electoral support in a context of rising landlessness and 
worsening inequality may be attributed to the particular relations forged between the CPP, 
the state bureaucracy, the military and the private sector over the past twenty years. 
 
During the course of the 1990s, following narrow defeat by the returning Royalists in the 
1993 election, the CPP pursued a strategy of consolidating loyalty among key sections of the 
elite, specifically key individuals in the police and military, among defecting insurgent units, 
and in sub national administration. This was achieved through offering these individuals the 
opportunity to amass fortunes through participation in a programme of asset stripping, 
primarily with respect to Cambodia’s forests and fisheries, mostly located in remote and 
insecure areas.  The Royalist-led government had little control over these areas: such control 
as existed was by virtue of informal links via the networks of patronage and comradeship 
forged by the Cambodian People’s Party during the 1980s. The CPP’s facilitation of wealth 
accumulation on the part of key individuals in the military, the provincial administration, the 
customs service and police, and various line ministries across the country, via privatization of 
common resources and tolerance of high levels of corruption, smuggling and other illegal 
activities on the part of state officials, made these networks stronger at the same time as they 
undermined efforts by the Royalist party to stamp its authority on the government elected in 
1993. 
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Following the CPP’s election victory in 1998, the party pursued a different tack, using donor-
sponsored institutional reforms to cement power in the hands of the central government and 
instituting laws over forestry and land which gave the central government better control over 
the award of forest and land concessions in remote parts of the country.  As the economic 
boom began in the early 2000s, this enabled the party’s leader, Prime Minister Hun Sen, to 
award significant tracts of land and forest to Cambodian tycoons and foreign investors 
prepared to support his, and his party’s political platform. In return for preferential treatment, 
businessmen were required to make large donations to party-sponsored development projects 
across the rural heartland of the central plains, building schools, roads, pagodas and irrigation 
schemes. The lavish spending on these Party projects significantly outstripped state 
development budgets, and created a strong base of support for the Party in the most densely 
populated and electorally significant rural areas, particularly since it was clear that villages 
and individuals that voted for the opposition would be excluded from benefiting from Party-
related largesse. However, it caused economic misery and political contestation in the 
peripheral areas where land and forest concessions were awarded, and in urban areas where 
the poor were evicted en masse to make way for shopping malls and hotels. 
 
This political model, combining predation with neo-patrimonialism, has been successful in 
eliciting election wins and powering economic growth during the boom years, but it differs 
substantially from liberal prescriptions for good governance. The ability to elicit donations 
from businessmen and spend these on highly politicised development projects, specifically 
presented to the population as gifts from patrons that are expected to be reciprocated during 
elections, is dependent on the maintenance, by political party leaders, of absolute discretion 
over contracts, concessions and distributions of budgets. As such, it militates against the 
emergence of regulatory regimes that can preside over such functions as procurement, budget 
execution and development planning in the interests of transparency, fairness, and efficiency.   
An important factor in the success of this model of development is the weakness and 
disorganization of countervailing alliances.  Experience elsewhere in Southeast Asia suggests 
that three likely sources of opposition to the emergence of a predatory elite of this kind: a 
politically assertive middle class and/or organised labour; a private sector that competes 
internationally and is not dependent upon the state for contracts and licences; and 
international pressure from donors and investors.  In Cambodia, none of these potential 
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sources of opposition has so far proved capable of forging a solid political alliance capable of 
withstanding the resurgence of the CPP. 
 
There are a number of reasons for this. First, during the Cold War, Cambodia suffered an 
unusual degree of destruction of civil society organisation. Every regime from independence 
onwards paid an extraordinary degree of attention to the rooting out of potentially dissident 
groups, and the imprisonment or summary murder of their members. This was facilitated by 
the articulation of a strident and paranoiac nationalist ideology which uniformly branded 
regime opponents agents provocateurs working for neighbouring countries bent on annexing 
Cambodian land. This rhetoric reached its apotheosis under the Khmer Rouge regime of 1975 
to 1979, during which more than a million Cambodians died and all forms of independent 
social organisation including the family were targeted by policies of dissolution via forced 
collectivization.  However, it is a rhetoric that was already familiar to Cambodians decades 
before the Khmer Rouge came to power, and still resurfaces during election campaigns in 
Cambodia today. 
 
Because civil society organization was so severely repressed during the Cold War, post-Cold 
War efforts to revive it had little to work with.  Contemporary Cambodian civil society 
organizations tend to take one of three forms: informal micro-organizations operating at 
village or commune level to organise sharing of communal resources; formal and 
professional non-government organisations, dependent upon international funding and highly 
oriented towards international development agendas; and ad hoc social movements which 
form to articulate the concerns or demands of particular communities at particular times, but 
which are generally quite fluid and temporary in their organization. The first of these kind of 
organizations have not developed political agendas, and in contemporary Cambodia tend to 
be the target of party benevolence and control. The second are formally independent of 
government, but most have a service-delivery mandate, in areas such as health care and 
education, which involves working closely with government to fill the gaps in local services.  
The nature of their relationship with government has entailed that these organisations, 
although occasionally advocating for particular policies in their field of expertise, rarely take 
a stance of public criticism of government or of governance processes.  The third of these 
types of organization have been the target of renewed repression over the past ten years, 
including bans on public rallies and demonstrations; police attacks on picket lines and 
villagers defending their homes during forced evictions; roadside assassinations of leaders; 
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and use of defamation laws to silence influential national-level critics. As a result, despite 
repeated urban rejection of the CPP at the polls in every election until 2008, urban protest 
movements have withered over the past ten years, and both the urban middle class and the 
poor have failed to form organizations that can effectively pressure the government. 
 
Furthermore, the development of the private sector has not led to pressure on the government 
to improve governance performance.  The Cambodian business elite have almost uniformly 
emerged from the exigencies of the 1980s state.  During the 1980s, state officials presiding 
over failed policies of collectivization and socialist production were in a position to facilitate 
and profit from practices of illegal private production and distribution, and particularly cross-
border smuggling. Following the emergence of free market policies in the late 1980s and the 
rapid privatization of common resources and state assets that accompanied this, these 
officials legalised their businesses and set up companies which dominate the Cambodian 
private sector today.  Some of the most prominent tycoons bankrolled particular battles or 
campaigns in the ongoing civil war, and in return were awarded state contracts and licences 
to monopolise particular types of imports.  A key example is the Thai Bunrong company, 
whose president Teng Bunma in the 1990s boasted that he had paid for the government’s 
successful assault in 1996 on the gem-mining town of Pailin.  In return for this, Thai 
Bunrong, and other companies owned by Teng Bunma’s children were offered a variety of 
contracts, including the monopoly on electricity supply to the town.  Similarly, the Sokimex 
company of Okhna Sok Kong made a number of loans to the CPP to fund key political and 
military campaigns in the 1990s, and was subsequently able to buy the state-owned 
petroleum company on its privatization in 1996, and was awarded the monopoly on 
petroleum imports to Cambodia as well as the contract to be sole supplier of uniforms and 
pharmaceuticals to the Cambodian military, and a five-year contract to sell tickets to the 
tourist mecca of Angkor Wat.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, foreign investors have also played an important role in the Cambodian 
economy, particularly in the garment manufacturing industry which before the global 
financial crisis accounted for 17 per cent of Cambodian GDP (World Bank, 2007a). The 
industry is dominated by investors from the region, particularly Malaysia and Taiwan. The 
Garment Manufacturers Association, formed to advocate for the interests of the industry, has 
a close relationship with the government, and has reportedly been only partially successful in 
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its backroom lobbying for government to exercise greater control over, for example, Customs 
demands for informal fees from garment manufacturing companies. However, for the 
Garment Manufacturers Association, as for other international investors in Cambodia, the 
CPP is able to offer other enticements: in particular, stability in a context where rioting and 
attacks on foreign (Thai) businesses occurred as recently as 2003; and control of the labour 
force.  The labour force in the garment industry is highly unionised and in the early period of 
establishment of the industry strikes were a common occurrence.  However, the CPP has 
managed to co-opt most unions, through a combination of patronage of pro-government 
unions and murder of anti-government union leaders, thus giving it a degree of leverage over 
garment industry employers. The Garment Manufacturers Association, consequently, has not 
emerged as an organisation that is likely to challenge the CPP over governance practices. 
 
International pressure from donors has also been relatively ineffectual.  Partly this is due to 
the inability of western donors to form a united front in pressuring the Cambodian 
government. Partly it is due to the difficulty of challenging a government which presents 
countless action plans and policy statements that conform to donor stipulations, and follows 
this with endless plausible excuses for inability to implement these.  Partly it is due to the fact 
that since the early 2000s, Cambodia has received significant assistance and investment from 
China, which has little interest in promoting particular governance practices, and is much 
more interested in gaining leases on large tracts of land for the establishment of plantations. 
 
The Failure of Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
For these reasons, serious political alliances in support of good governance reform are hard to 
find in Cambodia, and efforts by international donors to forge them have often foundered due 
to the difficulty of finding local partners willing and able to engage in such struggles.  The 
fate of a recent effort by USAID to promote a civil society advocacy campaign on corruption 
offers an example. In 2005 the US Agency for International Development, via the 
international NGO Pact Cambodia, began funding civil society activities to raise awareness 
of the impact of corruption, and encourage citizens’ participation in anti-corruption activities.  
This led to a civil society campaign called the Clean Hands campaign, organised by a group 
of Cambodian NGOs calling themselves the Coalition of Civil Society Organization Against 
Corruption (CocSOAC). CocSOAC organised a number of events including a million-
signature petition against corruption, delivered to parliament shortly before the national 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM  
13 - 14 DECEMBER, 2010 
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY, PERTH 
 
77 
elections in 2008; and a televised music and comedy concert held in the national Olympic 
Stadium in front of 50,000 people in 2009 to spread the anti-corruption message. 
 
While the ruling Cambodian People’s Party refrained from responding to the petition, the 
concert prompted a political backlash after the US Ambassador, Carol Rodley, in the opening 
speech made at the event, claimed that corruption cost the Cambodian Treasury $500 million 
a year (Rodley, 2009). This comment attracted strong criticism from the Cambodian 
government.  Chair of the government’s ineffectual Anti-Corruption Unit, Senior Minister 
Om Yentieng, a close advisor of Prime Minister Hun Sen, said at a press conference that 
Rodley’s statement “strongly affects the honour and reputation of the Cambodian 
government,” (AFP, 2009)  while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the US Embassy 
claiming that the accusations were “politically motivated and unsubstantiated” ( ). The 
Cambodian Ambassador to the UK, Hor Nambora, member of a well-connected Cambodian 
political family, claimed Rodley’s comments “inflammatory” and “politically motivated” 
(Nambora 2009) and suggested that Rodley might be perceived as “having allied yourself 
with the discredited views of the international pressure group Global Witness which 
continually engages in virulent and malicious campaigns against the Royal Government of 
Cambodia.” (ibid).  
 
The linking of the anti-corruption with Global Witness - an international NGO that was 
expelled from Cambodia in 2007 following its exposure of government connivance in 
forestry crimes, and whose local members have been violently attacked, effectively 
repressing protest over forestry issues - cast a chill over the anti-corruption movement. Pro-
CPP television stations subsequently hosted comedy shows in which comedians – some of 
whom had previously performed anti-corruption sketches as part of the Clean Hands Concert 
– parodied anti-corruption NGOs as themselves lazy and corrupt, living off ill-gotten gains 
from interfering foreign donors. Sketches showed foreign NGO workers faking scenes of 
violent evictions, lazing around in villas and visiting prostitutes, and local NGO workers 
paying villagers to put their thumbprints on anti-corruption petitions (Campbell, 2009: 
Duffet, 2009). An anti-corruption law was finally passed in early 2010, following fifteen 
years in the drafting process, perhaps reflecting a perception within government that both 
international donor and Cambodian public pressure was building on the issue. However 
certain provisions in the law – such as the article mandating up to six months’ imprisonment 
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for whistle blowers making accusations that ‘lead to fruitless investigations’ (Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 2010) – seemed certain to render it ineffective. 
 
The backlash against civil advocacy on the corruption issue represents a significant threat to 
Cambodian NGOs, who have long lived under the shadow of government interference, 
including threats of court action on charges of disinformation and defamation, and threats of 
new legislation to control them.  It further indicates the sensitivity of the government on the 
corruption issue, and the links explicitly drawn, in the government’s various responses, 
between anti-corruption activities and the forestry and land regimes underline the extent to 
which areas of governance which relate to the key concern of the Cambodian People’s Party 
– the retention of discretionary control over the disposal of Cambodia’s natural resources – 
are off limits to would-be reformers.  Similarly, other governance areas, such as judicial 
reform, which could impinge upon this imperative, have languished, along with sections of 
the public financial management reform program associated with increasing the regulation of 
control over budgeting. 
 
The World Bank and the Demand For Good Governance Programme 
In a climate where many of Cambodia’s donors are retreating from putting money into 
governance reform programmes, citing poor performance and lack of political will on the 
part of the government, the World Bank in 2008 launched a US$20 million ‘Demand for 
Good Governance’ programme that is intended to promote citizen involvement in holding the 
government to account in a range of areas.  In a press release announcing the project, the 
Bank, in line with the approach underlying its similar programmes in other countries, 
explicitly linked it to the anti-corruption agenda, remarking: 
 
Good governance is increasingly recognized as a fundamental prerequisite for 
sustainable development. It’s opposite—corruption—is also recognized as a major 
impediment to efficient and effective government, with a disproportionate impact 
on the poor. Stimulating citizen demand for better governance has become a 
fundamental tool for more transparency and accountability in public affairs, and an 
integral part of the World Bank’s governance and anti-corruption strategy (World 
Bank, 2008a). 
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However, World Bank officials familiar with the situation in Cambodia are more tentative in 
claiming that the programme might have a specific impact on anti-corruption campaigning, 
pointing to the backlash against the Clean Hands movement, and suggesting that a much 
more cautious approach was needed which could lay the groundwork for more modest 
reforms. 
 
The Demand For Good Governance project was founded upon a series of evaluations by the 
Bank of the role of civil society in promoting good governance in Cambodia. Key reports 
commissioned in 2005 and 2007 had concluded that civil society organisations could be  
harnessed more effectively to ‘demand-side’ governance initiatives, if they could be better 
linked to government and citizens through new approaches to campaigning (Burke and 
Vanna, 2005; Malena and Chhim, 2009). In making these assessments, the World Bank drew 
explicitly on its own demand side agenda, seeking to evaluate the scope for shifting civil 
society activism ‘from shouting to counting’ in the Cambodian context. This prompted the 
launch, by the Bank, in 2008 of the Programme for Enhancing Capacity for Social 
Accountability (PECSA) in Cambodia. PECSA incorporated four goals: training civil society 
organizations in social accountability techniques; adapting what were called ‘global 
accountability practices’ to the Cambodian context; providing grants for experimenting with 
social accountability projects; and supporting networking between groups doing social 
accountability work.  The PECSA project also entailed a number of two-week intensive 
‘social accountability schools’ in which individuals drawn from civil society organisations in 
Cambodia and from selected Cambodian government agencies were trained in social 
accountability techniques by trainers imported from Ateneo University in Manila’s School of 
Government. Those social accountability scholars who showed the most promise were also 
taken on ‘exposure visits’ to see social accountability in action in a range of projects in the 
Philippines and in India. 
 
PECSA engaged members of more than 100 civil society organisations in Cambodia, and 
sought to systematize the ad hoc experimentation with techniques such as citizens report 
cards and service user groups that had been associated with a range of donor programmes in 
different areas of Cambodia in the past.  Graduates of the PECSA programme were given 
small scale funding for projects; subsequently the Demand For Good Governance 
programme offered a total of US$4 million of funding to provide grants to Non-State Actors 
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to engage in partnerships with government institutions in social accountability projects. The 
Demand for Good Governance also targeted selected state agencies for assistance.  Agencies 
selected were those regarded as either already experimenting successfully with accountable 
practices, or as open to reform programmes.  Accordingly, four agencies were highlighted in 
the programme: the Arbitration Council under the Ministry of Labour which arbitrates 
between employers and unions in industrial disputes in the garment industry; a talkback radio 
show produced on the state radio station Radio National Kampuchea, under the Ministry of 
Information; a project experimenting with One Window Service Offices in two provinces 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior; and the law dissemination department of the 
Ministry of National Assembly Senate Relations and Inspections.  The four programmes 
were regarded as programmes that were already successful, albeit in a small way, in 
promoting accountability and transparency, and as opportunities to experiment with more 
challenging social accountability practices (Bhargava, 2009). The DFGG programme was 
launched following extensive discussions with the Cambodian government, and 
representatives of the ministries concerned, and is currently run through a Project 
Coordination Office based in the Ministry of Interior. In examining this programme in the 
context of this article, two questions arise.  First, what is the significance of the DFGG 
approach in the context of Cambodia?  And second, assuming that it has some significance, 
what ideological agenda does the Cambodian government see this as serving? 
 
For the World Bank, the significance of these programmes is twofold. First, it provides an 
opportunity to overcome a longstanding attitude of distrust between the Cambodian 
government and civil society, fostering “a culture of constructive engagement that NSAs 
[Non-State Actors] would carry over to other contexts.” (World Bank, 2008b) and it provides 
an opportunity to initiate better standards of governance within Cambodian state institutions.  
Although the institutions selected are not directly related to the key areas of natural resource 
management and land in Cambodia, and consequently do not tackle head on the political 
economy of corruption that underpins Cambodia’s contemporary political regime, they do, 
Bank officials suggest, offer opportunities for the government to experiment with new ways 
of working.  According to a Bank official who led the project in its inception phase, 
 
We know there are certain things that are off limits.  For example, what has 
happened with PACT and USAID.  It is not explicitly written but it happens.  The 
government will make sure that line is not crossed…. We are trying to close the 
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gap between what is theoretically possible and what is actually happening.  
Without pushing the frontier, we can do a lot that isn’t being done.  Hopefully the 
frontier will move, but we can do a lot of things up to the frontier that weren’t 
being done. (Bhargaval, 2009) ii 
 
In initiating the programme, the World Bank anticipated a risk that the government would 
acquiesce to the programme provided it remained marginal to key concerns, then move to 
neutralise it if it seemed to be mobilizing citizens effectively.  Consequently, the Bank went 
to quite considerable lengths to ensure that key ministers, including the Prime Minister 
himself, had been fully briefed on the implications of the project (Bhargaval, 2009). 
Preparations for the programme included a high profile launch in which Minister of Interior 
and Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng appeared on Cambodia television announcing the 
project.  
 
Research suggests that the Cambodian government has not entirely embraced the aims of the 
project.  For example, Secretary of State of the Minister of Interior, Ngy Chanphal, in charge 
of overseeing the Project Coordination Unit that runs the DFGG programme noted in an 
interview that when translated into Khmer, the programme was called the “Local Governance 
Project” rather than the “Demand for Good Governance Project,” because: 
 
There was some complaint about the title.  The word demand means demanding, 
imposing forcefully.  This is not really good… So when the World Bank brought 
this project we changed the title in Khmer to Local Good Governance Project.  In 
Khmer we would not accept this kind of demand.(H.E Ngy Chanphal, 2009) 
 
In the same way, NGO participants in the project pointed to a difference between the 
government and the World Bank in translating the term accountability itself.  While the 
World Bank preferred tetuel koh trew which means a broad sense of responsibility or 
obligation, the government insisted upon using the invented term koneakdeypheap which has 
a much narrower meaning, more associated with accountancy. (Silaka, 2009). The 
government’s care on the use of terminology is indicative of its concern to impose a 
particular ideological framework on the project. The decision to substitute the idea of 
‘demand’ with the idea of ‘local’ governance is particularly interesting, since acceptance of 
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the programme on the part of the Cambodian government fits well with a series of 
experiments the government has recently undertaken with respect to decentralization, and it 
is here that powerful political coalitions of support for changes in approaches to government 
that could be regarded as in line with donor reform prescriptions can be most clearly 
identified. 
 
Good Governance and Local Governance 
Decentralization of government is regarded in recent development orthodoxy as providing 
promoting good governance by bringing government closer to the people, thus reducing the 
costs to the poor of organising to demand better service. The Cambodian government 
maintains that its interest in decentralization is in promoting what it calls ‘democratic 
development’ at local level and in this area, at least, it appears that good governance reform 
is being promoted by the government. 
 
For example, the Strategic Framework for Decentralization and Deconcentration of 
Governance in Cambodia, produced in 2005, stated that the reform programme for 
subnational government in Cambodia has two ‘strategic goals’: strengthening and expanding 
local democracy, and promoting local development to reduce poverty.  Consequently, 
according to the Framework, reforms will be based on four key principles: democratic 
representation; public participation in decision-making; effectiveness in service-delivery; and 
public sector accountability.  With respect to the latter, the Framework states, “Reform will 
strengthen accountability at all levels of administration and facilitate citizens' oversight of the 
administrative and financial affairs of those administrations.”(Strategic Framework, 2005) 
 
Underlying these principles are two concerns that have emerged as central to the legitimation 
strategy of the Cambodian People’s Party over the past ten years. First, the CPP has 
consistently campaigned, during electoral campaigns as well as at other times, on its 
effectiveness – its ability to ‘get things done.’ The power of the CPP to mobilize resources 
and to deliver tangible local development goods such as school buildings, roads, irrigation 
schemes, temple renovations and so on is central to the party’s image and dominates 
television news broadcasts. In doing so, the party draws upon its supporters in the private 
sector: Cambodian tycoons compete with one another to donate to the party’s development 
projects, in return for receiving honours such as the title of Okhna, bestowed when one has 
contributed $100,000 or more to such initiatives.  The symbiotic nature of the relationship 
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between state, party and business is revealed through both television reports of the generosity 
of Okhnas to the Cambodian poor, and the frequency with which Okhans receive state 
contracts.  Of 19 contracts to develop Special Economic Zones awarded to Cambodian 
businesses, for example, 13 were awarded to Okhnas (InvestinCambodia); other owners 
include the PM’s sister in law.  Some of the same Okhnas have also been identified by the 
NGO Global Witness as recipients of lucrative logging concessions iii and are currently listed 
on the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries website as recipients of large economic 
land concessions: state-awarded leases of thousands of hectares of agro-industrial land in the 
north of Cambodia intended to be used to establish plantationsiv. Three of these Okhnas  - Ly 
Yong Phat, Lau Meng Khin and Mong Rithy - have also been appointed to the upper house 
of Cambodia’s parliament as CPP senators. 
 
The Cambodian People’s Party has developed a highly efficient system for mobilizing 
popular support across Cambodia’s rural heartland, whereby government officials are 
allocated districts within which they are responsible for coordinating development projects 
paid for both via the state budget, international aid projects and donations from these tycoons.  
High-ranking ministers and secretaries of state are expected to spend their weekends 
overseeing these projects in liaison with party working groups based at district level.  In turn, 
the district level party working groups liaise with elected commune councils.   
 
To some extent, ideas underpinning good governance mesh well with this system.  Secretary 
of State Ngy Chanphal, who leads the Demand for Good Governance/Local Governance 
Programme Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Interior, commented on the improved co-
ordination between central and local government since the election of the commune councils 
in 2002, and the significance of this for the CPP’s national electoral strategy: 
 
Now they continue to improve – they help the government to fulfil assignments 
that we couldn’t do alone.  It is very challenging – a ten-year programme of 
changing behaviour of people and of government officials as well.  The new civil 
servants should not be the master of the people, but the public servants.  We want 
to make services better: we are trying, working as a political party, we are required 
to work in our home districts.  Now what happens down there – people bring it 
back to the government to hear.  We have very good support from the people.  
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Buying votes is not going to help.  We have to prove that we work well and 
explain government policy, really do things.  We have to be involved 
infrastructure et cetera.  The people see it.  And you cannot trust that they will vote 
for you if you don’t do this (H.E Ngy Chanphal, 2010).  
 
This policy of working at the ‘grassroots’ or the ‘base’ to mobilize participation and support 
is integral to the CPP’s success in cementing its hold on power over the past ten yearsv. 
Government officials such as Ngy Chanphal describe the system as a form of homegrown 
democracy: “Now we have a very democratic society – from the grassroots up, this is not 
imported from somewhere… Doing reform and economic development, ensuring the 
sustainability of the livelihood of the people is the main objective” (H.E Ngy Chanphal, 
2010). Some analysts have regarded this as a shift from the elite patronage surrounding 
forestry in the 1990s, used to cement the CPP’s political alliances and end the Khmer Rouge 
insurgency, to a form of mass patronage that could represent a precursor to democracy vi. 
However, there are important limits, in this system, to the kind of critical response that 
villagers are permitted to exhibit, and this significantly restricts the extent to which the 
system may evolve towards greater assertiveness on the part of the poor.  Development, in 
the CPP’s model, represents a form of ‘gift’ given by meritorious benefactors to the poor out 
of a sense of moral obligation that combines ideas of socialist mobilization with Buddhist 
conceptions of merit-making and compassion for the poor.  The repeated reference to 
development projects as “gifts” provided by saboraschon – generous people – in newspaper 
and television reports, and of the joyous gratitude of the recipient poor underlines the 
powerful moral tone of these activities vii. 
 
There is, arguably, a sharp disjuncture between this approach and democracy.  The noblesse 
oblige approach of the saboraschon, even when explicitly wedded to vote-winning for 
elections, differs from true democratic control of development trajectories. The assumption 
of unanimity of purpose, explicitly mobilized in the CPP’s development rhetoric, allows 
attention to be focused away from the question of how development might be conceptualised 
and towards the question of who is self-evidently best-placed to deliver it.  With respect to 
the purpose of development there is, in fact, almost no public discussion within Cambodia 
whatsoever.  The Special Economic Zones and Economic Land Concessions that form the 
key to the government’s industrialization strategy and provide the profits which help to fund 
the CPP’s rather fixed notion of ‘rural development’ have never been publicly debated in any 
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inclusive forum that offers a voice to the poor; indeed, they represent the outcome of 
backroom deals between elite networks held together by patronage and corruption.   
 
As such, the CPP’s model of democratic development specifically excludes any form of 
political contestation of questions of substance, forming rather a way of mobilizing 
participation into pre-determined agendas, and at the same time offering opportunities for 
better information about mismanagement or resources or abuse of power to flow up through 
Party – not state – structures. While this has certainly improved the atmosphere within 
Cambodian villages, in comparison to the widespread climate of fear of local authorities that 
prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s, it allows only the most superficial of discussions over 
government ‘effectiveness’.  This is how the Demand for Good Governance programme 
appears also to be conceptualised within government. Although intended to provide 
opportunities for citizens to participate in monitoring government activities, for example 
through citizens’ audits and citizens’ report cards, this monitoring is oriented, first, towards 
supplying higher levels of government with data they can use to discipline and control local 
level officials; and second, towards encouraging citizens to engage with government in 
ironing out questions of effectiveness, rather than in developing powerful non-state 
movements that might challenge the government’s overall trajectory.   
 
As such, the programme can be interpreted as a means for the government to use good 
governance reform to perfect already powerful systems of grass-roots mobilization associated 
with the provision of small scale development programmes.  The championing of the 
programme by Minister of Interior Sar Kheng is in line with this perspective. The Ministry of 
Interior is the lead Ministry for the government’s broader decentralization and 
deconcentration programme, with responsibility for maintaining discipline over newly 
elected councils at commune, district and province level, and over the civil servants seconded 
from various ministries to serve these councils.  This entails a need to be informed not only 
about their performance but also their political loyalty.  Consequently, the Ministry of 
Interior can use good governance reforms such as the promotion of social accountability 
techniques or talkback radio shows to elicit information from citizens that can help it to do its 
job.  
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It is important to point out that there has been far less enthusiasm for both decentralization in 
general, and for governance reform in particular, from other ministries in the Cambodian 
Government. The powerful Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), for example, has 
been less enthusiastic.  The MEF has a minimal role in local level mobilization, although it is 
charged with monitoring the way that subnational councils spend their budgets.  More 
important, however, in Cambodia’s political economy is the MEF’s role as drafter and 
disburser of the national budget, collector of revenues, and controller of public procurement 
for contracts in amounts over 1.3 billion Cambodian riel (about US$350,000). Thanks to 
these strategic positions, the MEF has long acted as a clearing house for funds being 
siphoned from state to party coffers, a role which certainly makes the Ministry more cautious 
about even the most tentative steps in the direction of social accountability.  As such, the 
MEF has been a more difficult interlocutor for World Bank officials working on the Demand 
For Good Governance programme. Pre-existing projects initiated by NGOs aimed at 
monitoring activities within the Ministry of Economics and Finance, specifically the national 
NGO Forum’s Budget Monitoring Project which advocates for better public access to 
information about the national budget, have not so far been picked up by the Demand for 
Good Governance Project, despite their evident close relation to the aims and objectives of 
the social accountability agenda, reflecting, arguably, the caution within the World Bank 
regarding overstepping the government’s line on what are acceptable advocacy issues.  
 
The different roles of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Economics and Finance in 
the political economy underpinning the current Cambodian political settlement are reflected 
in their different stances on the issue.  For the Ministry of Interior, expanding controlled 
sources of information about potentially wayward subnational councils is a key aim, and 
entirely consonant with the Party’s vote-winning national development patronage system 
which requires a close eye be kept on the way that subnational councils deal with donated 
funds.  For the Ministry of Economics and Finance, dealing with the other end of the state-
party-private sector relationship relating to taxation, customs, and state procurement, offering 
citizens an oversight role over the administration of public funding appears a much more 
threatening proposition. 
 
NGOS and the Demand for Good Governance 
A key question over the effectiveness of the Demand for Good Governance programme is the 
extent to which it is likely to promote the position of civil society associations to form 
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assertive alliances for reform. The Demand for Good Governance programme, in line with 
recent donor thinking, focuses on the idea of ‘constructive engagement’ between the state 
and civil society in achieving improvements in governance.  The Demand for Good 
Governance programme incorporates a requirement that any grant-funded initiatives under 
the scheme should be conducted in a spirit of ‘constructive engagement.’  This clause is 
explained by World Bank officials as merely a requirement that “someone in government 
knows what you are planning to do and is prepared to listen – otherwise what is the point in 
doing it?” For Ngy Chanphal, the clause has rather more significance that than this, and 
implies incorporation of NGOs in government initiatives: 
 
“The NGOs have to understand the reform agenda of the government.  We will not 
provide funding to NGOs who want to bring the government down.  We want to 
improve service delivery and build a partnership together.  A small number of 
NGOs are not working in local governance – these are human rights and 
corruption NGOs…. But working in local development, only a few NGOs are 
politically oriented.  They have an attitude of unconstructive engagement.  We 
can’t afford to have fighting with each other.  Democracy is not mature yet, but we 
will achieve this through economic development and political stability growing 
together.”(H.E Ngy Chanphal, 2009) 
 
The implication here is that human rights and corruption NGOs are ‘politically oriented’ and 
therefore will not be allowed to engage because their agenda is to ‘bring down the 
government’; but that, in any case, these NGOs are not working in ‘local development’ so 
they are irrelevant to the programme.   
 
The distinction drawn between ‘political’ NGOs and ‘local development’ NGOs is a long-
standing one in Cambodian politics, and represents a second aspect of the utility of the 
Demand for Good Governance programme for the Cambodian government.  For the Ministry 
of Interior, local development NGOs can be regarded as an extension of government, via 
constructive ‘partnerships’, helping the central Ministry to monitor the practices of local 
government and make up for any shortfalls at a time when the structure of local government 
is changing rapidly under the influence of decentralization reform: “civil society can help to 
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monitor subnational councils, work with subnational councils at district and province level 
and bring more local knowledge.” For Ngy Chanphal: 
 
One of the main assets for Cambodia is that we have 2400 NGOs.  Now they have 
capacity – they are doing a lot more work.  In remote areas, only those working 
with NGOs know what’s going on there.  Their work is complementary to 
Government (H.E Ngy Chanphal, ). 
 
In a context where NGOs are highly dependent on external funding, the US$4 million 
available via the Demand For Good Governance scheme offers an opportunity for the 
Ministry of Interior to cement its relationship with ‘constructive’ NGOs: 
 
We have a principle of constructive engagement – it is clear that those that are not 
supporting the government will not be funded.  But NGOS working to support the 
reform agenda – reform is life or death for Cambodia.( H.E Ngy Chanphal ) 
 
For Cambodian NGOs who participated in the PECSA and DFGG programmes maintaining 
an independent stance and a critical voice in the context of such programmes is difficult. 
Furthermore, most NGOs in Cambodia are professional rather than membership 
organisations, reliant upon external donor funding. Maintaining a continued flow of such 
funding already implies walking a fine line between maintaining government tolerance for 
their activities, and maintaining a reputation both for political independence and for 
competence and impact in the eyes of external donors. NGO graduates from the PECSA 
programme questioned whether entry into DFGG-style partnerships with a government that 
sought primarily to elicit rather than share information would be beneficial to their 
organisations: 
 
What is the benefit for NGOs from this?  There is no clear answer…. There must 
be consultation first, to figure out whether they [the government] are willing or 
not. If we start monitoring the budget, how they spend it, the relationship will be 
put into question.  There must be clear points to say that if you do things in the 
good governance area and get some pressure from the police, or from the 
provincial governor, you can come to us, there is a mechanism, or something like 
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that.  Then again, getting information on government money is not easy and if we 
fail we will lose credit with the donors (Silaka, 2009). 
 
Another graduate of the programme, who went on the visit to India, commented similarly on 
the significance of the political environment in Cambodia, “The Indian government is very 
democratic: because of full democracy, the level of threat is almost zero.  People can say 
what they want to say.” 
 
In Cambodia, by contrast, this interviewee suggested, most of the NGOs that were likely to 
have the capacity to implement social accountability work “are working for advocacy for 
change within government, so the government is not happy to work with them.” (Soeung 
Saroeun, 2009). From the NGO perspective, the DFGG programme was highly risky: fragile 
relationships with government could be damaged, while international donors would be 
displeased with failure.  On the other hand, the lure of World Bank money was great – for 
NGOs competing in the highly competitive aid market, a World Bank grant was regarded as 
‘CV-building’.  It could be used as evidence of the NGO’s worthiness when applying for 
other grants, and was consequently worth taking risks for. 
 
However, NGOs were also concerned that the constructive engagement criterion risked 
reinforcing the divide asserted by the World Bank report and by the government between 
constructive and oppositional NGOs, and reasserting the area of natural resources – land and 
forestry governance – in particular as a no-go area for assertive struggle on the part of civil 
society. 
 
Implications for Donors 
 
This analysis suggests that understanding both the constraints and the opportunities for good 
governance reform in Cambodia requires a more differentiated understanding of both the 
interests and the ideologies of different governmental and non-governmental agencies than 
has been apparent in donor planning to date. Although donors are aware that the Cambodian 
government has a poor record of sticking to its governance action plans, there has been a 
tendency to treat the Cambodian government as an undifferentiated block with identical 
interests.  In fact, the political economy of CPP rule entails different efforts aimed at 
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maintaining the support of different sections of the population, and these assume different 
levels of importance at different times, depending upon the stage of the electoral cycle, the 
need for party funding, and the opportunities offered by the level of national economic 
development and the global investment climate.  As these change, certain aspects of 
government responses to governance reform alter, while other core concerns, particularly 
related to the maintenance of discretionary control over natural resources, remain remarkably 
stable. 
 
This suggests that a reconceptualization of reform is needed in order to make political 
economy analysis more useful to donor agencies.  Reform has often been regarded by donors 
simply as the implementation of a set of progressive policies.  However, the analysis above 
suggests that particular policies can be framed within sharply divergent ideological 
perspectives, with the implication that apparently enthusiastic reformers may turn out to 
share few of the donor’s underlying assumptions.  This different framing is not always easily 
apparent, particularly where loose translations of development jargon into national languages 
allow particular policy slogans to take on new connotations, which officials within donor 
agencies may either be unaware of, or be unwilling to recognise given the imperative to 
disburse aid moneys. 
 
This analysis also suggests a need to rethink the nature of opponents to reform, and their 
relationship to reformers.  Development agencies often assume that local reformers are the 
opponents of more obstructive ‘vested interests’, but the analysis above shows that this is not 
always the case.  The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Economics and Finance in 
Cambodia are associated with different, and perhaps rival, party lines, and have different 
interests in terms of fulfilling party work; yet they remain dedicated to the cause of the Party, 
a goal that is antithetical to the liberal democratic ideals of western donors. 
 
Similarly, civil society organisations, even though more likely, in the Cambodian case, to 
share the donors’ liberal ideals, evaluated the Demand for Good Governance project in the 
light of their own interests.  These prominently included concern to preserve their ability to 
continue to work, through preserving tolerant relations with government and preserving a 
reputation for soundness and effectiveness among donors.  A number of civil society 
representatives engaged with the Demand For Good Governance programme primarily 
because it offered opportunities to build relationships either with government or with donors. 
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These goals were more important than the governance reforms themselves – in particular 
because most NGO representatives interviewed for this project were sceptical of the chances 
of success in reforming government.  Once again this suggests a more complex picture with 
respect to reformers, who see project activities as a means of investing in long term 
relationships rather than as a means of achieving better governance. 
 
Earlier in this monograph we have developed a typology of reformers which includes 
opportunists and tacticians, as well as dedicated ideologues. This analysis suggests that the 
boundaries between these three groups may in practice be blurred, since dedicated ideologues 
may join projects that they agree with but see as destined to fail, for tactical reasons.  The 
question for donors, faced with such issues, is how far to tolerate tactical, as opposed to 
dedicated, support, and how to distinguish between them in contexts where both motivations 
might be present.  
 
This perspective on reform and reformers suggests that orthodox understandings of reform as 
consisting of a one-time change from one set of policies to another, promoted by progressive 
reformers and resisted by vested interests, is mistaken.  What donors instead are confronted 
with is a set of groups which co-exist in shifting relations, and whose commitment to 
promoting and preserving relationships is often as significant as its commitment to reform.  
Negotiation – the success of which is also dependent on the nature of relationships invested 
in in the past – to bring in tactical interests, or to try to finesse the differences between 
distinct ideological standpoints is central to the success of reform programmes, and must be 
ongoing, reflecting the essentially contingent nature of alliances for change. Donors need to 
recognise this, not only in order to inject a level of realism as to what can be achieved, but 
also in order to develop new and better strategies for intervention. 
 
Notes 
i  Measures of consumption inequality by the World Bank suggest a rapid increase in 
consumption inequality in rural Cambodia between 1993 and 1997, and again between 2004 
and 2007. The World Bank attributes this rise in inequality partly to geographical factors (poor 
soils in some regions etc.), partly to individual differences in talent and entrepreneurship and 
partly to the extent to which households are able to access local government services via the 
payment of bribes and the use of connections (World Bank, 2007b: vii-viii.  Consumption 
inequality figures for 2007 provided by Stephane Guimbert.) 
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ii The reference to PACT and USAID is a reference to the government’s criticism of the US 
Ambassador’s remarks at the Clean Hands Concert 
iii These include Okhna Ly Yong Phat, develop of the 335 hectare Neay Koh Kong SEZ and the 
1,750 hectare Kiri Sakor Koh Kong SEZ; Okhna Lau Meng Khin, developer of the 178 hectare 
Sihanoukville SEZ1 and the 1,688 hectare Sihanoukville SEZ 2; and Okhna Mong Rithy, 
developer of the 100 hectare Okhna Mong SEZ.  According to Global Witness, the same 
business tycoons have also been awarded concession for mining, monopolies on imports and 
contracts for utility supplies and providing supplies to the military (Global Witness, 
Cambodia’s Family Trees, p.11). Global Witness estimates that Lau Meng Khin’s company, 
Pheapimex, controls 7.4 per cent of Cambodia’s total land area through its logging and 
economic land concessions (Global Witness, Cambodia’s Family Trees, p.77). 
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Introduction i  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided – with the Cities Alliance – technical 
assistance to the Philippine government to enable the phased roll out of a slum upgrading and 
eradication program in Metro Manila over 15 years. Critical to the success of the Metro 
Manila Urban Services of the Poor (MMUSP) program is the willingness of local 
government units (LGUs) to participate. Under early 1990s legislation, LGUs are required to 
ensure that land, essential infrastructure and services are provided for socialised housing, but 
typically compliance has been weak ii. Accordingly, the MMUSP program aims to 
“incentivise” LGUs to meet their responsibilities, principally through the offer of loan 
funding and technical support for “integrated urban development” strategies which can 
enable LGUs to cross-subsidise socialised housing through its proximate location with 
commercial developments. However, to date no LGU has agreed to formally sign up to the 
program by agreeing to accept an ADB loan.  
 
As this paper explains, LGUs have conflicting mandates and interests with respect to 
socialised housing and commercial development which the MMUSP program does not 
address. Their powers to raise revenues from property and other business taxes are a 
condition of the proposed cross-subsidisation, but equally they also mean that LGUs have 
strong political and economic interests in local land markets and development (Shatkin 2007: 
36). Without appropriate enforcement mechanisms, LGUs have considerably less interest in 
fulfilling their service obligations with respect to housing the poor than they do in pursuing 
higher-value land uses. What is more, they do not generally share the ADB’s vision of urban 
development. Whereas for the ADB (and other international donors), slum eradication is 
designed to tackle urban poverty, for LGUs it overwhelmingly constitutes the removal of 
“urban blight” through the demolition of physical structures and concomitant relocation of 
inhabitants to distant, peri-urban sites. Underpinning this understanding of slum eradication 
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are conceptions of development that link progress and political accomplishment to physical 
order and public cleanliness. These conceptions are embedded in social relations wherein the 
urban poor are continually characterised as “dirty” and therefore lacking the human qualities 
needed  to be “clean” – with all the explicit and implied connotations of moral standing and 
proper place that attach to this (Schaffer 2009: 134-135, Pinches 1992).  
 
In other words, Metro Manila’s slums are thus not merely a physical manifestation of 
material poverty; they are deeply embedded in class relationships that find form in relatively 
enduring patterns of conflict and mobilisation. The MMUSP program does not address these 
relationships as it seeks reformers only on the basis of formal, institutional responsibilities 
and conflates motivation with technical and resource capacities. It pays no attention to power 
relations beyond formal authority and, what is more, aims to unlock the very urban 
development processes that currently undermine informal settler communities’ political 
capacities to take on the mayors. The paper begins with some more detail on the program and 
its progress to date, before going on to explain its form, paying attention to the legacies of 
past conflicts and the present state of urban poor organisations and alliances. Thereafter, the 
paper analyses the different interests of “reformers” vis-à-vis the program and concludes by 
reflecting on what might be done.  
 
The program  
 
The ADB’s MMUSP program aims to help the Philippine government to address the shelter 
needs of informal settler/urban poor households who make up about thirty-five percent of 
Metro Manila’s population (ADB 2005: 1). Specifically, it seeks to provide ‘decent and 
affordable housing, basic infrastructure and urban services, including secure tenure’ through 
a mix of investment financing, technical assistance, capacity building and local livelihood 
programs (ADB 2008). In reform terms, the MMUSP program is thus directed at significant 
improvements in the implementation of existing policy and legal mandates with respect to 
socialised housing. To quote a senior official from the program’s executing agency – the 
national government’s Housing Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) – the 
approach is more about ‘strengthening what is in place than reform [per se]’ (Interview 
2009). The same official said the objective is to ‘incentivise the LGUs’ to take part in the 
program and, more broadly, to meet their formal governance obligations (Interview 2009, 
emphasis added).  
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Program documents state that LGUs have neglected socialised housing in part because they 
have mostly not controlled suitable land and/or have not had the organisational and technical 
capacities to undertake the necessary planning and project management (IDP Consult, Inc. 
2006: 65). Accordingly, the program endeavours to build on the national government’s 
“urban assets reform” agenda through which LGUs are able to acquire new lands. To quote 
the ADB: 
While available land under the control of the LGUs in Metro Manila is in short 
supply, national government land parcels have been identified for privatization. 
Previous efforts to sell these parcels through public bidding have failed, largely due to 
the problem of squatters. With the sale of such land, the [1991] Local Government 
Code (LGC) entitles the concerned LGU to 40% of the proceeds as its share in the 
“proceeds from development and utilization of the national wealth”. LGUs have 
expressed interest in on-site upgrading of these land parcels or in using them as in-
city relocation sites for their squatter populations. (ADB 2005: 1) 
 
To encourage LGUs in this direction – and ensure that the resultant housing is affordable – 
the MMUSP program proposes that the acquired sites be developed through “land sharing”. 
Typically, land sharing involves informal settlers agreeing to vacate ‘high-value land in 
return for being allowed to either rent or buy a part of the land below its market value’ (ADB 
2005: 8).  
The advantage of such an agreement is that it allows the landowner to regain control 
of the site and realize higher commercial returns from the land without having to 
evict illegal tenants. In return, illegal residents gain legitimate tenure and are able to 
continue living close to their established livelihoods. (ADB 2005: 8)  
In this case the LGU as the landowner  is expected to commit to providing eligible 
households with affordable housing, with the expectation that proximate commercial 
developments will deliver new, increased revenue streams to help off-set the costs involved 
iii.  
 
Critically, also the ADB favours integrated urban development because it can provide the 
kinds of subsidies it supports, that is those which are financially sustainable and not market-
distorting. As well, in addition to the Bank seeking as much as possible to keep the poor 
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living in-city, its objective is to provide them with assets in a form that means they can be 
used as collateral for loans from mainstream sources. In other words, it is important to stress 
that the MMUSP program is directed at the integration of urban poor households into formal 
markets for money and land.  
 
The plan is that the MMUSP program be rolled out in stages in all of Metro Manila’s 17 
cities and municipalities over 15 years. In this way, initial developments are expected to have 
learning and demonstration effects whilst also contributing to institutional strengthening 
across the sector (ADB 2001: 3). The initial ADB investment loan was to cover two sites, 
one within the Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) area in Taguig and the other in the former National 
Bilibid Prison (NBP) grounds in Muntinlupa. The National Government Centre (Eastside) in 
Quezon City was originally also included in stage one, but it was withdrawn to the next stage 
because the LGU did not support slum upgrading on this site iv. All these cities skirt the old, 
more densely developed parts of Metro Manila. Taguig and Muntinlupa are especially 
undergoing rapid development for industrial, commercial and administrative purposes. 
 
Originally, the ADB intended to release its loan to the national government’s Social Housing 
Finance Corporation (SHFC), for it to then on-lend to participating LGUs and/or the private  
sector for infrastructure development (site development, house construction, and 
resettlement) and to NGOs for housing loans to beneficiaries (HUDCC and PCFC 2008: 4-
5)v. However, after ‘numerous meetings’ with the Department of Finance (DoF) ‘to convince 
[it] of the viability of the project’, in mid 2009, the ADB’s loan offer was rejected: ‘the DoF 
had too many doubts about working with SHFC and disbelieves that funds can be recovered 
from urban poor households’ (ADB, personal communication 2009).  The DoF also wanted 
the LGUs to assume a greater share of the risk by having them borrow directly from the Bank 
(ADB personal communication 2010). HUDCC officers reported as well that, within the 
national government there were apparently concerns that the proximate location of socialised 
housing and commercial development would undermine land values and hence the returns on 
its “urban assets reform” agenda. 
 
After not securing national government approval for the investment loan in this form, the 
ADB has embarked on the option of offering sub-sovereign loans to LGUs, allowable under 
Executive Order (EO) 809. As technical assistance was most advanced in the case of the FTI 
site, in 2010 Taguig was the first city approached. Whilst officers involved considered the 
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loan to be ‘attractive’ in principle, they nevertheless turned it down because ‘the interest rates 
are too high; they are 9-10 percent and we are seeking around 6 percent, otherwise it is a 
sunk investment [an investment with no return]’ (Interview 2010).  
 
In the next section, the paper accounts for the form that the MMUSP program takes, paying 
particular attention to the conflicts which generated the domestic legal and institutional 
framework in which the program is now situated. The focus is thus on the political processes 
explaining the framework’s emergence, along with how it actually works. 
 
Background to the program 
On the face of it, the MMUSP program is the product of, on the one hand, of current 
international thinking on slum upgrading as a means to reduce urban poverty and, on the 
other hand, the policy and institutional frameworks for socialised housing in the Philippines. 
Importantly, both these stipulate alternatives to the failed strategies of forced eviction and 
relocation. In international policy circles, this is a legacy of research and advocacy which has 
promoted more positive interpretations of slums as ‘places of opportunity’,  not despair, 
where the poor can (and should be encouraged to) pursue their own ‘self-help’ strategies via 
market inclusion (UN-Habitat 2003: xxvi). The ADB’s policy on “involuntary resettlement” 
is a clear example of this approach vi. In the MMUSP program, all participating LGUs are to 
be bound by this policy, indeed to the degree that, if ‘there are any gaps between the ADB’s 
policy requirements and the Government’s policy, the ADB’s policy on involuntary 
resettlement prevails’ (HUDCC and PCFC 2008: v).  
 
The legal and institutional framework for socialised housing in the Philippines is less the 
product of expert opinion than it is an outcome of domestic political processes, in the post-
Marcos era especially.  As demolition and relocation has been the standard response of public 
officials historically, informal settlers and their advocates have tended to react accordingly, 
most overtly through collective forms of direct resistance and demand-making that centres on 
tenure security. As a result, not unlike poor people’s movements elsewhere, Metro Manila’s 
urban poor have produced protest movements that are defined by acts of collective defiance 
rather than by ‘articulated social change goals’, as in the case of formal organisations (Piven 
and Cloward 1977: 4-5). However, in Metro Manila since the early 1970s, local defiance has 
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been more often linked to formal organisations in the form of NGOs with domestic and 
international church connections and support. The core groupings in this have pursued forms 
of community organising, intended to prepare local communities for ‘confrontations with the 
powerful’ (Carroll 1998: 118). During the 1980s, Metro Manila urban poor communities 
were also brought into the political networks and alliances of the leftist National Democratic 
Front (NDF) in the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. Since then, the NDF movement 
has fractured and declined, however, some groupings have been active in some urban poor 
communities, principally as a part of their efforts to challenge the regime and not to find 
solutions to their immediate problems. Not surprisingly, the urban poor’s collective defiance 
has been generally greatest during times of increased threat or hardship or when there are 
changes to existing social arrangements as a result of the electoral cycle or some political or 
economic crisis (Piven and Cloward 1977: 8-14). As well, the collective defiance has tended 
to arise at particular sites, where informal settlers are living in significant numbers. 
Nevertheless, both the opportunities for and the forms of collective defiance ‘are structured 
by features of institutional life’ (Piven and Cloward 1977: 23), not least because organised 
defiance is often directed at existing institutions and their personnel.  
 
After the restoration of democracy in 1986, the national political space for urban poor 
demands was increased, particularly for the community organisers with church support. As a 
result, during the Aquino period, there were some significant institutional and legislative 
gains from lobbying, most notably the setting up of the Community Mortgage Program 
(CMP) (discussed below) and the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) and 
the passing of the 1992 Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) (RA 7279) (see 
Karaos et al. 1995) vii. Hot on the heels of the 1991 Local Government Code enacting 
political decentralisation, the UDHA law meant that ‘local governments are ordered to meet 
legal requirements before a demolition, conduct a land inventory and beneficiary registration, 
and identify sites for socialized housing’ (Karaos 1997: 69). Under the Act, socialised 
housing is for ‘the underprivileged and homeless’, however, it is in fact directed specifically 
at existing informal settlements – thus indicating the extent to which the legislation ‘is 
advocacy-driven’ (Interview 2009). Importantly, this also signals the extent to which “the 
informal settler problem” is related to land use conflicts at specific sites. Urban poor 
advocacy has some reach into the national political arena in Metro Manila; however, it 
remains very site-specific for the same reason, it is demand-driven. 
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As already noted, LGU compliance with the UDHA has been poor. On the one hand, there 
are no formal enforcement mechanisms in place: HUDCC only undertakes coordination. Part 
of the problem is that the urban poor now mostly lack the ‘coalitions strong enough to 
confront the mayors’ (Interview 2006). There has been a decline in the number of middle 
class activists prepared to join as community organisers, but as well, urban poor 
organisations lack the ‘institutionalised channels of access to representation in the power 
structures of society’ (Racelis 2005: 87). NGOs have tended to retain connections within the 
Catholic Church, and used them to obtain national level political access, but these are 
normally ad hoc and dependent on individuals. To some extent there have been positions 
secured on local and national government boards and committees, but these have offered 
limited representation and have not been a means to alliance building (Hutchison 2007). 
Where results have been achieved at local government levels, this has been an outcome of 
political pressures applied to elected officials by local NGOs (see Bodegon 1999). Finally, on 
top of this, the development pressures nowadays are more intense. To quote one activist: 
The pace of change in Manila is very fast now. It is hard to keep up. And there are 
many [political] actors involved – local mayors, past presidents, district 
representatives – they are all getting involved. All have their own political projects – 
so it is very hard to target all these actors on all these fronts. (In Hutchison 2007: 864) 
In this period, urban poor advocates have generally considered the ADB to be an ally, on 
account of its involuntary resettlement policies and its efforts in relation to particular projects 
and officials. Yet they stress they have received no direct support from it. More generally, 
during  the 1990s, urban poor NGOs were given greater “participatory” roles in mobilising 
communities for project and program implementation, but these have been within the 
confines of donors’ hopes for social capital as a tool of development (Shatkin 2007: 6-7).  
To summarise, the MMUSP program is designed to promote LGU compliance with existing 
legal mandates which were established as a result of urban poor demands. Nowadays, the 
organising capacities of urban poor communities are generally in decline. Nevertheless, it is 
instructive to reflect on the status of their advocates as “reformers”. According to the 
typology (in Hughes and Hutchison in this volume), they are ‘pragmatists’ more than 
‘idealists’, meaning they ‘have long term goals of social transformation but also consider 
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short term gains significant’ and, consequently, they are willing to ‘form both dedicated and 
tactical alliances’. 
In the next section, the Taguig LGU’s reluctance to accept the ADB investment loan, 
apparently on cost grounds, is put into wider context. LGUs are clearly the MMUSP 
program’s critical ‘gatekeepers’ in that they ‘hold power over the issue area and therefore 
need to be in some way on side’ (Hughes and Hutchison, this volume). Consequently, it is 
important to look in more detail at their orientation.  
 
The LGUs 
First, many in the sector express the view that LGUs ‘do not want to borrow on behalf of the 
urban poor’, because they consider it ‘an expense, not an investment’ – an investment 
carrying the expectation of a reasonable return. The following statement from the (then) 
Quezon City mayor is instructive:  
Loans are easier to rationalize if they are for projects that result in income streams 
that will generate payback mechanism for the loan, or those that are used for projects 
that represent social investments of our LGU to generate steadily increasing 
magnitude of public services to our constituents. (Belmonte, personal communication 
2010) 
Here the mayor indicates a preparedness to borrow for ‘social investments’, yet the cases of 
both Quezon City and Taguig demonstrate the limits of LGU commitments to the urban poor.   
 
Both Quezon City and Taguig LGUs already have what they term “socialised housing 
programs”. Quezon City, established the Housing Urban Renewal Authority (HURA) in 
2003 for this purpose. However, according to a HURA officer, housing for the poor ‘has 
been a struggle’ with respect to meeting their needs (Interview 2010). To date the LGU has 
completed 640 medium-rise accommodation units, but only about a third have gone to 
eligible informal settlers, the remainder have been taken up by low-wage employees, 
especially from city hall. The two groups are not necessarily entirely different, but it is 
generally the case that informal settlers are more likely to be in lower paid and irregular jobs 
or “the informal sector”, certainly if they are poor. Critically, for this reason they tend to be 
reluctant to commit to repayments and/or simply lack the access to housing finance through 
national employee-membership funds which the HURA programs rely on.  
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In Quezon City, the shelter needs of informal settlers in fact come under a different city 
department, the Urban Poor Affairs Office which targets the national government’s 
Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The CMP provides low interest, subsidised financing 
for land acquisition, site development and home construction, however, the bulk of loans are 
only used for the former, essentially making it a land tenure program (Porio et al 2004). The 
innovation of the scheme is that the loan is extended to informal settler communities through 
a second party “originator”, normally a NGO or LGU, which then bears the responsibility 
(and risk) of amortisation. The CMP has been popular, but has limitations. For the very 
reason it is affordable – borrowing can be disaggregated to serve different purposes – it has 
often not delivered the physical changes from slum upgrading proper. Its critics complain 
there is often ‘no discernible change in [settlers’] way of living … many CMP sites do not 
differ from other slum areas’ (PBSP 2007: iii). As well, the CMP has been used mainly to 
purchase private lands, whereas a much larger proportion of informal settler households are 
on government owned lands. Finally, international donors reject interest-based subsidies 
because they are considered to block the involvement of commercial banks.   
 
The point of the Quezon City case is that its socialised housing program does not currently 
address the needs of the urban poor in informal households. Whilst the LGU is active in land 
acquisition programs through the CMP, this involves little or no LGU subsidy and is limited 
to instances where private landowners want to sell. As noted already, Quezon City LGU is 
not keen to undertake the kind of in-situ slum upgrading that the MMUSP program promotes. 
It is interested in assistance to achieve cross-subsidies, but only in the case of resettlement 
sites further out (Belmonte, personal correspondence 2010).  
 
The Taguig case is different on the surface, but not substantively. This LGU commenced its 
socialised housing program in 2005, in partnership with the house-building NGOs, Habitat 
for Humanity and Gawad Kalinga. To date this arrangement has produced 730 
accommodation units and the city has plans for many more (Interview 2010). The medium-
rise, Habitat for Humanity-built units do currently house a significant number of former 
informal settlers, but these tend to be households with one or more members in regular, paid 
employment. A number of households from the same settlements are said to have rejected the 
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option of a unit because they considered they could not afford the repayments (Interview 
2010). Future plans include the LGU partnering with the Coalition for the Homeless – an 
NGO established by ‘the former presidents of reality businesses’ – to provide dwellings for 
‘LGU employees, police and teachers’, quite specifically not for the poorest ‘20 percent’ of 
households (Interview 2010).  
 
Gawad Kalinga housing is more strongly targeted to the very poor as its construction costs 
are lower and entirely donated; yet its model of intervention is highly contested by 
international donors and urban poor community organisers alike. However, given the earlier 
point about the current difficulties in attracting middle class activists into urban poor 
advocacy, it is significant that Gawad Kalinga has emerged as something of a middle class 
movement in the Philippines, but in ways that underline the endurance – and mobilising 
power – of its ‘discourse of class construction, through which middle class actors connect, 
but command and distance themselves from the masa [the masses]’ (Pinches 2010: 306). 
Gawad Kalinga – meaning ‘extending care’ – was first formed as an off-shoot of the 
evangelical group, Couples For Christ, whose founder connects poverty alleviation to 
personal transformation, in direct, intentional contrast to the confrontational-style community 
organising which has characterised progressive movements in the Philippines for number of 
years (Kessler and Rüland 2008: 194-195). Although it is now independent, Gawad Kalinga 
retains the same strong commitment to change through relational, personal transformation. 
Gawad Kalinga personnel informed me their priority is ‘bridging the gap in relationships [in 
Philippine society] with ‘care and share’’ (Interview 2010). The relationship gaps are 
principally those between the poor and the non-poor, although in fact it is clear that the non-
poor participants highly value (and enjoy) the relationships they establish among themselves. 
As Pinches observes, it is striking how attractive the Gawad Kalinga ‘vision of nation 
building through slum eradication’ (Pinches 2010: 305) has been to many middle class 
Filipinos, across business, the professions, government and academia. He argues that part of 
the appeal is the way it taps into ‘an old and powerful discourse of paternalism enunciated by 
the Church, by members of the elite, and by politicians … rendering the super-ordinate party 
active and generous, and the dependent other compliant and grateful’ (Pinches 2010: 305). 
 
A further area of note is LGUs participation in the programs of the Cities Alliance. Formed in 
1999, the Cities Alliance is ‘a global coalition of cities and their development partners 
committed to scaling up successful approaches to poverty reduction’viii. As mentioned at the 
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outset, it has helped to fund technical assistance for the MMUSP program. The Cities 
Alliance’s two “cornerstones” are its City Development Strategies (CDS) and Cities Without 
Slums (CWS) programs. The first promotes urban development strategies that in to increase 
the participating cities’ economic competitiveness. The CWS strategy promotes citywide 
slum upgrading through national programs. Critically, the two programs are supposed to be 
fully integrated: 
The initial preparatory stages of CWS Program formulation should be undertaken as 
an integral part of the preparatory/analytical stages for the CDS. It can be anticipated 
that as a result of this process, poverty reduction will be identified as a key problem 
area, and the CWS program will be prepared as part of the broader (CDS) strategic 
response. (ADB 2004: 5) 
Mukhija observes that the Cities Alliance strategy contains ‘an embedded contradiction 
between enhanced economic competitiveness and better housing conditions for the poor’ 
(Mukhija 2006: 58). Moreover, because of the preoccupation with ‘cooperation, institutional 
pluralism and consensus building’, it has no processes for handling conflicts. This is clearly 
observable in the Philippines.  
 
According to a World Bank officer, in recent years the country is ‘the poster child’ for the 
Cities Alliance’s CDS ix. However, it is clear that this has done little to nothing to promote 
socialised housing and “cities without slums”. In the words of the Secretary General of the 
League of Cities in the Philippines, the CDS has encouraged LGUs to adopt  
a new approach to managing their cities. … First and foremost is the realization of the 
city as an economic space. Cities are identifying their competitive advantages and 
maximizing these in promoting local economic development. (emphasis added) x  
Too much causation ought not to be attributed to the Cities Alliance’s interventions. Indeed, 
interviews with various LGU officers suggest that they tend to take a take it or leave attitude 
with regards to participation. In the words of one LGU officer: ‘Cities Development 
Strategies, we know of these, but we do not participate seriously … if useful we can adapt [it 
to our purposes]’ (interview 2010). LGUs have both mandated and political interests in 
economic development.  Under the 1991 Local Government Code, LGUs were given primary 
responsibility for urban development and service delivery. Also, they were extended wider 
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revenue raising powers through ‘property taxes, proceeds from the operation of public 
enterprises (such as public markets), local business taxes’ and so on (Capuno 2002: 234). 
This means they have vested interests in local land markets and property development, in 
ways that often conflict with the allocation of land to socialised housing and undermine 
community organising. To quote Shatkin (2007: 36): 
Saddled with the responsibility for a variety of services as a result of decentralization, 
local governments are under pressure to generate revenue through property and 
business taxes. Each of these sources of revenue now represents a larger proportion of 
local government budgets in Metro Manila than the Internal Revenue Allotment 
(IRA), the sum provided by the national government to all cities and municipalities. 
Local government officials also often have a vested interest in encouraging local 
economic development, both because influential businesspeople make powerful 
political allies, and because officials themselves often come from families with real 
estate interests. Thus city and municipal governments have increasingly competed to 
attract investment in the form of commercial development, industrial development, 
high-value residential development, and development of institutions such as colleges, 
hospitals, or government officers.  
 
The final point in this section on the background to Taguig’s rejection of the ADB loan 
relates to LGUs general understanding of the nature of the development problem that slums 
present. From an international donor perspective, slums are a manifestation of the interlinked 
problems of poverty and governance and institutional failures. Accordingly, the solutions 
proposed aim to address these. By contrast, LGUs in the Philippines overwhelmingly regard 
slums as “urban blight” and “development” correspondingly as a process that involves and 
requires the demolition of physical structures and the relocation and resettlement of the 
inhabitants. These attitudes reflect a broader set of middle and upper-class ideologies about 
the urban poor and their settlements being an offence to ‘urbanidad’, a Tagalog word 
denoting good manners or civility. The association between poverty and dirt is particularly 
significant as dirt is ‘something that is not in its proper place’ (Schaffer 2009: 1354, Douglas 
1966, Pinches 1992).  As we have seen with Gawad Kalinga phenomenon, such views 
encourage a belief in development as improvement centred on nexus between personal 
discipline and social order, cleanliness and morality and ‘beautification’ of the urban 
environment and social order. In short, LGUs largely consider that ‘land is too precious a 
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commodity to use for socialized housing, [for] a group that in their view is an impediment to 
the kind of urban development that is attractive to global capital’ (Shatkin 2007: 26).  
 
The LGUs are the MMUSP program’s critical gatekeepers. As we have seen from the above, 
their engagement with the program is at best likely to be ‘tactical’ and not ‘dedicated’; as 
such they are better classed as potentially ‘opportunistic reformers’ than opponents per se 
(see Hughes and Hutchison, this volume).  At one level, the LGUs simply do not need to be 
opponents: the program poses no threat because there are no sanctions or other real 
consequences arising from non-participation.  The program seeks to incentivise them to take 
part, as public officials who are committed to meeting their service obligations. Yet the 
record of struggles over slums in Metro Manila is one in which public and political figures 
have responded under pressure from constituents and their advocates and supporters. In 
Muntinlupa there is a Local Housing Board due to pressure from a local NGO, the 
Muntinlupa Development Foundation (MDF). In Taguig, the mayor started to accept that 
socialised housing was his responsibility – and not the national governments – only after 
extensive lobbying from local informal settlers. As reported by one of his staff: the settlers 
‘would come and see him all the time with requests, it never stopped … he evolved, there 
was a political colour to it’ (Interview 2009) . The MMUSP program involves consultations 




The ADB seeks to promote a comprehensive slum upgrading and eradication program in 
Metro Manila by way of measures to encourage local government units (LGUs) to allocate 
land to the shelter needs of urban poor households who currently live in informal settlements. 
In essence, the ADB program aims to enable LGUs to off-set the costs of this through the co-
location of commercial developments with a future revenue stream. A weakness is that the 
plan assumes that LGUs in fact want to meet their legal responsibilities in this area and they 
are prepared to forgo other land uses with higher financial returns in order to do so. With 
other international donors in the Cities Alliance, the ADB is advocating a set of urban 
development strategies in which there is  ‘an embedded contradiction between enhanced 
economic competitiveness and better housing conditions for the poor’ (Mukhija 2006: 58). In 
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so far as LGUs in Metro Manila do not support the integration of these, there are not other 
means in the MMUSP program to resolve this conflict. Indeed, the very land developments 
that the ADB (and other international donors) want to promote are those that make it difficult 
for informal settler communities to challenge the power of the mayors.  
 
Notes 
i ADB officers were not willing to be interviewed about the MUSSP program’s progress, but 
did assist with several email communications. Interviews were conducted in 2009 and 2010 
with personnel from HUDCC, SHFC, World Bank, UN-HABITAT, League of Cities of the 
Philippines, Gawad Kalinga, urban poor NGOs, as well as officers from four LGUs: Taguig, 
Muntinlupa, Quezon City and Marikina. In addition, I visited affected informal settler 
communities and interviewed local leaders in Taguig, Muntinlupa and Quezon City. I am 
most grateful to Dr. Anna-Marie Karaos, Director of the John J. Carroll Institute on Church 
and Social Issues (ICSI), for her generous assistance with my research, and to Gerald and 
Gladys, my two research assistants (also from ICSI), for their willing help also. 
ii  Socialised housing is housing that embodies some form of subsidy, to meet the shelter needs of 
households which otherwise cannot afford housing through the private market.   
iii   There are other components to the design of the program that aim to achieve affordable 
housing. These include the construction of medium-rise dwellings for higher residential 
densities and the release of land on a usufruct basis so that land costs are excluded from the 
housing package.    
iv I was never directly told that this was the reason, I have concluded as much from separate 
interviews with two senior Quezon City officers in 2009 and written correspondence with 
Mayor Belmonte in 2010.  
v   The SHFC was selected because, the national government agency which provides finance for 
socialised housing it was considered to know the sector and earlier pilot programs with 
commercial banks had not been successful (ADB, personal correspondence 2009). 
vi  The policy is at, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Involuntary_Resettlement/default.asp?p=rsttlmnt.  
vii  The National Shelter Program is more obviously a product of international thinking in its 
adoption of an ‘enabling’ role for the state (Shatkin 1999: 35-36, Hutchison 2007: 862). The 
MMUSP program is more directed at the implementation of RA 7279,  although its approach 
in general promotes the same enabling role for the state.  
viii  The World Bank and UN-Habitat (as the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) were 
founding members; the ADB joined in 2002. 
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ix   The CDS of the Cities Alliance is coordinated in the Philippines through the World Bank and 
the League of Cities in the Philippines. 
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8 ‘The streets belong to who?’: ‘Governance’ and the Urban Informal 
Sector in Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
Ian Douglas Wilson  
Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia 
 
The aim of this case study is to assess the nature and impact of policy relating to governance 
of the Urban Informal Sector (UIS) in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing in particular upon the 
degree of representation of various stakeholders and sets of interests in existing policy. After 
outlining the background context of the issue, focusing upon Jakarta, it will ask; what has 
been the nature and extent of this representation in current policy, what political and 
economic interests have dominated policy debate, what efforts have been made to represent 
the sector and what can potentially be done to ensure that representation translates into 
effective and equitable governance strategies that balance the needs of UIS workers with 
those of other relevant stakeholders.  
 
Defining the Urban Informal Sector 
By way of a general introduction, the informal sector covers a wide range of economic and 
income generating activities, including casual jobs, small-scale entrepreneurial activity, home 
industry and part-time work; work operating outside of formal government regulation and 
taxation (including the black-market or illegal), making it a complex and problematic area of 
governance. The term ‘informal sector’ is meant to capture the characteristics of that sector 
of the labour force which is not part of the regulated employed sector. This study will focus 
upon one of the more conspicuous and contentious sectors of the UIS in Jakarta; petty street 
traders and vendors known more as pedagang kaki lima or PKL. Due to the often transient 
and fluxing nature of street trading it is difficult to find accurate estimates of the numbers of 
PKL in Jakarta with figures ranging from 140,000 to over 350,000. In particular, during 
times of economic crisis or downturn the numbers of PKL can quickly expand. For example 
during the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 the number of vendors and itinerant traders 
jumped from 95,000 to 270,000 in the space of a few months (Firman 1999) i.   
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The Global Development Research Centre has identified a number of criteria distinctive of 
the UIS: a) It operates in open spaces, (b) it is housed in a temporary or semi-permanent 
structure, (c) it does not operate from spaces assigned by the government, municipality or 
private organizers of officially recognized market-places, (d) it operates from residences or 
backyards, and (e) it is not registered ii. Employment instability based on casual ad hoc 
employment means that UIS workers often engage in petty trade, and as such do not receive 
salary or benefits from a stable employer. While UIS workers in Indonesia are not by 
definition poor, the urban poor make up an overwhelming majority of the UIS iii. The 2006 
World Bank Report Making the New Indonesia Work for the Poor gives figures that 60% of 
all Indonesians work in the informal sector, the number rising to 75% amongst those they 
define as the poor (World Bank 2006) iii  In 2001 Blunch et al cite a figure of 77.9% for the 
proportion of the Indonesian urban work force located in the informal sector (Blunch, 
Canagarajah and Raju 2001). This compares with 66.9% in the Philippines and 51.4% in 
Thailand (Blunch, Canagarajah and Raju 2001). In 2008 it was estimated that as many as 60 
million out of Indonesia’s workforce of 97 million worked in the informal sector (Khalik 
2008).  
 
With the high dependence of formal sector employment upon global markets, the informal 
sector has continued to expand particularly during times of global economic downturn such 
as the Asia Financial Crisis of 1997. As such it has provided a safety net against abject 
poverty in the absence of extensive functioning social welfare services in Indonesia. Portes 
and Hoffman have documented globally the dramatic growth in what they describe as an 
‘informal proletariat’; “the sum of own-account workers minus professionals and technicians, 
domestic workers, and paid and unpaid workers in microenterprises” (Portes and Hoffman 
2003: 55). The implementation of neo-liberal policies and the privatisation of markets, 
particularly in developing countries, has seen an overall shrinkage of public sector jobs and 
‘forced entrepreneurialism’ and invented self-employment for many (Centeno and Portes 
2006). This trend of informalisation has also accelerated processes of urbanisation (Davis 
2004). The continued lack of economic opportunities in rural areas makes migration to urban 
centres a pragmatic survival strategy for many, swelling the size of cities and overwhelming 
the already limited absorptive potential of the formal sector. The urban informal sector is a 
global socio-economic reality that will continue to grow in the future. As Centeno and Portes 
state, its expansion is also “a poignant reflection of the distortions and failures of the 
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development process”, and “simultaneously a key actor for implementing any solution to 
them” (Centeno and Portes 2006: 24).  
 
With these figures and economic and population trends in mind, the characteristics and 
dynamics of the urban informal sector in Indonesia should be a matter of high priority for 
government and policy makers. Some of the key characteristics of the urban informal sector 
in comparison to formal sector workers are: 
• They have minimal income security and as a result are constantly in search of work. 
Insecurity is a constant feature of their existence, and they are highly susceptible to 
income loss. 
• Their relations with their employers/clients are generally more direct and personal than 
those of formal sector workers, and they often have multiple relationships. Despite a 
common perception of informal sector workers as self-employed potential or actual 
micro-entrepreneurs (pushed by donor agencies such as the World Bank), most in fact 
work for someone else i.e. via consignment, rental of a pushcart or space or as off the 
books workers or suppliers for formal sector firms.  
• Their socio-economic and political life is primarily territorial based (neighbourhood, 
street) and not workplace based. Subsequently they have a higher consciousness and 
sensitivity to issues of space, but a diminished sense of sectoral consciousnesses. Issues 
of economic livelihood are frequently intertwined with those of housing/residency. 
• Due to the fluidity in their situation, there is a far greater degree of social heterogeneity in 
their immediate living environment. People frequently move in and out of 
neighbourhoods as fortunes, consumption patterns and demand fluctuate. This can lead to 
unique forms of social organisation (such as community based cooperatives) but can also 
inhibit the development of effective forms of community based advocacy. This 
heterogeneity, generally within crowded environments with poor infrastructure and a lack 
of basic amenities, can also contribute to the emergence of forms of social conflict and 
predatory and reactionary forms of organisation (street gangs, protection rackets, 
vigilantes).  
• There is greater flexibility as regards to time/working hours.  
• The UIS often operates in highly competitive yet unregulated markets. Markets 
frequently become oversaturated, resulting in overall reduction of profits. 
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• Largely by default they engage in more illegal activities, ranging from squatting and 
trespassing to unlicensed businesses, making them frequently subject to harassment and 
arrest by the authorities. Davis has estimated that up to 85% of urban residents in the 
developing world “occupy property illegally” (Davis 2004:15).  
• They serve an important economic role by providing affordable goods and services for 
the urban poor as well as low wage formal sector workers.  
 
Considering the significance of the UIS, in terms of the sheer numbers of people involved, its 
inherent precariousness and its crucial safety net role in relation to an often equally 
precarious formal sector, what have been the governance strategies of the Indonesian 
government towards it; how has it been represented in policy and what types of initiatives 
and support programs have been implemented to accommodate this now global product of 
hyper-urbanisation?  
 
Policy and approaches  
Throughout Indonesia UIS governance has been characterized by an informal approach. In 
practice the presence of informal sector activity in public space is frequently tolerated to 
varying degrees (often due to a lack of resources to do otherwise) however with few 
exceptions it lacks any formal legal foundation or safeguards. On a day-to-day basis in cities 
such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan such informal governance is often the preserve of the 
community itself, or frequently criminal and protection rackets gangs often working in 
cooperation with the police, civil ordinance officials and local authorities (Robison, Wilson, 
Meliala 2008). UIS workers are frequently subject to a range of both formal and informal 
fees paid to gangs, the police and civil ordinance officials. A study conducted by the Institute 
for Economic and Social Rights in 2007 showed that street vendors in Jakarta paid Rp. 279.8 
billion (US$27.9 million) in retributions, the majority of which were illegal (Nasir 2008) iv. A 
common situation found in the streets and neighbourhoods of Jakarta is vendors paying 
retributions to gangs and protection groups in the hope that this will prevent the extraction of 
fees from other gangs and also provide protection from harassment and eviction by the 
authorities. Often vendors are forced to pay fees to both gangs and officials, with neither 
providing any binding guarantee of security.  
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The implementation from 2001 of political decentralisation in Indonesia, and the subsequent 
demand from provincial and district level governments for an increase in locally generated 
revenue has, despite opportunities for increased public participation in development and 
planning, had a negative overall effect on informal sector workers, with many small 
enterprises being pushed into the formal economy with insufficient planning and street 
vendors evicted or ‘criminalised’ in the context of increasing competition and clashes of 
interest over the use of public space. In Jakarta part of the rationale for an intensification of 
this repressive and prohibitive approach since has been that large numbers of UIS workers 
are economic migrants to the nation’s capital and that the capacity of the city to sustainably 
absorb a greater population has already been surpassed v. This rationale is not entirely 
unfounded as Jakarta’s population has grown at a startling rate.  Totaling only 1.5 million in 
1950, according to the 2010 census it is now around 9.58 million with the greater Jakarta 
region reaching 26.6 million, making it one of  the largest metropolitan cities in Southeast 
Asia (BPS 2010) . Rapid urbanisation has been accelerated by continued under-development 
in rural areas resulting in a near constant stream of migration into the capital vi . In 2005 it 
was estimated that Jakarta had 2.4 million long term and 430,000 short term migrants from 
rural areas (Resosudarmo, Yamauchi and Effendi 2009). Street vending in particular is for 
many new migrants often one of the only viable and accessible means by which to generate 
income, hence recent and long term migrants are heavily represented.  
 
This argument however obscures the reality of limited formal employment opportunities 
even for long term Jakarta residents, and also the ways in which existing resources, space and 
infrastructure have been utilised and prioritised, and the sets of interests that have benefitted. 
As Rukmana states, “many of the problems associated with the informal sector are not 
attributes inherent to the informal sector but manifestations of unresponsive urban planning 
itself” (Rukmana 2007). Clearance of slums for example is entirely counter-productive when 
alternate places of residence and livelihood are not provided or do not exist, and in Jakarta 
such operations have been used as a means for freeing land for high-level investment 
developments (Human Rights Watch 2006). As has been well documented, capital intensive 
retail developments such as shopping malls and luxury housing estates are also placing 
unsustainable burdens on Jakarta’s physical infrastructure and environment and have been 
linked to the exacerbation of long term problems such as flooding (due to reducing natural 
catchment areas) and the attendant issue of land subsidence vii.   
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At a national level there is limited in principal recognition of the UIS in the National Spatial 
Planning Law 26/2007 which identifies the importance of the informal sector in urban areas; 
the need to incorporate it into urban planning as well as minimum standards of services and 
provisions for greater accountability in spatial planning processes (Hudalah and Woltjer 
2007). The ambiguous in principal and non-binding nature of the law however has meant that 
it is easily overlooked, or is often countered by regional and district level regulations (known 
as Peraturan Daerah, or Perda). A further Presidential decree in 2007 also stipulated that 
chain convenience stores in particular be required to assess their impact upon any traditional 
markets in close proximityviii. Similarly, national level ministers have, usually during periods 
of economic downturn, requested that street traders be left undisturbed in the interests of not 
further burdening financial pressures on the poor. These however have not been considered 
binding, or backed by concrete legislationix.  
 
However in some urban centres in Indonesia street vendors have been formally 
accommodated within planning and space allocation and involved directly in a consultative 
planning process. For example in the city of Solo, Central Java, a participatory approach 
towards the accommodation of the UIS has been adopted by the mayor Joko Widodo. Plans 
to relocate over a thousand vendors involved an extended process of negotiation and 
consultation with vendors after which they voluntarily moved to a new location, in contrast 
to the tactics of his predecessors (The Jakarta Post 2010) x. Vendors were accommodated 
within fifteen recently renovated traditional markets or provided with new street carts and 
main bus routes redirected so that there would be a constant stream of customers (Tempo, 
2009). Local regulations have also been introduced, and more importantly enforced, limiting 
the number of large malls and 24hour minimarkets (Indarini 2010). A Street Vendors 
Administration Office (Kantor Pengelolaan PKL) has been established to pursue initiatives 
for assisting and consulting directly with the UIS xi. Most significant in the Solo case, is the 
recognition of the UIS as a legitimate sector to be incorporated within development and 
planning agendas and allocated adequate resources, the most important of which is space xii. 
The Solo example, while encouraging, has however been an exception to the rule. Nationally, 
the prevailing orientation of regional regulations towards the UIS is prohibitive; indicating 
that while informally it is recognised, the prevailing tendency is to view it as illegal activity 
due to its operation outside of state regulation and its reliance upon public space.  
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Between order and disorder in ‘the city of vendors’ 
In part due to the sheer size of its population the management and politics of the UIS in 
Jakarta is far more complex than in other urban centres throughout Indonesia. The response 
from government however has been far less nuanced or accommodating than in Solo. The 
primary policy instrument used for dealing with the UIS has been the 1988 Public Order law, 
which was later revised in Regional Law No.8 2007 (FAKTA 2008) x  
iii. The Public Order law criminalises non-state sanctioned UIS activity, stipulating that it is 
illegal to sell goods or conduct business in streets, parks or other public places except in areas 
designated by the governor. The recognition of the informal sector in the 2007 National 
Spatial Planning Law was in a sense countered by a tightening of the previous Public Order 
law, which included greater penalties for illegal vending along with begging, busking and 
squatter settlements. A parting gift of outgoing governor Sutiyoso, he argued that the law was 
necessary to "to put order into things of common interest"(BBC 2007).  
 
The regular experience of violent confrontation between UIS workers and state agencies was 
in many ways shaped during the governorship of Sutiyoso (1997-2007) who waged a 
systematic campaign against the informal sector at a time when it was expanding 
dramatically in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis xiv. During the period 2001-2005 
approximately 60,000 slum dwellers were evicted whereas in 2003 alone 17,700 street 
vendors were moved on, many having their stalls demolished (FAKTA, 2004). Identity card 
checks were increased, especially at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan when 
traditionally there is an influx of new migrants. Public parks such as the National Monument 
(Monas) were fenced off and pedestrian paths narrowed to prevent vendors establishing stalls 
xv. Indigenous Betawi gangs and ethnic militias were mobilised, resulting in increased clashes 
with migrant ethnic groups predominant in street trade such as the Madurese (Wilson 2006). 
A former Jakarta military commander, Sutiyoso employed urban management techniques 
associated with the former New Order regime. His vision and concept of Jakarta, inspired by 
Singapore and Hong Kong, had no place for the UIS, which was considered an eyesore, 
source of social problems and unbefitting a modern city (Kusno 2004).  
 
This negative impact of this law and order approach upon the UIS has been compounded by 
a failure to implement and enforce existing legislation accommodative of informal economic 
activity, such as Jakarta regional law No.2/2002, which requires developers of large scale 
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retail developments (2,000-4000m2  of floor space) to allocate up to 20% of total space for 
UIS activity, and not to be within 2.5km of traditional marketsxvi. Since the passing of the 
law in 2002, there has yet to be a single development that has allocated space as stipulated in 
the regulation and a number of recent retail developments are well within the 2.5km 
exclusion zone xvii. The common practice is for powerful developers to simply buy 
themselves out of regulatory adherence, either via illegal payments to officials or other forms 
of retribution xviii.  From the perspective of developers providing space for vendors is seen 
simply as a waste of money, with little to be gained in terms of social or political capital xix. 
The outcome has been an overabundance of high end retail developments, housing estates 
and commercial buildings. By way of example, Jakarta currently has around 40 traditional 
markets each of which can accommodate around 500 traders (20,000 in total), well short of 
the estimated 140,000-350,000 street vendors (Interview with Azas Tigor, Director of the 
Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), Jakarta, 6 August 2010). This can be contrasted with the 
60+ medium to large sized shopping malls in Jakarta that are estimated to serve the needs of 
and be affordable for only around 500,000 residents, or 3.5% of Jakarta’s total population 
(Rukmana 2009a ). At the municipal level, each of Jakarta’s mayors has informally 
designated areas for street vendor activity, though with the high demand and price of land the 
trend has been towards reducing rather than increasing these. For example in December 2009 
in Central Jakarta there were 62 designated areas for street traders, down from 66 in February 
of the same year (Sabarini 2009). The rationale for the reduction of space despite an increase 
in demand was that it is necessary in order to ‘tidy up the city’ (Sabrini 2009).  
 
With the limitations and precariousness of legal space in which to operate, UIS workers 
takeover the streets, filling up sidewalks and alleyways and are subsequently subject to 
eviction, relocation or dislocation via regular ‘razia’ or raids conducted by Satpol PP public 
order officials. This enforcement is sporadic and usually conducted without prior negotiation, 
adding to the uncertainty of UIS workers and increasing the risk of conflict. There is 
significant evidence suggesting corrupt and collusive practices, in which Satpol PP clear 
vendors and poor communities on behalf of developers and so called ‘land mafia’; networks 
using intimidation, falsified land title documents and bribes to officials to acquire land 
(Human Rights Watch 2006). A 2009 report by the Indonesian human rights group Imparsial 
recommended that the Satpol PP be disbanded due to its systemic human rights violations in 
the enforcement of public order laws against vendors and disproportionate allocation of fiscal 
resources it receives (Imparsial 2009). In the 2007 Jakarta regional budget the Satpol PP was 
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allocated 303.2 billion (US$29.7 million) (Imparsial 2009) xx. This compares to 188 billion 
allocated for primary level education, 200 billion for government run health clinics and 64 
billion for the Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, a body seen as 
crucial to the development of the UIS (Imparsial 2009). This huge investment in the Satpol 
PP, whose core function is the enforcement of the public order laws, indicates the prevailing 
attitude towards the UIS at the top levels of the Jakarta administration is that of illegal 
activity which obstructs more profitable forms of development.  It also reflects the prevailing 
matrix of interests that dominate policy formation processes and their selective enforcement, 
with the administration generously funding a force with the core function of clearing the 
streets of UIS workers and the urban poor.   
 
The social and economic outcomes of this criminalisation approach has been almost entirely 
negative, both for government and UIS workers, and linked to a range of social problems 
such as increased levels of urban poverty, street criminality, social conflict as well as a de-
legitimisation of government agencies xxi. Often left with nowhere else to go, evicted vendors 
simply move to another area, or return to their original site once things have ‘cooled down’, 
resulting in an ongoing pattern of ‘semi-nomadism’ within the city. In part this nomadism is 
inherent in the nature of street vending itself, which tends to congregate around pre-existing 
centres of activity (schools, transport terminals, business districts etc), rather than becoming 
the locus for an economic or retail hub in its own right xxii. According to Azas Tigor, Director 
of the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), the Jakarta administration has not recognised this 
central characteristic of street traders, hence the repeated failure of attempts to force them 
into the formal sector. For example the Jakarta City Market Authority (PD Pasar Jaya) has 
instigated a number of ‘vendor relocation programs’ aimed at removing vendors from the 
streets and situating them within market buildings (Wisnu 2009). Situated away from organic 
hubs of activity, or in direct competition with convenience chain stores, and often in high 
states of disrepair these markets have been unpopular both with consumers and vendors 
themselves. The high fees imposed for kiosks (anywhere between Rp.7-10 million per meter) 
has also been prohibitive (Wisnu 2009, Interview with PD Pasar Jaya official, Jakarta 12 
August 2009). Informality remains more profitable.   
 
The election of Fauzi Bowo as governor in 2008 brought some optimism amongst NGOs, 
residents forums and vendor associations that a more humane approach would be adopted 
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towards street vendors, however to date he has continued the confrontational and approach of 
his predecessor xxiii.  An example is the implementation of his plan to increase ‘green space’ 
in Jakarta from 9.6% to 13.9% by the end of 2010 (Rukmana 2009b) xxiv. As anyone who has 
spent time in Jakarta knows, public parkland is rare and much needed xxv. However as the 
NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) and others have identified, the 
targets for reclaiming land for green zones have been overwhelmingly ‘soft’, such as squatter 
communities and existing vendor and street market sites, in short the urban poor and UIS 
workers (Khalid 2009). Examples include the eviction of long-established street traders in 
Jalan Barito, settlements surrounding the BMW Park in Tangerang and communities in 
Rawasari Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta (Khalid 2009). On the other hand, a number of 
malls and shopping centres that have already been built on designated green zones (largely 
illegally and due to corruption) have neither been demolished (which according to the 
governor would be ‘impractical’) nor required to pay any compensatory fee or tax xxvi. 
Proposals for further mall developments on allocated green zones have also been allowed to 
reach formal assessment stages (Setiawati 2010).  
 
One major conceptual failing of the Green Zones concept, and spatial planning more 
generally, is that it does not incorporate residential areas or allow for either informal or 
regulated economic activity. Rather than ‘greening’ existing neighbourhoods, the strategy has 
been to clear designated green zones of human inhabitants putting further pressure upon 
surrounding areas. Organisations such as WALHI, Urban Poor Consortium and the Jakarta 
Residents Forum (FAKTA) have all developed detailed alternative planning models which 
have been submitted to the Jakarta administration for consideration however representatives 
of each stated that they had yet to receive a serious response (Interview with Wadah Hafidz 
(UPC) and Slamet Daroyni (WALHI), Jakarta, 10 August 2009).  Alternative plans from 
within the administrative bureaucracy have also been rejected after opposition from big 
business, such as the Jakarta City Parks agency’s proposal to develop green spaces at the site 
of 29 gas stations (Rukmana 2009 b). 
 
As Hudalah and Woltjer state, spatial planning processes are ‘coordinative in nature’, 
meaning that in practical terms it involves negotiations and deal making between public and 
private stakeholders (Hudalah and Woltjer 2007). Hudalah and Woltjer add that “there is no 
specific obligation of the government to invest or to finance the proposed development or 
land supply” (Hudalah and Woltjer 2007: 298), with the role of government primarily one of 
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making programmes to facilitate and guide investment and financing from the private sector. 
This reliance upon capital from the private sector fundamentally discriminates against the 
UIS, and makes planning processes and the allocation of permits and zoning highly 
susceptible to the distribution of favours, kickbacks and corruption. The outcomes, such as 
those identified previously, indicate the entrenchment of the prevailing matrix of interests 
and the ease with which market capital can determine the direction of planning priorities. 
When programmes are funded by the government, such as the vendor relocation programme, 
the imperative to recoup costs undermines the ostensive intent to provide vendors with 
affordable space.  
 
Organisation and (non)representation of the sector 
As we have seen, the lack of effective representation of UIS interests is due to a combination 
of the conceptual denial of the UIS by the administration together with the ease with which 
the interests of developers have been able to highjack and direct policy, and planning 
priorities, and outcomes. Difficulties in developing the kinds of organisation that could lead 
to effective lobbying and representation in policy making processes is further exacerbated by 
the diverse and expansive nature of the informal sector itself which poses its own limitations. 
This is not helped by existing labor policy which is implicitly based upon the idea of 
formalising the informal workforce. There has been some limited recognition within social 
welfare policy, such as in the extension of health insurance coverage to informal sector 
workers under the state run Jamsostek scheme. However the paradigm of formal sector 
conditions prevails with UIS workers paying more due to the absence of an employee 
contribution (International Labour Organisation, 2008). 
 
Another key issue is that of citizenship. Many UIS workers in Jakarta are legally ‘non-
citizens’ as they do not possess a Jakarta identity card. Failure to obtain one may be due to a 
number of factors, ranging from non-eligibility, prohibitive fees, absence of required 
documentation such as birth certificates or a general reluctance found within informal 
communities to interact with government officials. This has contributed to the disinterest of 
political parties, who do not see UIS workers as a significant potential voting constituency 
and have subsequently not made serious efforts to develop alternative policy strategies or use 
it as a campaign issue. Political ‘engagement’ has been largely restricted to the mobilization 
of UIS workers and the urban poor more generally during campaign periods. This non-
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existence also has significant implications to allocations of the regional budget, as it is only 
to be used for registered residents of Jakarta. 
 
There are a variety of sectoral organisations such as the Indonesian Street Traders 
Association who have attempted to engage in lobbying and advocacy on behalf of the UIS as 
a whole. National labour unions such as the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (Serikat 
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, or SBSI) have also made some efforts to extend to the UIS 
however these still remain partial and made problematic by its diverse and disparate nature 
(Social Alert 2005). Subsequently street vendors have not been adequately represented at this 
sectoral level. There are also numerous local and national level NGO’s and community 
groups doing grass roots organisation and advocacy that have achieved successes in terms of 
localised accommodation of the UIS. For example, the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA) 
has lobbied at the local level for accommodation of vendors, and developed regular lines of 
communication with Jakarta’s current governor, Fauzi Bowo. It has also encouraged UIS 
workers to contest power directly at the local level, such as running for the lowest elected 
positions of formal authority in the administrative hierarchy like a Neighbourhood Unit head 
(Rukun Tetangga or RT) giving them potentially greater input over allocation of budget 
funds and space at the local level xxvii. FAKTA activists state that many lower level officials 
are highly sensitive and aware of issues facing the UIS, but are often hamstrung by the 
priorities and interests of those higher up in the administrative system xxviii. Another 
campaigner for the UIS is the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). Established in 1997, the UPC 
has developing a network of community based collectives throughout Jakarta and  focused 
upon public demonstrations and education campaigns aimed at drawing public and media 
attention to the issue, together with efforts at lobbying the administration for a rights based 
approach to the UIS and the urban poor. The UPC links the situation of the UIS and urban 
poor to a broader critique of stalled political change in Indonesia and the entrenchment of 
oligarchic interests, a position which has not endeared it to many legislators or politicians xxix. 
 
The strength of the UIS lies in its rootedness in local communities, which does not translate 
well into the traditional top-down institutional model that still prevails in Indonesia nor to 
sectoral forms of representation via unions or NGOs. A variety of battles are being fought on 
local fronts throughout Jakarta, but this has not resulted in effective lobbying at higher levels 
of government. A significant amount of NGO and community activity amongst the UIS is 
focused upon developing various forms of self-sufficiency, such as local cooperatives. There 
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is a deep scepticism and hostility amongst vendors towards government, with the common 
view being that it only serves its own interests and those of the rich and powerful. The 
regular experience of violence and eviction at the hands of the Satpol PP and extortion by 
local officials have broken trust,  lines of communication and dialogue. For many UIS 
workers, vendors in particular, the avoidance of contact with state agents is a key concern, 
with their ultimate aim not transition to formal sector employment or even equitable state 
imposed regulation, but the ability to operate their enterprise free from government 
intervention and harassment. In confidential interviews with the author in 2009 street vendors 
frequently stated that “the state was of no use” and that “they are untrustworthy and don’t 
represent us”.  
 
In principle, limited opportunities for local input into planning and development priorities 
can arise in the context of engagement with government facilitated ‘participatory processes’ 
such as Development Planning Consultative Process (Musrenbang). Conducted annually 
through various levels of government Musrenbang are multi-stakeholder forums which are 
meant to encourage non-government stakeholders to participate in proposing, identifying and 
prioritizing development policies, and act as a mechanism through which to mediate 
differences between government and nongovernmental stakeholders (Djani, Wilson, Masduki 
2009). This local government development planning and budgeting mechanism replaces the 
top-down and non-participatory one of the Soeharto era. Proposals undergo further levels of 
screening at higher levels of the administrative hierarchy, and must be in accordance with 
pre-established government programs and core areas to be eligible for funding. Studies have 
shown however that the Musrenbang process has had limited success in incorporating grass 
roots and community based initiatives and inputs into planning priorities and directions with 
the actual levels of participation and its outcomes highly dependent upon the power relations 
between the actors and groups involved (Djani, Wilson, Masduki 2009). In Jakarta NGOs 
and community groups involved in Musrenbang complained that their participation was 
“window dressing” used to legitimate pre-determined agendas, echoing the findings of Djani, 
Wilson and Masduki’s study of the impact of patron-clientism of Musrenbang in other parts 
of the country (Group interview with Musrenbang participants, Jakarta, 11 August 2009).  
 
The inadequacy of policy instruments inhibits UIS workers from organising themselves 
effectively and they are dealt with by government agencies on an individual or localised 
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territorial basis. The top down model of policy instruments and the entrenched interests that 
benefit from this deprives them of a platform to voice their needs, while the inadequacy of 
institutional frameworks also hinders the potential of NGOs, advocacy groups and residents 
forums to act as effective intermediaries. Campaigning for improved conditions, insofar as it 
focuses on addressing specific grievances as distinct from holistic long term solutions, also 
narrows the potential constituency for any networks and relationships (alliances) as the basis 
for shifting power in such a way to enable the identified grievances to be addressed. The 
informal urban sectors conditions of existence and its grievances, as has been noted, are 
characterized by a localized and variegated reality, unlike the industrial/formal sector which 
can more easily mobilise around nation-wide demands, such as a generalized increase in 
wages. Subsequently, fragmentation of campaigning according to localized or otherwise 
relatively narrow issues remains a general characteristic of the various attempts to pressure 
governments for effective action.  In the case of the UIS and vendors in particular the natural 
location of organization (i.e. the workplace) intersects with public and private space, creating 
a complex web of tensions and conflicting interests.  
 
Conclusion 
There are a number of key issues underlying the problems surrounding the Jakarta 
administrations strategies towards the UIS. Firstly is the issue of recognition: the failure of 
local and national government to officially and fully recognise the informal sector as the 
predominant valid form of productive economic activity that not only provides a safety net 
against poverty (in the context of a country in which state welfare services are minimal), but 
also serves the needs of the cities poor and middle-classes. The importance of the informal 
sector has been regularly acknowledged at a national level, such as President Yudhoyono’s 
statement that in the wake of the 2009 economic crisis forced evictions of street traders 
should be ceased (Gatra 2009, Sabarini 2009). This pattern of calls by national and regional 
leaders to show lenience towards the UIS during periods of economic crisis and downturn 
displays an awareness of the sectors significance, if only as a safety net, however it has yet to 
be turned into either concrete legislation or policy xxx. It also fails to articulate the UIS’s 
important role in subsidizing “the consumption and profits of actors in the formal economy” 
(Centeno and Portes 2006 :15). Paradoxically, the generally low wages of the formal sector 
jobs created by developments such as malls means that these workers ultimately rely on the 
existence of the informal sector for goods and services xxxi.  
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Local instances of accommodation and allocation of space for street traders by individual 
mayors or sub-district heads for example, is also largely via informal negotiations and 
dependent upon the individual agency and will of those local leaders. As such it remains 
precarious and subject to termination when more powerful interests intervene.  The existence 
of both prohibitive and accommodative policies towards the UIS, such as the Public Order 
laws and Jakarta regional law No.2/2002 indicates the existence of tensions within 
government as to how best approach and manage the UIS. The failure to enforce the latter 
while the former is allocated significant resources suggests that powerful political and 
economic interests linked to the allocation and use of public space continue to sideline people 
orientated development despite the over-abundance of high end retail and housing servicing 
Jakarta’s economic and political elites. Ostensibly participatory forums such as Musrenbang 
are yet to achieve significant outcomes, in part due to problems of design but also due to high 
jacking by entrenched interests. This situation is compounded by the lack of a coherent or 
organised political lobby from the sector, either via sectoral and mass organisations, unions 
or representation via political parties. Local gains have been made and productive grass 
roots/local level advocacy is taking place, however this has yet to filter through and have an 




i. In 2002 the Jakarta Centre for Statistics estimated there to be 141,073 street vendors in 
Jakarta. Tempo (2002), ‘Kaki lima sebagai katup pengaman’, 24 February. The Institute for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights estimated in 2007 that there were 200,000, while the 
Urban Poor Consortium suggests upwards of 350,000. Interview with Wadah Hafidz, 
Director of Urban Poor Consortium, Jakarta, 10  August 2010. One of the difficulties in 
establishing reliable figures is that official statistics are usually limited to those with Jakarta 
identity cards, whereas a large number of UIS workers do not possess one, and numbers are 
in a constant state of flux in particularly during periods of economic downturn or recession.  
ii. The Global Development Research Centre, ‘The Informal Sector: Definitions at a Glance’, 
http://www.gdrc.org/informal/1-ataglance.html.  
iii. The report estimates that 49% of all Indonesians earn less than US$2 a day. Of these as 
many as 22% in urban areas do not have access to safe water, and 59% no access to 
adequate sanitation (World Bank 2006).  
iv. This figure is based upon currency conversion rate of rp. 10,000 to US$1. 
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v. Suharto notes that while some informal enterprises can be relatively profitable, the 
proportion of poor households in the informal sector has remained constantly higher than in 
the formal sector. Edi Suharto (2002). 
vi. The World Bank estimates that nationally the population of Indonesia’s cities have trebled 
in the past 25 years (World Bank 2006: xxii) 
vii. This argument was most consistently put forward by Jakarta’s previous governor Sutiyoso.  
viii. According to research conducted by the Limnology Research Centre, of the 218 lakes 
found in Jakarta and its outskirts in 1990,  only four currently remain. See Kalinga 
Seneviratne, ‘Jakarta floods linked to illegal construction’, 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36725, 26 February 2007.  
ix. There is little evidence in Jakarta to suggest that either have been implemented or enforced. 
x. See for example Gatra, ‘Mendag: jangan gusur PKL’, (Minister for Trade: Don’t evict 
street vendors), 12 February 2009.  
xi. The mayor had 54 separate meetings with vendors, represented by nine vendor associations, 
over the space of seven months. As he explained “Clear-cut communication detailing the 
benefits of relocation overcame the vendors”.  
xii. Widodo also initiated a credit scheme by which small home based enterprises can borrow 
Rp. 4 million rupiah with 0.5% interest and gave vendors a 6 month exemption from tax.   
xiii. The positive embrace of the UIS was inspired by Widodo’s own background and 
experience as an antique and furniture trader rather than the result of effective lobbying or 
advocacy, drawing attention to the importance of individual agency. Other examples 
includes Gede Winasa, a former dentist and the regent of Jembrana who has implemented a 
comprehensive health insurance scheme for the poor. 
xiv. In 1978 long before either of the public order laws were passed, Regional Regulation No.5 
1978 carried specific reference to management and operation of PKL in Jakarta, 
designating authority to the governor to determine where PKL could legally operate. The 
regulation was never revoked, meaning that legally the governor still has the legal power to 
allocate spaces for street vendors. The regulation also lays responsibility for orderliness and 
cleanliness with vendors themselves, in stark contrast to the prohibitive tone of the 1988 
and 2007 public order laws, but which also lay ultimate authority with the governor.  
xv. The history of hostility towards the UIS and street vendors in particular extends back to the 
governorship of Ali Sadikin (1966-1977) who considered street based enterprise a potential 
threat to public order and as signs of a “backward society”.  Sadikin, A. (1977), Gita Jaya: 
Catatan H. Ali Sadikin, Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta 1966-1977, 
Pemda Ibu Kota Jakarta, Jakarta. Even earlier President Sukarno  
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xvi. New migrants who failed within 14 days to register and obtain a visitors identity card, 
which requires proof of formal employment and residence, were liable to imprisonment and 
heavy fines.  
xvii. According to activists form the Urban Poor Consortium and FAKTA, retail developers 
frequently sidestep the law by hosting one week street vendor festivals, but not establishing 
any permanent space.  
xviii. Interview with Nurkholis Hidayat, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, 7 August 
2009. Examples of violations of the law include Senayan City Mall and the second Plaza 
Indonesia Mall. The exclusion zone for chain convenience stores such as Alfamart or Circle 
K is less than 1km.  
xix. Interview with Nukholis Hidayat, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, 7 August 
2009 
xx. This figure is based upon currency conversion rate of rp. 10,000 to US$1 
xxi. Confidential interview with retail developer, Jakarta, 10 August 2009. 
xxii. Yearly ‘anti-thug’ campaigns, ostensibly aimed at tackling gangs and petty crime, regularly 
target street traders together with street children, beggars and buskers.    
xxiii. Interview with Azas Tigor, director of the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), 6 August 
2009.  
xxiv. This initial optimism came from a number of pro-poor and residents advocacy groups who 
had developed productive lines of communication with Bowo when he was vice-governor. 
His status as an ethnic Betawi, the so called indigenous population of Jakarta, also led these 
groups to think he may show amore compassion towards street vending particularly in 
Betawi communities.   
xxv. ‘Green space’ is defined in legislations simply as “areas where plants can grow” (Rukmana 
2009a). 
xxvi. Green space in Jakarta was roughly 35% in 1965. The target of 13.4% is still significantly 
below the stipulated minimum of 30% established in the 2007 Spatial Planning Law. In 
2008 the allocated budget for green conversion of Rp. 2.6 billion was also significantly 
reduced, all but eliminating the possibility that the 2010 target would be met and increasing 
the imperative to focus upon ‘soft target’ evictions of poor communities. Deden Rukmana 
(2008), ‘Decreasing green areas in Jakarta’, The Jakarta Post, 17 March.  
xxvii. Examples include the Senayan City Mall and Sudirman Palace as well as malls in Kelapa 
Gading, Pantai Kapuk, Sunter, Senayan, and Tomang.  
xxviii. Interview with Azas Tigor (FAKTA), Jakarta 6 August 2009. 
xxix. Ibid. 
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xxx. During Sutiyoso’s period as governor the UPC in particular were subject to physical 
intimidation and attack at the hand of ethnic militias working on behalf of the 
administration. See Wilson 2006. 
xxxi. Some urban poor activists have suggested that these statements, referred to as ‘himbauan’ 
or appeals are purely populist and aimed at appeasing and diverting public anger during 
periods of economic uncertainty.  
xxxii. Average shop attendant wage in Jakarta is around the minimum wage of Rp.1.2 million per 
month.  See Doja Fasila, (2010),’Rise in minimum wage to fall far below union’s demands’, 
The Jakarta Globe, 13 October, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/rise-in-jakarta-
minimum-wage-to-fall-far-below-unions-demands/401254 (accessed 14 November 2010).  
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Where to Now?  
While the DOC initiative appeared to signal a new era in development policy thinking, 
translating an understanding of political economy into practical policy has proven difficult, as 
we note in chapter three. As Sue Unsworth argues, the World Bank’s strategy for 
engagement on governance and corruption, for example (World Bank 2007), “ … contains no 
diagnosis of the underlying causes of weak governance, and hence no recognition of the scale 
of the challenges or the processes involved in creating more effective public authority” 
(Unsworth 2009:  885) . As we shall argue, the Bank has continued to regard insights into 
politics as essentially a means to better target institutional incentives and achieve behavioural 
change in key groups. Nor has the analysis of politics transformed the broad approach of 
DFID. Unsworth also notes that the British Government’s White Paper (DFID 2006), 
advances a “ … technocratic and largely conventional agenda for enhancing growth and 
improving basic services, with barely a nod in the direction of politics.” ((Unsworth 2009:  
889). On the one hand, it is true to say that recognition that politics is important has not led to 
new ways of understanding the problems of development so much as to new means of 
making old paradigms work better. At the same time, there have been important efforts, 
especially in the research agencies of development banks and organisations to grapple 
seriously with the problem of translating knowledge into practice.  
 
Models for the way forward 
One way out of the dilemma is simply to attempt to ignore or override the problem of 
politics. A second path has seen policy-makers seriously address the issue.   
 
Forget engagement with politics.  
1. The Neo-Conservative Solution: creative destruction 
Perhaps the most important and dramatic revision of existing strategies of influencing change 
was that initiated by neo-conservatives in the Bush Presidency. They clearly recognised the 
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limits to protecting markets by supporting dubious regimes and enforcing change through 
institutional reform and took the view that market-based reforms at both the economic and 
political level require nothing less than the elimination of entrenched ruling groups and their 
entire edifice of institutions and authority, if necessary by pre-emptive military strikes (see 
Mallaby 2002; Cooper 2002). The case of Iraq represents the quintessential insight into this 
thinking where the destruction of the Baathist government and its political apparatus created 
a seeming tabula rasa into which market-based economic policies could be introduced at will 
by the Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer. These policies included 
provisions that are the dreams of neo-liberal reformers even within the established heartlands 
of market orthodoxy, among them a flat tax-rate of fifteen percent grafted onto plans for 
extensive institutional reform in the bureaucracy and in the political sphere, including a 
framework of democratic institutions (Peck 2004: 392; Tabb 2006). It seemed that nothing 
could go wrong. 
 
There are obvious reasons why the neo-conservative solution of enforced development by 
means of war has its limits. But the neo-conservative experiment has some important 
political economy lessons. It has shown that the elimination of specific regimes is not in itself 
enough to guarantee the effective implementation and embedding of the sort of market and 
institutional reforms envisaged by neo-liberal reformers. What is missing in this prescription 
is a cohesive political force able to mobilise substantial social support on behalf of a wider 
programme for the reordering of power and the reconstruction of institutions towards a 
market society. Here, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative reformers confront serious 
dilemmas. The genuinely progressive forces that might be able to drive reform are usually the 
very ‘distributional coalitions’ that act on behalf of collective social demands in welfare, 
human rights or environmental reform and critics of the market and the interests it often 
supports. In any case, progressive middle class movements and social democratic or liberal 
political parties, from Mossadeq in Iran in the 1950s, have often already been eliminated or 
weakened by entrenched regimes. At the same time, the cliques of businessmen and 
politicians that have often been favoured as the political spearhead of reform in post-crisis 
societies are invariably without any serious social base or political support. The disastrous 
experiment with the disgraced businessman, Chalabi and his colleagues in Iraq is only one of 
many similar examples (Khalaf and Fidler, 2002). More recently, the attachment to 
Mohamed Kharzai in Afghanistan continues the tradition.  
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2. The Millennium Challenge Account: Pre-emptive Selectivity 
By contrast, the central approach of the Millennium Challenge Account proposed to 
overcome indifference or resistance by self-interested elites to ‘good governance’ and ‘good 
policy’ by simply excluding countries from development assistance where specified 
institutional and policy frameworks were not already in place. The selectivity approach of the 
MCA seemed simple enough: US development assistance would only be made available to 
countries where elites had the political will and capacity to put in place specified institutional 
and policy reforms that supported markets. For  Chhotray and Hulme, ‘MCA thus, is a tool 
for “pre-emptive” development, which does the reverse of imposing conditionalities, that is, 
it withholds funds until all demands for meeting neo-liberal goals (promoting economic 
freedom and the rest) are met, largely through quantitative forms of measurement’ (Chhotray 
and Hulme 2009: 39-40).  However, as Hout (this volume) points out, there are real limits to 
simply withdrawing from support of various regimes even where they are serial exponents of 
corrupt and repressive forms of rule. The threat of spreading disorder and the abandonment 
of populations to accelerating poverty as well as potentially disturbing the geo-political order 
inhibit governments and aid agencies in the West from declaring governance and institutional 
programmes defunct (Holman 2006).  
 
3. Making do with what is there: supping with the devil 
It is clear that the benign liberal evolution expected by many in the West has not taken place. 
As we have seen in chapter two, in Africa, highly predatory and repressive regimes survive 
even in the ongoing condition of chronic economic decay and spreading poverty. In Asia, 
even the shocks of the Asian Economic Crisis and the efforts by the World Bank and the IMF 
to impose reforms on beleaguered governments as they sought bailouts and rescues has failed 
to radically transform the governance and political regimes of the region. Even in Indonesia, 
where democratic transformation took place, the same oligarchies and power relations 
continue to prevail. In any case, such regimes are now protected from the kind of assaults on 
currencies that precipitated the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s where they possess 
large foreign reserves and, increasingly, substantial sovereign funds able to influence 
investment decisions even in the West itself. What are the options for development 
reformers? One is to provide intensive inputs of development assistance and policy reform 
and let the by-products of institutional reforms and a progressive middle class hopefully take 
care of themselves. This is the thinking that underpinned the ‘shock therapy’ introduced into 
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Eastern Europe, as we have seen. And it appears to inform much of the thinking behind the 
UN Millennium Project (Sachs 2005).    
 
For others, these regimes represent different and historically entrenched institutional 
pathways within which market capitalism itself must be accommodated (Zysman 1994). 
Some economists remain convinced that ‘good governance’ and efficient market institutions 
are not so essential to the consolidation of markets in the early stages at least (Rodrik 2003). 
There is some recognition that even neo-patrimonial forms of governance can possess utility 
in entrenching market economies in developing countries and even, ironically, in lubricating 
markets in the US itself (Brinkerhof and Goldstein 2005). And there is some acceptance of 
the idea that even the worst of regimes from the viewpoint of good governance and economic 
efficiency may indeed be highly functional, at least to the most powerful political and 
economic interests in the country and therefore derive considerable resilience from this 
(Chabal and Delos, 1999). Thus, development organisations have fluctuated between 
bypassing governments to deal with the grass roots via PRSPs and dealing directly with 
governments.  
 
Engage with the Problem of Politics 
a) The World Bank Agenda: Manipulating Politics by Building Better and Cleverer 
Institutions 
In the World Bank, the idea that development and markets themselves might be driven by 
conflicts over power and its distribution has been anathema in this beehive of rational choice 
approaches and methodological individualist assumptions. However, it has also been argued 
in the neo-liberal camp that pressure for reform might be applied on recalcitrant governments 
by civil societies within the developing countries themselves. There was no shortage of moral 
exhortation from within the neo-liberal camp for citizens to take the lead. There should be a, 
“better public understanding of the appropriate role of government” (Duncan and McLeod 
2007: 91), or more good-will or common sense that emphasised the critical role of leadership 
in persuading citizens and subjects to have ‘correct – that is, realistic and empirically-
grounded – beliefs and expectations’ and convincing officials to be honest and citizens to 
trust legal systems and governments (Levi 2006: 12). How would this happen? Are we 
talking about the old modernisation ideas where the West supplied modern culture, values 
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and norms? For the World Bank, such transformations could be achieved via good 
institutional design aimed at providing incentives and opportunities.  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt at political economy analysis by the World Bank 
has been that of Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009). In this study, the authors suggest ways that a 
study of political economy might enable more efficient design of institutions. The idea of 
political economy is focused around collections of individuals and organised groups such as 
the military, political parties, business associations or NGOs. These are divided into 
‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side stakeholders’, or ‘reform champions and ‘reform opponents’ 
or winners, neutrals, and losers’ (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009: 47). They act on behalf of 
multiple, shifting and overlapping interests. The problem is to design institutions that will 
motivate one party (agents) to act on behalf of another (principals), especially to enable 
citizens to motivate politicians to act in the collective interest rather than their own self-
interest or elected officials to motivate bureaucrats to implement policies and provide 
services (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009: 51).  
 
Thus, institutions can be designed to influence the ‘gatekeepers’, ‘veto players’ and 
‘selectorates’ identified by political economy analysis in a kind of game theoretic exercise. In 
other words, this is an idea of political economy based on the presumption of voluntary 
exchanges between rational, utility-maximizing individuals and where there is no system of 
overarching power relations. It continues the basic principles of public choice political 
economy, urging only better institutional design through a more careful analysis of the 
agents, principals and other players in the game as we have noted in chapter four (see also 
World Bank 2003).  
 
In practical terms there are also advantages in trying to influence reform by means of 
institutional engineering and governance, social contracts and new forms of citizenship and 
participation. These avoid the difficulties of directly dealing with potentially incendiary 
issues of power, especially in cases where corruption, social injustice and repression are 
essential elements in the way political allies sustain their authority. The focus on social 
capital and partnerships expresses a pluralist construction of citizens’ demand making. For 
officials in development agencies, programmes of governance and institution building make 
it easy to allocate funds and report outcomes where these focus on the processes of design 
and delivery. Nor is it any exaggeration to say that a vast and growing army of consultants 
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have also been the beneficiaries of trends to outsource policy and devise and measure 
technical fixes to complex economic and social problems. Governance is a highly lucrative 
industry for them (Hamilton-Hart 2006).          
 
b) Is there a Future for the DOC?- attempts to address politics by directly engaging with 
elites and or civil society.  
i)  Incentives are advocated to support the DOC objectives although not in the way 
institutional engineering is used by the World Bank to change behaviour. Unsworth 
and other advocate ways where incentives can be applied by policy actions, including 
those between politicians and potential investors (Unsworth 2009 and Williams et al. 
2009). For example, Unsworth points to the way market leverage has been applied in 
the forestry sector in efforts to eliminate illegal logging and to support the rights of 
forest communities (Unsworth 2009: 888). Perhaps the most widely discussed 
incentives approach concerns the issue of taxation and the proposition that 
governments will be more accountable and responsive where they rely on domestic 
sources for their revenues rather than on windfalls from resources booms and foreign 
aid flows (see, Moore 2001, Moore and Unsworth 2006). Progressive withdrawal from 
aid in favour of targeted assistance in building tax collecting capacity would constitute 
potentially important incentives. Of course, the question here is the extent to which 
those who can be forced into paying tax have the power to influence the government 
and whether the increasing number of governments, especially those in in Africa, that 
now have access to resource rents, would be interested in developing domestic 
revenues.  
ii) David Booth and colleagues have sought to extend the DOC framework through 
‘[a]ssessment of the room to manoeuvre or scope for different outcomes created by 
dynamic aspects of the change process’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: v).  
Influenced by the work of Merilee Grindle, they point to the’ need to devote deliberate 
attention to the otherwise unexplained scope for change ‘against the odds’ and to the 
factors that operate within that space’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: v)i.   
iii) The Leadership Program explores ‘the role of human agency – specifically leadership, 
elites and coalitions – in the process of institution and state building’ (Land 2010: 1). 
Critically, these are to be ‘understood politically’ (de Ver 2008: 1). The Leaders, Elites 
& Coalitions Research Programme (LECRP) has sought to understand the role of 
Conclusion –Where to now? 
140 
leadership in ‘shaping institutions, state building and development outcomes’ 
(Leftwich 2009: 1). Commenced in 2007, the first phase of the program to mid-2009 
was housed within the World Bank, but since then it has been under the wing of 
AusAID. Intending to focus attention on agency and strategy, the concern is with 
leadership as political processes in particular contexts, rather than with the traits or 
behaviours of particular individuals as leaders (ibid). In this sense therefore, leadership 
is not treated ‘as a free-standing virtue’ but as involving the establishment and 
maintenance of coalitions and institutions for particular collective purposes (Leftwich 
2009: 7). However, as applied to advancing donors’ agendas’ it is inevitable that 
“development” is understood in ‘intentional’ terms, as an outcome of political decision 
making if not exactly planning. It is more possible to talk of development in these 
terms if we focus on the outcomes from particular projects or even programs of donors, 
it becomes less possible when we look at development as a process of structural 
transformation.  Viewed in this second way, there are clearly larger questions about the 
nature of development to be answered. 
iv) ‘Building demand from below’. The question is how to put pressure on elites to adopt 
specific reform agendas, including governance reforms. This involves, ‘ … increasing 
the ability of citizens to participate in decisions that affect their lives, to influence how 
development challenges are met and to hold governments or other institutions to 
account.’ (AUSAID 2007a: 1). The idea is generally that this can be done by means of 
institutional reform, including opening opportunities for greater participation and 
accountability in governance (World Bank, see also OECD DAC 2005: 35).   
 
Within the OECD there have been suggestion of direct involvement in strengthening ‘change 
agents’ within the government, civil society, bureaucracy or academia – in other words, 
western-oriented middle classes and business – that may support technocrats (Development 
Assistance Committee 2001: 12). At another level, development agencies began to address 
more direct ways of cultivating and strengthening reform-minded organisations and interests 
as potential partners in reform coalitions. This often meant little more than greater 
collaboration between aid agencies and NGOs and increased flow of aid funds to the latter. 
But there have also been more ambitious ideas for achieving a broader mobilisation and 
organisation of potential reformist allies. In part these were aimed at providing citizens with, 
‘ … information about how government works, what to expect, and how to hold governments 
accountable.’ (AUSAID 2007a: 2). Elsewhere, more direct engagement is proposed, both 
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with institutions that mediate state-society relationships – parliaments and electoral systems – 
and to support and strengthen civil society organisations, including churches, the media, 
research organisations and ‘reform agents’ within both the public and private sectors 
(AUSAID 2007a: 4).   
 
Lessons from Structural Political Economy: Implications from the Case Studies 
 
Given the above attempts to better engage with politics, what is the niche or gap that our 
studies fill? 
At a general level, structural approaches to political economy raise the question of whether 
policy-makers are at the mercy of the structural constraints and processes involved in the 
construction of social power and state authority. Is there any room for intervention that can 
change things? Obviously there are. Some institutional reforms have an important impact 
because they satisfy a preference for reform that has political weight. Economic crises or the 
sudden injection of huge amounts of money into an economy, for example, have the potential 
to change things and disrupt the existing organisation of power and influence in society and 
politics. The point is whether this is going to weaken predatory regimes and strengthen 
reformist coalitions and what control is exerted by outside forces over the direction of 
change? Are attempts to support change agents going to be successful, even where they take 
into account reform leaders need coalitions and organisations to support them (Leftwitch 
2009). The important point is that these are political questions. It is important to ask why 
reformist sympathisers have not already seized and exerted power and why specific regimes 
remain entrenched even in cases where they preside over unhappy populations and derelict 
economies. In some cases, attempts to bring (the right sort of) agency back into the equation 
will fail. Elsewhere they may be more realistic. Structural political economy provides the 
tools to assess this in a way that no other political economy does.   
 
At a more practical level, while it is true that structural understandings of power and society 
point to the limits of policy and institutional fixes for complex problems and suggest that 
there are preconditions for reform that are often beyond the control of development agencies 
and donor countries, one negative benefit of this approach is knowing what not to do. This 
can be more important than appears. For example, an appreciation of structural political 
economy will make it fairly easy to predict where the disbursement of funds or use of 
Conclusion –Where to now? 
142 
property rights – including over land and forestry – as a means of solving various 
development problems will simply be expropriated to concentrate inequalities and support 
vested interests. In these cases a decision not to proceed can be the best one. Or highly 
engineered processes for the allocation and operation of these rights may be designed.  
Some of the more specific conclusions form the case studies are as follows:  
1)   we consider how ‘donors can better know how their programs are interpreted by 
recipients, how this affects their alliances (or not) and, accordingly, how formal and 
informal shifts in alliances can strengthen or weaken different ideological perspectives, 
over short and long terms’ (Hughes and Hutchison, this volume). This is done also with 
an understanding of change dynamics.  
2)   we focus on issues around donors’ engagement with civil society actors. One point 
arising is that if donors are to be more politically engaged then they will need to give 
ground on their own agendas and recognise the ways in which development objectives 
are framed differently on the ground, often as a result of particular enduring struggles.  
 
The Cambodian Case 
The Demand For Good Governance programme in Cambodia represents a good example of a 
programme designed to meet the needs of donor politics rather than tailored to fit the needs 
of the target country. The programme served a number of purposes for the World Bank, 
including a concern to bolster the Bank’s reputation amongst Cambodian NGOs which had 
vocally criticised the Bank’s land, forestry and demobilization programmes; and a concern to 
promote the DFGG model which had been successfully deployed elsewhere.  Consequently 
reservations expressed by staff members with local knowledge were overridden in the 
concern to get the programme off the ground.  The significance of these kinds of imperatives 
are widely recognised within the aid industry, but until now they have not been factored into 
political economy analyses in a sophisticated way. 
 
Just as aid organisations design aid programmes with regard to unstated as well as stated 
goals, so too do local partners participate in them on the same basis.  Our model of dedicated 
and tactical alliances suggests an initial vocabulary for distinguishing between different types 
of reformer, based upon whether their goals are primarily about the nature of reform itself, or 
about the building of political alliances.  Recognition that investment in tactically useful 
relationships may be a goal in itself represents a recognition that alliances for reform are 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM  
13 - 14 DECEMBER, 2010 
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY, PERTH 
 
143 
continually negotiated and renegotiated and that this in itself requires deployment of 
resources and effort on the part of all development partners. 
 
Recognition, not only that a tactical element exists for all organizations and actors involved 
in aid programming, but that this tactical element is a significant and important part of the 
development process, represents a starting point for moving away for a model of ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ in terms of stated development outcomes, and towards a model of engagement 
that regards the maintenance of political alliances as useful in itself.  However, the analysis 
we present also warns against regarding such political alliances as a vehicle for achieving 
reform in the short term.  As the US experience in promoting the Clean Hands Campaign in 
Phnom Penh shows, simply backing a weak alliance against a powerful elite with a strong 
interest in preventing certain types of reform can be counter-productive. 
 
The Cambodian experience across a range of fields of development programming suggests 
that international interventions are continually turned to the advantage of a predatory elite in 
its apparently unstoppable consolidation of power.  A structuralist analysis suggests that 
fundamental change is in any case only possible in times of crisis, when the investment in 
particular alliances and the propagation of particular ideas can suddenly provide an 
opportunity to influence events.  This implies that development agencies dealing with 
governance need to rethink their understanding of reform: genuine reform can only occur 
when ruling elites are severely weakened and seeking new ways of boosting legitimacy, or 
when new social forces are contending with established political alliances for power.  
Consequently, institutional reforms, of the kind that governance programmes have focused 
upon, are inevitably going to be either blocked or co-opted unless they are promoted in times 
of crisis. Structuralist approaches thus locate change within time frames that are far longer 
than most donor programmes will admit.  Attempts to wedge political economy analyses into 
short time frames, that align with the budgetary cycles and staff deployment cycles of donor 
agencies, have entailed a superficial engagement with the idea of structural change. Taking 
political economy seriously requires recognising that the short term reform efforts that 
characterise most donor programmes are contained within the contingencies of political 
negotiations between interested alliances of actors, rather than transforming these.  The 
Cambodia case described here shows how reform programmes can be established with the 
mutual agreement of a variety of partners, despite lack of agreement on the desirability of 
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change.  For the Ministry of Interior it represents a way of enlisting the World Bank and 
NGOs in the delicate business of supervising newly elected subnational councils with newly 
devolved powers, and ensuring that the process of de-concentration of power not only 
effectively mobilizes the voters to greater election winning effect, but does not upset the 
hierarchies of loyalty and patronage that characterise Cambodian People’s Party Control.  For 
NGOs it represents a way of networking internationally with social accountability groups and 
developing a relationship with a powerful donor that could help them in the future.  Even for 
the local World Bank office, there is doubt over the achievability of the programme’s reform 
goals, but awareness that the programme could help the Bank build better relations with 
NGOs who have been critical of the Bank’s past interventions in forestry and land titling. 
Temporary and tactical motives – an interest in new modes of political mobilization on the 
part of the Cambodian government; a concern to invest in relations with the World Bank on 
the part of NGOs – can allow a programme to get off the ground with no real belief or 
intention that its reform goals will be met. 
 
Moreover, taking structuralist analysis seriously suggests that the instutionalisation of reform 
processes cannot of its self generate progressive outcomes, since the functioning of 
institutions is determined by political struggles within society.  From a structuralist 
perspective, therefore, it is unsurprising that donor programmes of institution building are 
harnessed by existing or rising elites, rather than unseating them.  World Bank programmes 
targeting natural resource distribution in Cambodia offer a good example of this.  Forestry 
programmes intended to ensure good governance of natural resources were far less important 
in determining distributions of wealth from forest resources than the fact of the integration of 
Cambodia into regional and global timber markets.  Once the latter was accomplished, elites 
within Cambodia competed for control of the profits from these, and used those profits to 
further strengthen their position within the political regime.  A similar phenomenon was 
observable in the land sector.  A World Bank programme designed to provide equal access to 
land titles for rich and poor was undermined by the impossibility of the programme’s 
institutions operating impartially in areas such as the capital city where land values were very 
high and the target of elite struggles.  The World Bank decided to avoid implementing its 
project in these areas, and attracted significant criticism from NGOs representing evicted 
families, who pointed out in failing to tackle that section of the poor most at risk of 
dispossession, the Bank’s programme resembled the emperor with no clothes. 
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In the short term, donor agencies are better advised to focus not on achieving fundamental 
transformations in the nature of power, but in understanding and developing a language for 
discussing it with local actors.  Taking this approach suggests that the DFGG programme will 
be of greatest use, both to the Bank, would-be reformers in the Ministry of Interior, and the 
NGOs that have trained through the PECSA programme, if its goals remain, in fact, rather 
vague, and if the focus of the programme is upon developing relationships rather than 
achieving particular results. 
 
The need to develop a common language for discussing questions of governance is pressing.  
As the DFGG programme shows, mistranslations or the transposition of donor terminology 
into quite different ideological frameworks can significantly change the import of reform 
programmes.  The DFGG programme also shows how such mistranslations can be 
convenient to aid agencies whose ulterior motive is not reform per se but the building of new 
relationships.  The DFGG programme, and the case of Cambodia more generally, also 
demonstrates how time consuming and expensive, in terms of resources, the doublespeak 
associated with governance reform can be.  Both government and NGOs in Cambodia devote 
considerable time and resources to developing cadres of officials who have the language 
skills and training to be able to converse and report in a language that is familiar and 
convenient for donors.  However, there is little evidence that either government or NGOs 
have developed a capacity to translate this meaningfully into a conversation with the 
Cambodian population.  On the contrary, the narrative of reform and development which 
Cambodian government officials and NGO workers use in their relations with poor villagers 
connects poorly, if at all, with the narrative that is sustained in Phnom Penh when conversing 
with donors.  This puts a great deal of pressure on individuals caught in the middle, in trying 
to maintain a coherent sense of their own role.  It also has the effect of professionalising 
reform activists and distancing them from the average citizen, an effect that has been noted in 
a number of studies of the NGO-ization of social movements emerging in the fields of fishery 
and land disputes in Cambodia. 
 
Analysis of the DFGG programme illustrates two aspects of this.  The first relates to the 
relationship between donors and government.  The analysis presented here suggests that the 
agreement between the World Bank and the Ministry of Interior on the establishment of the 
programme rests upon a mutually convenient mistranslation of its aims.  For the Ministry of 
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Interior, reform is focused upon mobilizing wider participation and using NGOs and villagers 
trained in social accountability techniques as a means to manage a complex and politically 
risky process of deconcentration of state power away from central ministries to provincial 
and district levels.  Contrary to liberal assumptions, all available evidence suggests that the 
Ministry of Interior conceptualises this as reform designed to renew and further strengthen 
the legitimacy of CPP dominance, rather than as a way of opening up political competition 
within local government.  This embeds a particular model of development which is in many 
ways antithetical to either liberal politics or liberal economics, as described in chapter x 
above. 
 
Given the trajectory of Cambodia’s development since 1979, and the lack of success of 
Western donors in imposing liberal models via funding for armed insurgency in the 1980s, a 
complex peace-keeping operation in the early 1990s, and subsequent efforts at statebuilding 
and support for civil society, it is unrealistic to expect that these attitudes within the Ministry 
of Interior could possibly be reformed via manipulation of aid mechanisms. The way in 
which Cambodia has integrated into the regional and global economy since the early 1990s 
has strengthened, rather than weakening, these tendencies in Cambodian politics.  Donors are 
increasingly recognising this: the implication is that engagement in governance in Cambodia 
implies relinquishing the rather hopeless goal of achieving reform within a time frame of a 
few years, and investing instead in developing a body of knowledge about the nature of the 
Cambodian government.  Agencies such as the World Bank tend to be staffed by a mixture of 
career officials from head office, who move from country to country and do not build up a 
body of local knowledge; contract staff employed for their country expertise, but in 
subordinate and temporary positions; and local staff, who are usually selected for their 
knowledge of international development models.  This hierarchy entails that much World 
Bank programming entails eliciting such information about the local context as is necessary 
to facilitate the roll-out of international programmes, rather than using local knowledge to set 
the agenda for reform.     
   
Shifting emphasis away from returns on the aid dollar and towards a ‘knowledge’ model 
where aid agencies build up specialist country teams and develop country-specific 
vocabularies for engaging in negotiations on the nature of reform and development would 
appear to be a prerequisite for an approach informed by political economy.  This implies 
openness on the part of aid agencies to not only the conceptualization of reform, but also the 
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operational hierarchies within agencies, and the nature of the aid bureaucrat’s career and 
function.  Replacing the generalist familiar with standardized templates for aid programming 
with a specialist prepared to learn local languages and spend years in-country establishing 
relationships with local political players is a prerequisite for an approach that puts politics at 
the centre of development.  Such an approach could give substance to the claims of 
‘partnership’ that are currently popular in development thinking.  Our analysis suggests 
further that taking this approach seriously requires some political commitment to particular 
social forces or alliances.  The technocratic approach has allowed avoidance of such political 
commitments on the basis that certain policies are objectively correct, regardless of who 
implements them.  The political economy approach suggests that relationships be elevated 
over policies, and that local knowledge and priorities be allowed to influence aid 
programming: this implies a shift to a solidarity model of decision-making for aid agencies, a 
principled commitment to support for particular groups and for the preservation of particular 
types of political space in which local political struggles can play out, even in situations 
where it is acknowledged that such an approach is unlikely to result in short term ‘success’ in 
achieving reform. 
 
Where to on slums in Metro Manila?  
The case study of the ADB’s slum eradication program in Metro Manila shows how attempts 
to “incentivise” public officials to undertake pro-poor reforms will prove inadequate if they 
do not directly address how these officials interpret what is proposed and how this connects 
to their structural interests and alliances. The program’s incentives assume that LGUs are 
predisposed to meet their service obligations, so long as they are provided with appropriate 
know-how and resources. But, as the study shows, local government officials have rather 
different visions and plans for urban development and socialised housing. Nevertheless, 
slums are not merely a physical consequence of material poverty. They are in fact the 
product of social and political relationships that – especially in a capital city like Metro 
Manila – extend from local to national levels, through linkages variously created by 
institutional requirements, electoral cycles, ideological commitments, and/or collective 
organising. These relationships have reproduced inequalities, but as well, under certain 
conditions, they have delivered concessions to the urban poor  – occasionally in the form of 
national programs, legislation and new modes of representation (Hutchison 2007), but more 
often more through site-specific political deals and/or standoffs.  
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There are three points worth making about concessions. One is that they are forced and 
therefore require further pressure and effort to secure implementation and compliance. 
Another is that concessions are as much directed at placating and/or containing pro-poor 
protest as they are at delivering on the substance of pro-poor demands. Finally, because 
concessions are forced they do not come at any time, they are generally linked to other 
pressures or openings in prevailing power relationships which are created by (to cite some 
examples) electoral conditions, infrastructure developments, donor funding and/or supportive 
alliances.  
 
One urban poor activist suggests that the ADB should be looking to ‘do deals with the 
mayors’ because this is ‘the only way to get them on side’ (Interview 2006). Critically, deals 
are not incentives. The incentives approach seeks behavioural change so it has to hope that 
opponents’ motivations and interests are essentially malleable. By contrast, the move to 
make deals accepts that interests are relatively enduring and not likely to change; 
nevertheless, deals are possible if opposing sides have appropriate bargaining strengths. 
(Concessions tend to follow when inequalities are greater.) In other words, from deals it is 
possible to achieve “tactical” rather than “dedicated” support for reform. They do not deliver 
a fundamental change in power relations, but do provide a way to negotiate politically. It is 
not clear what deals international donors might be actually willing and able to make, but it 
most likely they will need to be coordinated between donors, in the case of slums, perhaps 
through the Cities Alliance. That said, it is unlikely that deals can be done without further 
domestic political pressures.  
 
What are the prospects for building a reform constituency among Metro Manila’s urban 
poor? If the reform is the ADB program itself, the answer is ‘little’. This is because, despite 
the program embodying real attempts to ensure compliance with legislation that was an 
outcome of urban poor advocacy, it is clear there is little or no effective “demand from 
below” for it in its present form. This is not because the urban poor’s shelter needs are not 
great; instead it is that that there just has not been the support forthcoming for the ADB’s 
proposed solutions. The informal settler communities targeted early in the program have 
declined to sign up to the shelter arrangements on offer because they consider them to be 
unaffordable. On the whole, communities have demonstrated greater support for measures to 
increase land tenure security, without the inclusion of purpose-built housing. For one, a 
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concern about purpose-build housing is that it is too inflexible because it is not possible to 
build-on to accommodate additional family members and/or renters. More particularly, there 
is often significant reluctance to taking on (more) debt. Widely couched negatively, as the 
urban poor thus seeking to avoid their responsibilities, this reluctance can also be seen to 
indicate household preferences for a range of shelter and livelihood strategies – a number of 
which neo-liberal efforts to bring poor households into formal land and financial markets 
will foreclose.  
 
This is not to say that the mobilisation of pro-poor forces should be constrained by the 
present, but it does indicate where their priorities lie. The point is that urban poor protest is 
neither as continuous nor as formally organised around a city-scale set of demands as 
international donors’ might prefer. On top of this, the politics of Metro Manila’s slums is 
quite complex. There are identifiable individuals, organisations and alliances with histories 
of urban poor activism – and associated victories – but these do not cover the sum total of 
urban poor political engagement. It is worth pointing out, however, that urban poor protest is 
generally not particularly driven by ideology, at least not in the sense of adherence to defined 
manifestos or parties. Critics have portrayed the urban poor consequently as ‘political 
clients’, but it is important to stress this misconstrues the nature and form of their demand-
making – both the extent to which it is oriented to real outcomes and is far more 
confrontational than patron-client models portray. On the whole, urban poor NGOs 
themselves are “pragmatists” rather than “idealists” – that is they have long term goals of 
social transformation but also regard short term gains as significant (see Hughes and 
Hutchison, this volume). This means that they are open to engagement with international 
donors, although not always in ways that donors have previously tried. For example, NGOs 
have sought alliances with more powerful others – for example the Catholic Church – at least 
partly to provide a greater level of  protection from harassment and violence.  
If donors are to seek to engage with “demands from below” they will need to do so from the 
vantage point of  how power works on the ground. The “power cube” approach is one. To 
quote Gaventa: ‘In this approach, I argued, power must be understood in relation to how 
spaces for engagement are created, the levels of power (from local to global), as well as 
different forms of power across them. By applying such analysis, I argued, we could begin to 
assess the possibilities of transformative action in new democratic spaces, and how 
transformative possibilities of citizen action might be enlarged.’ (Gaventa 2005: 6):  
Conclusion –Where to now? 
150 
Attention to the spaces – ‘opportunities, moments and channels’ (Gaventa 2005: 11) – for 
change suggest a way forward that incorporates structural political economy, more than a 
focus on the agents of change.  
 
The Urban Informal Sector in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
 Centeno and Portes have argued that “the relationship between the state and civil society 
defines the character of informality and this relationship is in constant flux”, adding “the 
changing geometry of formal/informal economic activities follows the contours delineated 
by past history and the character of state authority” (Centeno and Portes 2006: 32).  
Applying this proposition to the case of the urban informal sector in Jakarta, the hostile 
approach adopted by the Jakarta administration suggests that authoritarian and centralist 
tendencies remain well entrenched, despite the introduction of minimal participatory 
channels and informal recognition of the sectors importance to the economic and social 
wellbeing of the city. The protection racket type mentality institutionalized during the New 
Order still prevails, which sees the informal sector as economic transactions ‘where the state 
neither provides protection nor receives a cut’, making conflict all but inevitable. At the 
same time the regulatory capacity of the state is limited: it is neither able to exert a monopoly 
over territory by effectively controlling the presence of the UIS, ameliorate the conditions 
producing its expansion nor, when intent is present, regulate and mediate the interests of 
private capital by shaping the direction of urban development in ways accommodative of 
UIS activity and the poor more generally.  
 
One fundamental problem that continues to inhibit the development of effective management 
and incorporation of the UIS in Jakarta is the persistence amongst political elites of static 
ideas regarding urban development itself. From Sukarno’s vision of Jakarta as a ‘city of 
greatness’ to former governor Ali Sadikin’s notion of a ‘modern metropolis’ devoid of “non 
modern elements” such as becak rickshaws and Sutiyoso’s Singapore inspired 
criminalization of ‘disorderly’ street life, successive political leaders have remained fixated 
upon what Kusno refers to as ‘nationalist urbanism’. Jakarta, as the nation’s capital, must be 
seen to reflect national prestige and state power through appropriate forms of ‘modern 
development’, discipline and order, despite this being seemingly at odds with the social and 
economic needs and realities of a large percentage of the city’s population. The result has 
been the emergence of two faces to Jakarta: relatively spacious arterial roads lined with 
luxury hotels, high-rise office buildings, shopping malls and elevated highways 
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(infrastructure reflective of the dominant class) which masks, displaces or simply passes over 
crowded shanty towns, poor kampung and traffic jammed side streets and alleyways, with 
the boundaries and spaces of intersection between the two a constantly shifting zone of 
conflict and contestation between state and society. As Rukmana has argued, “many of the 
problems associated with the informal sector are not attributes inherent to the informal sector 
but manifestations of unresponsive urban planning itself”. In this particular image of Jakarta 
as a modern and orderly city the UIS have no legitimate place, out of place elements 
constituting an eyesore unbefitting a modern capital, the urban street transformed into a site 
of disturbance, disorder and criminality in the face of an ideal type ‘development’ 
increasingly shaped by the consumption patterns and lifestyle preferences of a growing upper 
middle-class. While faced with a very different socio-political environment to that of Ali 
Sadikin, including the Asian Economic Crisis induced ‘forced entrepreneurship’ of tens of 
thousands of Jakarta residents, including many from the middle-class, post New Order 
governors Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo have nonetheless continued his uncompromising 
approach in relation to the UIS despite holding, in principle, the legally mandated authority 
(such as via Regional Regulation No.5 1978) to designate it legitimate space in which to 
operate. More recently increasing public debate and frustration over the seemingly 
unsustainable nature of Jakarta’s current development trajectories has led not to a 
fundamental rethink at top levels as to how better manage and govern urban space, but rather 
an ‘escape plan’ entailing moving the nation’s capital elsewhere. These entrenched 
conceptualizations of the image of the city and its future development cannot be divorced 
from the particular configurations of interests that benefit from them. With a surplus of high-
end department stores, shopping malls and luxury housing, Jakarta has reached a virtual 
saturation point of development shaped by the interests of private developers, property 
moguls and political elites, with the ever increasing numbers of UIS workers literally 
cramming into the cracks and shadows between these mega-projects.  
 
Where to from here: recommendations  
With these obstacles and constraints in mind, the following are a number of practical, 
strategic and conceptual recommendations that can be potentially considered by government, 
donors and civil society stakeholders to tackle some of the issues identified: 
 
For government and donors: 
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1. The establishment of an Office of Street Traders Affairs (DINAS PKL) within the 
Jakarta administration whose central task is the development of strategies for finding 
equitable/integrative solutions for accommodating UIS workers. In order to be 
effective such an agency needs to cooperate closely with other relevant government 
bodies, such as Office of regional Planning and Development (Bappeda) and Satpol 
PP. The case of Solo offers an example of a successful precedent. A parliamentary 
commission into the UIS must also be a top priority.  
2. It is crucial that the UIS is given a greater level of official and legal recognition as the 
statistically predominant economic sector from which Jakarta residents (also 
nationally) make a livelihood, including its importance to the stability of the formal 
sector. It is necessary for the administration and donors to re-think predominant 
conceptualizations of the UIS, and the nature of ‘urban development’ more broadly, 
embracing the sector as a productive and dynamic one rather than as a social problem 
or a ‘formal sector in waiting’.  
3. Greater enforcement of existing regulations which are accommodative of the UIS is 
required together tighter regulating of future development.  Considering the huge drain 
on public resources created by its enforcement, a review of the socio-economic impact 
of the 2007 Public Order Law is required. This needs to be coupled with serious 
attempts to tackle corruption and abuses of power within enforcement and planning 
agencies, in particular the Satpol PP. The substantial financial resources allocated to 
Satpol PP could be reassigned to incentive and consultative based alternatives. This 
could include the creation of incentives for developers to incorporate space for the UIS.  
4. A focus upon integrative and inclusive approaches to planning i.e. specified operating 
hours, street side expansions and a revised concept of Green Zoning which integrates 
with existing residential zones and informal economic activity. To be sustainable those 
affected must be meaningfully involved in the planning process. In this respect the 
example of Solo again offers a potential model to be adapted to Jakarta’s particular 
conditions.  
5. Further revisions to the participatory mechanisms of the Musrenbang process in order 
to facilitate greater grassroots and community based input. In particular there needs to 
be a consideration of ways by which representative decision making power can be 
allocated to civil society participants and community stakeholders, such as is found in 
the Local development Councils model adopted in the Philippines.  
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6. Accommodation and integration of the UIS into city planning should be seen as an 
integral element of broader poverty reduction strategies.  
7. An expansion of ‘rural growth poles’ implemented by the national government, 
whereby jobs, housing and public services are provided in certain rural areas to reduce 
rates of rural-urban migration.  
 
For NGOs, advocacy and sectoral groups 
1. The dissemination of successful local strategies from fragments of activity into city wide 
strategic plans for more broad based lobbying of the Jakarta administration (and political 
parties and national government) via a coalition/strategic alliance of relevant NGOs and 
vendor associations, residents groups etc. Pressure needs to be applied to national 
government to turn informal acknowledgement of the UIS into concrete policy and action. 
2. A multi-level advocacy approach at the highest and lowest levels of government 
simultaneously. This is both a local and a national issue, which will only continue to 
increase in the future without suitable sustainable policies. 
3. Further engagement with existing participatory forums such as Musrenbang and local 




i Grindle (1991) observes that neoclassical political economy does not explain change and how it 
occurs, when it does. She recommends that we study “critical moments when change occurs, 
for such moments reveal essential political dynamics at work in a society” (Grindle, 1991: 63).  
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